Abstract
Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM), the woman pioneer of the realistic phenomenological school, describes the reality (Realität) to which her philosophizing is addressed as “totally non-material corporeality”. With this contradictory expression she seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality: the spatial that achieved material realization in real existents and the concealed non-spatial that is at the cradle of the establishing of reality and remains present behind its phenomenal and material appearing. This article focuses on three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality—“essence”, “abyss”, and “self”—whose meaning both implies and raises the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in a complex manner. Moreover, the three seek the same objective of coming to terms with the force in real beings that will never ever be able to shine in its entirety. By means of philosophical explication of the mentioned elements and the illumination of the dialectic of each of them with the corresponding spatial aspects, this article demonstrates the evolution of HCM's understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole.
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Notes
- 1.
References to HCM ’s works appear in parentheses in the body text without an author’s name, using the abbreviation which is listed in the References. The earlier year within square brackets in the References signifies the year of composition, while the later year is the year of publication. All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original. References to the works of other authors appear in parentheses using the author, year format.
- 2.
HCM is an outstanding figure in the early phenomenological school, later called “The Munich Circle,” which consolidated around Edmund Husserl in the 1920s in Gӧttingen. The circle included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of phenomenologists, whose prominent members were Alexander Pfänder , Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger , Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach , Dietrich von Hildebrand , Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler , Jean Hering , Alexander Koyré , Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein , and Hedwig Conrad-Martius . For further reading about the circle, see Avé-Lallemant (1971, 19–38).
- 3.
See also Doctrine: 430, 450, 452–455, 464–465, 471, 474, 514.
- 4.
For further reading, see Miron (2014).
- 5.
See Hering (1921).
- 6.
HCM realizes this path in Doctrine of Appearance that is focused on the study of the modes of appearing of the external world before the senses . In this treatise, reality is regarded as realized in the external space (Doctrine, 423) which is at the same time the realm for objectivity (Doctrine, 373), for objects of perception (Doctrine, 372) depicted as “transcendent to perception space’s parts” (wahrnehmungstranszendente Raumstücke) (Doctrine, 381). HCM uses various expressions for this understanding of spatiality: “space reality (Raumwirklichkeit) of objectivity”; see Doctrine: 373, 375, 377, 379, 381, 392–395; space world or real space world (reale Raumwelt), see Doctrine: 373, 381, 392, 394, 436–437; space sphere, see Doctrine: 383, 395); “space position” or “position of the space of reality (Raumwirklichkeitstelle), see Doctrine: 367, 374, 393; and spatial place (Rämlicher Platz) (Doctrine, 433).
- 7.
Husserl ’s method of essence intuition was common to the early phenomenologists of the Gӧttingen and the Munich Circle. HCM mentioned this method in many contexts; see Doctrine, 346–348, 355 note 1; Real, 159; Spekulation, 377; Wesen, 347. In the literature, there is usually an emphasis on the influence of Husserl ’s criticism of psychologism upon the early realist phenomenologists, which is apparent in their adoption of this method; see Husserl (1970a, §§ 1–7, 165–179, 2012, §§ 1–17, 9–33). For further reading on the method of essence intuition in relation to the realistic school of phenomenology , see Hart (1972, 39–40), Reinach (1951, 71–73), Pfänder (1913), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25).
- 8.
For further reading, see Miron (2016).
- 9.
Taken from Conrad-Martius ’ lecture at the conference of the Distinguished Service Cross in March 1958. The lecture was not published, but a transcription of it exists in the Munich Estate Archive. See Conrad-Martius (1958). The quote is taken from Pfeiffer (2008, 448) (my translation). The issue of achieving the phenomenological approach also occupied other members of the Munich Circle; see Avé-Lallemant (1971, 62–73).
- 10.
