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Reforming the European Parliament’s Monetary and Economic Dialogues: Creating Accountability Through a Euro Area Oversight Subcommittee

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The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis

Part of the book series: European Administrative Governance ((EAGOV))

Abstract

This chapter contrasts the European Parliament’s (EP’s) Monetary Dialogue with the European Central Bank with the (relatively) new Economic Dialogue, a forum launched in 2011 to promote greater transparency and accountability in relation to European Union (EU) economic governance. It charts the creation of the Monetary Dialogue and the Economic Dialogue, respectively, and evaluates their implementation. Although the Economic Dialogue is a welcome addition to the EU’s economic governance architecture, its effectiveness has been blunted by institutional constraints as well as by the EP’s approach to this forum. The chapter concludes by putting forward ideas for reforming the Economic Dialogue with a view to enhancing the democratic oversight of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, it calls for the creation of an EP Subcommittee for Euro Area Oversight.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An earlier version of this chapter was presented at a workshop organized by the College of Europe and the European Parliament Research Service in May 2017. Thanks to the workshop’s participants and a number of European Parliament officials for extensive feedback. The views presented in this chapter and any errors that remain are the authors’ alone.

  2. 2.

    Also known as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance.

  3. 3.

    This committee has been known by various names and acronyms, including EMAC, but we stick to ECON for simplicity’s sake.

  4. 4.

    That is the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Board, the European Supervisory Agencies, and the European Systemic Risk Board.

  5. 5.

    Article 2a, Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011.

  6. 6.

    Article 121(5) TFEU.

  7. 7.

    Article 126 TFEU.

  8. 8.

    Article 109b, TEC.

  9. 9.

    Article 109b, TEC.

  10. 10.

    It could be argued that MEPs rather than the EP are holding the ECB to account through the Monetary Dialogue. Committees have the authority to decide on draft resolutions but resolutions can only be adopted in plenary sessions. This procedural point, though it is correct, overlooks the significant legitimacy exercised by EP committees. When the ECB attends ECON, the former is widely seen as appearing not at but before the EP (see e.g. Amtenbrink and Van Duin 2009).

  11. 11.

    Article 2a, Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011.

  12. 12.

    Article 3, Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011.

  13. 13.

    Article 6, Regulation (EU) 1174/2011.

  14. 14.

    Article 14, Regulation (EU) 1176/2011.

  15. 15.

    Article 2-ab, Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011.

  16. 16.

    Article 2a, Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011.

  17. 17.

    Article 3, Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011.

  18. 18.

    Article 14, Regulation (EU) 1176/2011.

  19. 19.

    Article 15, Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013.

  20. 20.

    Article 15, Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013.

  21. 21.

    Article 18, Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013.

  22. 22.

    Article 13, Fiscal Compact.

  23. 23.

    This figure does not include those EP staff in, for example, the Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union or the European Parliamentary Research Service that occasionally produce analysis for the Economic Dialogue.

  24. 24.

    Source: http://congressional-staff.insidegov.com/d/a/Senate.

  25. 25.

    Article 15, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013.

  26. 26.

    Article 3, Regulation (EU) No 472/2013.

  27. 27.

    Article 12, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011.

  28. 28.

    Article 12, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011.

  29. 29.

    Article 12, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011.

  30. 30.

    Article 2(a-b), (EU) Regulation 1175/2011.

  31. 31.

    Under Article 3, (EU) Regulation 1173/2011.

  32. 32.

    Article 2a, (EU) Regulation 1177/2011.

  33. 33.

    Article 14(2), (EU) Regulation 1176/2011 and Article 6, (EU) Regulation 1174/2011.

  34. 34.

    Article 15(2), (EU) Regulation 473/2013.

  35. 35.

    Article 3(8), 7(10), and 14(3), (EU) Regulation 472/2013.

  36. 36.

    Article 12(3) of the Fiscal Compact allows the heads of state or government of non-euro area members to attend the Euro Summit when certain agenda items are discussed.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium

    Michele Chang & Dermot Hodson

  2. University of London, London, UK

    Dermot Hodson

Authors
  1. Michele Chang
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  2. Dermot Hodson
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Correspondence to Michele Chang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Sciences Po Bordeaux, Centre Emile Durkheim, Pessac Cedex, France

    Olivier Costa

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Chang, M., Hodson, D. (2019). Reforming the European Parliament’s Monetary and Economic Dialogues: Creating Accountability Through a Euro Area Oversight Subcommittee. In: Costa, O. (eds) The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97391-3_16

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