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The Synthetic Psychology of the Self

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Cognitive Architectures

Part of the book series: Intelligent Systems, Control and Automation: Science and Engineering ((ISCA,volume 94))

Abstract

Synthetic psychology describes the approach of “understanding through building” applied to the human condition. In this chapter, we consider the specific challenge of synthesizing a robot “sense of self”. Our starting hypothesis is that the human self is brought into being by the activity of a set of transient self-processes instantiated by the brain and body. We propose that we can synthesize a robot self by developing equivalent sub-systems within an integrated biomimetic cognitive architecture for a humanoid robot. We begin the chapter by motivating this work in the context of the criteria for recognizing other minds, and the challenge of benchmarking artificial intelligence against human, and conclude by describing efforts to create a sense of self for the iCub humanoid robot that has ecological, temporally-extended, interpersonal and narrative components set within a multi-layered model of mind.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    By this, we mean the cluster of different but overlapping intellectual/cognitive faculties that make humans adaptive, flexible sociotechnical animals. Gardner’s [22] “multiple intelligences” view provides a good guide to this broader notion of human cognition. Attempts to create machine intelligence of this more multi-faceted form are increasingly discussed under the label Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) (e.g., [23]), hence we are using the phrase “general intelligence” rather than Gardner’s multiple intelligences.

  2. 2.

    Nathan Bateman to Caleb Smith about the humanoid robot “Ava” he has created, from the original movie script for Ex Machina (2015) by Alex Garland.

  3. 3.

    The suggestion that we call this the Garland test has also been made by Murray Shanahan, one of the scientific advisors on Ex Machina.

  4. 4.

    It has been suggested that Harnad’s T2 level cannot be achieved without first building T3 to achieve symbol-grounding [26]. Going directly to T2 is nevertheless a theoretical possibility, even if it might prove impossible to achieve without a contribution from robotics.

  5. 5.

    This idea also follows in the footsteps of many others. For example, the eighteenth century Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico, who wrote “verum et factum reciprocantur seu convertuntur [the true is precisely what is made]”, and the 20th century physicist Richard Feynman, whose office blackboard on the day he died held the message, “what I cannot create I do not understand”.

  6. 6.

    There are multiple measures of so-called “correlates of consciousness”, Tononi’s Φ [65], a measure of information integration, being one of the better-known ones. The problem is that there is no way to be sure that an organism or machine that scores highly on any such measure is actually experiencing consciousness. This is known as the “other minds” problem in philosophy. For Turing [68], this was part of the reason to devise a behavioral test for the existence of machine thought and to leave the challenge of consciousness to others.

  7. 7.

    Abel’s “field of being” view stems from Merleau-Ponty’s [38] phenomenology and his insistence on the centrality of the experience of the body. Studies in cognitive neuroscience, such as those of the “rubber hand” illusion (see [10]), support Merleau-Ponty’s proposal that the sense of the body/self can extend into objects and the world. With virtual reality systems and telepresence robots, it is now possible to experimentally manipulate the sense of a virtual body, or of a physically remote robot body, and the associated feelings of immersion or “presence”, demonstrating that “my body is wherever there is something to be done” (Merleau-Ponty, [38] p. 291) and providing new ways to test hypotheses about the self.

  8. 8.

    This was proposed by Hume [30], for whom, if the stream of perceptions is turned off, as happens in sleep, the self ceases to exist, and by Locke [35], for whom self was a manifestation of consciousness, which, in turn, requires an awake mind. Some elements of Locke’s view of self, which saw identity as arising from learning and memory, are close to the ideas of the extended and narrative selves discussed in this chapter.

  9. 9.

    We should admit here that Strawson intends the more restricted philosophical sense of phenomenology as a form of systematic reflection on the structure of experience. We prefer to interpret the challenge of describing the nature of self from a more empirical perspective as phenomena associated with self that could be accessible to methods in psychology and cognitive neuroscience.

  10. 10.

    Note that, for a theory or concept of self to be useful, we would not consider that the self has to be emergent in a strong sense (that is, not reducible to lower level phenomena), but rather it has to serve a useful explanatory function in our psychological theory. In other words, the concept of self as explicated and realized in machine form should help us to provide useful accounts of human (or machine) cognition and behavior. See Verschure and Prescott [72] for a discussion of theory building and the role of synthetic approaches in the sciences of mind and brain.

  11. 11.

    Modularity is itself a topic that is widely debated within the cognitive sciences. Again, we consider that the synthetic approach can help answer some of the longstanding questions about how distributed vs. modular human minds/brains are. Our view is that the distributed nature of the brain can be over-stated. The brain is a layered architecture [49], and as such, there is significant replication of function and some redundancy across these layers, however, there is also localization of function and specific local or repeated circuits that perform roles that can be clearly described and differentiated.

  12. 12.

    Endel Tulving’s patient N.N. exemplifies this point [67]. A traffic accident caused N.N. to experience profound retrograde and anterograde amnesia, nevertheless he could still talk about himself, his experience, his preferences, and so on; he had intact short-term memory and could describe time and events in general terms. He could talk about consciousness, which he described as “being aware of who we are and what we are and where we are” ([67], p. 4). When asked to imagine what he might do tomorrow, however, his mind drew a blank, which he described as being “like swimming in the middle of a lake. There’s nothing there to do hold you up or do anything with” ([67], p. 4). Like other patients with amnesia, N.N. could be described as “marooned in the present” [34] or as having a self that has lost much of its “temporal thickness” [20].

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Acknowledgements

The preparation of this chapter was supported by funding from the EU Seventh Framework Programme as part of the projects Experimental Functional Android Assistant (EFAA, FP7-ICT-270490) and What You Say Is What You Did (WYSIWYD, FP7-ICT-612139) and the EU H2020 Programme as part of the Human Brain Project (HBP-SGA1, 720270). We are particularly grateful to Paul Verschure, Peter Dominey, Giorgio Metta, Yiannis Demiris and the other members of the WYSIWYD and EFAA consortia, and to our colleagues at the University of Sheffield who have helped us to develop memory systems for the iCub, particularly Uriel Martinez, Andreas Damianou, Neil Lawrence, Luke Boorman and Matthew Evans. The Sheffield iCub was purchased with the support of the UK Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC).

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Prescott, T.J., Camilleri, D. (2019). The Synthetic Psychology of the Self. In: Aldinhas Ferreira, M., Silva Sequeira, J., Ventura, R. (eds) Cognitive Architectures. Intelligent Systems, Control and Automation: Science and Engineering, vol 94. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97550-4_7

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