Abstract
This chapter assumes that post-war steps to a parliamentary party-political European Union (EU) are irreversible. It further assumes, more debatably, that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure is also irreversible. It acknowledges six ‘known unknowns’ that could have consequences for the evolution of the Union’s party-political system. It considers several basic questions about the model the Union has cumulatively chosen before examining some of the ‘discontents’ of party-political systems and their potential relevance to the EU’s emerging system. It briefly considers whether the early evolution of the US party-political system might shed light on possible developments. It concludes that the existence of a parliamentary party-political system, with electoral linkage between the executive and the legislature, is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for viable governance—and opposition.
The views expressed in this paper are entirely personal and do not commit any other person, institution or organisation.
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Notes
- 1.
To see these assumptions and the developments behind them, see Westlake, Martin, ‘Possible Future European Union Party-Political Systems,’ https://www.coleurope.eu/news/bruges-political-research-paper-no-60-martin-westlake.
- 2.
Though Angela Merkel did not rule out such a possibility in her 15 May 2017 summit meeting with new French President Emmanuel Macron, Andrew Duff believes that ‘the next IGC, and hopefully Convention, will take place before 2024—not least to tackle eurozone governance, adjust post-Brexit, tackle immigration competence and electoral reform and seat apportionment’ (10 August 2017 correspondence with the author). See also Duff (2015c).
- 3.
On the other hand, as Sir Graham Watson has pointed out, ‘Political parties can deal with differentiated architecture. For example, the ALDE Party had a debate (at a Council meeting in 2013) about whether congress delegates from non-EU member states should have the right to vote in elections to choose the ALDE Spitzenkandidat. We decided they should, for 2014, but I can see this question being posed again in the future’ (7 June 2017 correspondence with the author).
- 4.
The creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office will to some extent achieve this already.
- 5.
Although the concept of some sort of European political constituency is as old as the directly elected European Parliament itself, if not older. I am grateful to Francis Jacobs for pointing this out.
- 6.
Although, as Geoffrey Harris points out, in the longer run, ‘the assumption that a special EU-wide list for the 73 ex-UK seats would mostly go to federalists is a risky one’ (4 July 2017 correspondence with the author).
- 7.
On the other hand, if the Spitzenkandidaten procedure is consolidated in 2019, then the Court’s argument about the non-justification for a threshold will surely be weakened because of the consolidated linkage to the executive.
- 8.
Writing in 1979, Marquand flatly declared: ‘The Community’s embryonic party system is an artificial construct, which reflects national rather than Community realities’ (Marquand 1979, 124). However, Hix points out that ‘the historical evidence is that political parties mainly form INSIDE rather than OUTSIDE parliaments – by elites breaking away from other parties, rather than by voters spontaneously starting a new movement. This is relevant for the European party system, as it suggests that at some point in the future “new” parties/party formulations could form if a “European party system” was truly independent from national parties. For example, could a “European progressive alliance” of MEPs, EP Groups, and national party leaders, emerge to agree a common candidate for the Commission President. Now that really would be a truly European party system’ (11 July 2017 correspondence with the author).
- 9.
However, whilst space precludes a proper treatment here, it should be pointed out, at least in passing, that some authors argue that the Swiss model of non-alternation (so nobody can be thrown out) might be more relevant to the EU (see, e.g., Van Parijs 2015, 2017). Richard Corbett has argued that ‘The Commission would appear to be edging towards a hybrid of Swiss-style collegiality in its overall composition, but with a more majoritarian approach to designating its President’ (in Kenealy et al. 2015).
- 10.
Sartori, among others, pointed a warning finger to the unhappy fates of the French Fourth Republic and Weimar Germany (see Hanning 1984, 437 for a consideration of this).
- 11.
A propos, as Pierpaolo Settembri has pointed out, ‘A possible long-term scenario is one where ‘opposition parties’ command, if not a single majority, at least several blocking minorities in the European Parliament, thus preventing the formation and the operation of a grand coalition’ (5 June 2017 correspondence with the author).
- 12.
Note that already ‘There is growing evidence of a shift in the critical political cleavage at national level in Europe, from left-right to pro-globalisation vs anti-globalisation. This has been accompanied by a shift in the socio-demographic basis of party choice from social class to age and education. I would expect this to be gradually replicated at EU parliamentary level, although it will not always align itself with the further integration vs no further integration division’ (18 June 2017 correspondence with Sir Ivor Crewe).
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Westlake, M. (2019). Possible Future European Union Party-Political Systems. In: Costa, O. (eds) The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97391-3_15
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