Balancing Self-Rule and Shared-Rule: Sources of Tensions and Political Responses in Contemporary Political Systems

Abstract

Federalism is a compromise between shared-rule and self-rule. As such, federal systems are rarely free of tensions since they involve an often delicate balancing act between ‘territorial integration’ and autonomy. This paper identifies and discusses three important sources of tensions stemming from the friction between shared-rule and self-rule elements in contemporary federal systems. A first source of tension are claims for recognition, often involving references to a right to self-determination, which are typically met with some resistance from the central state. We look at the case of Canada to illuminate both the problems and the possibilities raised by these types of claims. A second source of tension is the territorial redistribution of financial resources, either through centrally funded programs or through schemes of equalization. Here, we discuss the dynamics involved in the politics of social security in Belgium and in the politics of equalization in Australia and Canada. A third source of tension revolves around claims from constituent units to have a voice internationally and to play a role in the definition of the state’s international position on matter where they are domestically competent, which are met by state responses exhibiting varying degrees of accommodation. In this context, we discuss the cases of Belgium, Canada, the United States, and Germany.