In this context, the subjective experience refers to the plain of the natural attitude described as follows: “I am aware of a world, spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, without end. I am aware of it, that means, first of all, I discover it immediately, intuitively. I experience it. Through sight, touch, hearing, etc., in the different ways of sensory perception, corporeal things somehow spatially disturbed are for me simply there […] whether or not I pay them special attention” (Husserl 2012, §27, 51). At the same time, Husserl observed the issue of spatiality from transcendental point of view that is anchored in the distinction between primary and secondary qualities of bodily things, thanks to which the mere spatial appearance of things refers to “something that transcend the whole content of the thing as present to us in bodily form. It cannot therefore mean even the thing as lying in natural sensible space. In other words, its physical space cannot be the space of the world of bodily perception” or “what Is given in perception as corporeal reality , which is given exclusively through its sensory determinations” (Husserl 2012, §40, 75).
- 11.
Husserl established: “To ideal space belongs, for us, a universal, systematically coherent a priori, an infinite, and yet—in spite of its infinity—self-enclosed, coherent systematic theory which, proceeding from axiomatic concepts and propositions, permits the deductively univocal construction of any conceivable shape which can be drawn in space. What ‘exists’ ideally in geometric space is univocally decided, in all its determinations, in advance? Our apodictic thinking, proceeding stepwise to infinity through concepts, propositions, inferences, proofs, only ‘discovers’ what is already there, what in itself already exists in truth,” Husserl (1970b, §8, 22). See also Husserl (2012, §§149–150, 311–318).
- 12.
This orientation was inspired by Husserl ’s famous appeal “to return to the things themselves” (Husserl 1970a, §4, 172, §6, 174–175). This saying is widely discussed (see Seifert 1995; Kuhn 1969). However, the realistic emphasis on the “object” implied the reconsideration of the idea of “intention” in its shape in Husserl ’s Logical Investigations. Moriz Geiger well characterized this orientation as follows: “Wenn die Zeit vorher fast allgemein die Gegenstände als Vorstellungen eines Ich ansah, so trat jetzt die Spannung zwischen Ich und Objekt wieder in ihr Recht. Das Gegenüber von Ich und Objekt und die Überwindung der Spannung—nicht durch Hineinnahme des Objekts in das Subjekt, sondern durch den Begriff der gegenstandsgerichteten Intention—das gab dem Aufbau der unmittelbar gegebenen Welt einen anderen Aspekt” (Geiger 1933, 13). See also Becker (1930), Vendrell-Ferran (2008, 71–78).
- 13.
See Avé-Lallemant (1965/66, 207). The early phenomenologists were inspired by Husserl ’s struggle in Logical Investigations against psychologism, relativism, and varying reductionism, and in particular by his principle that it is possible to observe consciousness ’ condition apart from the thinking subject. See also Walther (1955), Schmücker (1956, 31). HCM admits the influence of Logical Investigations on her; see HCM , Doctrine, 355.
- 14.
For the “semblance of reality ” typical of perception’s objects, see also Doctrine, 380.
- 15.
- 16.
See Husserl (1977, §34, 69–72, §60, 139–140).
- 17.
Husserl described “a certain noematic ‘nucleus’ from the changing ‘characters’ that belongs to it, whereby the noema in its fullest specification appears drawn into the stream of modifications of various kinds. This nucleus […] stood out [abheben] intuitively as a unity, and sufficiently clearly to enable us to concern ourselves with it in a general way” (Husserl 2012, §129, 269). At the same time, the idea of nucleus is mentioned in Husserl ’s discussions of subjectivity, in his words: “To the one object we attach a variety of modes of consciousness , acts or act-noemata. […] sundry act-noemata have everywhere here a variety of nuclei, yet so that, despite this fact , they close up together in an identical unity, a unity in which the “something,” the determinable which lies concealed in every nucleus, is consciously grasped as self-identical” (Husserl 2012, §131, 273).
- 18.
See also, HCM , Real, 205–206. For further references to the idea of manifest surface , see Real, 194, 206–209, 214, 235–236.
- 19.
See also HCM , Wesen, 347–348.
- 20.
At this point, HCM ’s reliance on Husserl ’s thesis of the rationality is apparent; see Husserl (2012, §136–137, §139, §142).
- 21.
