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Function-Dependent Commitments for Verifiable Multi-party Computation

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Information Security (ISC 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11060))

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Abstract

In cloud computing, delegated computing raises the security issue of guaranteeing data authenticity during a remote computation. Existing solutions do not simultaneously provide fast correctness verification, strong security properties, and information-theoretic confidentiality. We introduce a novel approach, in the form of function-dependent commitments, that combines these strengths. We also provide an instantiation of function-dependent commitments for linear functions that is unconditionally, i.e. information-theoretically, hiding and relies on standard hardness assumptions. This powerful construction can for instance be used to build verifiable computing schemes providing information-theoretic confidentiality. As an example, we introduce a verifiable multi-party computation scheme for shared data providing public verifiability and unconditional privacy towards the servers and parties verifying the correctness of the result. Our scheme can be used to perform verifiable computations on secret shares while requiring only a single party to compute the audit data for verification. Furthermore, our verification procedure is asymptotically even more efficient than performing operations locally on the shared data. Thus, our solution improves the state of the art for authenticated computing, verifiable computing and multi-party computation.

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Acknowledgments

This work has been co-funded by the DFG as part of project “Long-Term Secure Archiving” within CRC 1119 CROSSING. It has also received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under Grant Agreement 644962.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Lucas Schabhüser, Denis Butin, Denise Demirel & Johannes Buchmann

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  1. Lucas Schabhüser
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  2. Denis Butin
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  3. Denise Demirel
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  4. Johannes Buchmann
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Correspondence to Lucas Schabhüser .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom

    Liqun Chen

  2. University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom

    Mark Manulis

  3. University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom

    Steve Schneider

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Schabhüser, L., Butin, D., Demirel, D., Buchmann, J. (2018). Function-Dependent Commitments for Verifiable Multi-party Computation. In: Chen, L., Manulis, M., Schneider, S. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11060. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_16

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