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Game Theoretic Modeling in Environmental and Resource Economics

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Handbook of Regional Science

Abstract

We cover applications of game theory in environmental and resource economics with a particular emphasis on noncooperative transboundary pollution and resource games. Both flow and stock pollutants are considered. Equilibrium concepts in static and dynamic games are reviewed. We present an application of game theoretical tools related to the formation and sustainability of cooperation in transboundary pollution games. We discuss the analytical tools relevant for the case of a stock pollutant and offer an application related to the optimal institutional arrangement to regulate a pollutant when several jurisdictions are involved.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and CIREQ, McGill University, 855 Rue Sherbrooke Ouest, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Prof. Hassan Benchekroun & Dr. Ngo Van Long

Authors
  1. Prof. Hassan Benchekroun
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  2. Dr. Ngo Van Long
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hassan Benchekroun .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Economic Geography and GIScience, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria

    Manfred M. Fischer

  2. and Business Administration Department of Spatial Economics, Free University Faculty of Economics, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Peter Nijkamp

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Benchekroun, H., Long, N.V. (2014). Game Theoretic Modeling in Environmental and Resource Economics. In: Fischer, M., Nijkamp, P. (eds) Handbook of Regional Science. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23430-9_52

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23430-9_52

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23429-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-23430-9

  • eBook Packages: Business and Economics

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