The term “bearer” has several occurrences already in Doctrine of Appearance (1916), usually as a character of the I (HCM , Doctrine, 482), of the spirit (Doctrine, 407, 514), of the senses (Doctrine, 497–498), or of the body (Doctrine, 525–526), and not as an ontological creature that accompanies the essence .
- 22.
HCM clarifies in this context that the phenomenon ’s standing on its essence is not equivalent to its objectivity, to its autonomy in its existence, or to its independency (Real, 180). This clarification is important considering her earlier discussion in Doctrine of Appearance, in which she positions the aspect of autonomy in existence as fundamental in the idea of reality (Doctrine, 392). However, in Realontologie this aspect is regarded as insufficient (Real, 162). It seems that objectivity and absoluteness are considered as insufficient since they can relate solely to formal and ideal existence and lack the capability for spatial realization that is inherent in HCM ’s discussion of non-spatiality.
- 23.
However, it should be noted that in Realontologie, HCM ’s dealing with the issue of reality is free from affinity to actual fulfillment. This enables many of her arguments regarding the real being to be applicable also to the ideal one. Thus, she holds that regarding the inseparability of the essence and the bearer (Real, 170) there exists “equality in meaning between the ideal side and the real one” (Real, 162).
- 24.
The early phenomenologists understood Husserl ’s appeal “to return to the things themselves” as indifference toward epistemological questions (see U. Avé-Lallemant 1965/66, 207). HCM characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (HCM , Doctrine, 347). The argument that the epistemological emphasis is bound with pushing the ontological is typical of the Munich-Gӧttingen School; see, for example, von Hildebrand (1976, 141). Likewise, HCM seems to connect between the idealistic supreme emphasis on “pure generality” that proved itself as a powerful tool in achieving epistemological meanings and its typical pushing aside of ontological elements; see HCM , Dasein .
- 25.
This is apparent in the study of the external world whose real existence is depicted as an absolute and independent being (Seinselbstständigkeit), autonomous and absolute (Doctrine, 391–392), closed in itself and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (Doctrine, 424). The aspect of the autonomy of Being will achieve its full maturation in the idea of the “self,” to be discussed below.
- 26.
HCM ’s criticism of idealism also implicitly contains a rejection of the positivistic worldview, according to which sensory perception is the only mode of knowing (Doctrine, 352), arguing that this is “an unreasonable limitation” and wondering whether what the positivist considers as “the only material of givenness” indeed has such precedence (Doctrine, 347). Doctrine of Appearance is an exploration of the first chapter essay, which received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Gӧttingen; see HCM , Positivismus, 10–24. In 1912, Alexander Pfänder accepted Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Munich (see Avé-Lallemant 1965/66). In 1913, the expanded chapter was printed and submitted as a dissertation, in a version almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance. In the epilogue to the special print in 1920 (Positivismus, 130–131), HCM explained that she left behind the criticism of positivism in favor of an ontological direction. Therefore, the original plan to elaborate the rest of the chapters of the awarded essay was never carried out.
- 27.
The term “self” occurs in Doctrine of Appearance in the sense of grounding the autonomy of the real against the “I” and the consciousness in general. Accordingly, the external world is depicted as an absolute and independent being (Seinselbstständigkeit), autonomous and absolute (Doctrine, 391–392), closed in itself and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (Doctrine, 424). Also, the objects of which the external is comprised are characterized as having “uncovered self-emerging” (unverhülltes Selbsthervortreten), “self-announcement” (Selbstkundgabe), “self-existence” (Selbstdasein) (Doctrine, 371), “corporal-self” (leibhaftes Selbst), “real self-presence” (reale Selbstgegenwart) (Doctrine, 376), “self-performance” (Selbstdarbietungseigenschaft) (Doctrine, 411, 494), and “self-presentation” (Selbstpräsentation) (Doctrine, 413) (See also, Doctrine, 430, 450, 452–455, 464–465, 471, 474, 514).
- 28.
- 29.
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Miron, R. (2018). Essence, Abyss, and Self—Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the Non-spatial Dimensions of Being. In: Luft, S., Hagengruber, R. (eds) Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97861-1_11
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