Abstract
The German émigré political scientist and lawyer Karl Loewenstein is widely recognized as the ‘father’ of the concept of militant democracy. This is understandable, given his impressive comparative work on legal measures to protect democracy and the fact that he published in English and in internationally well-known journals. However, around the same time, other thinkers also wrestled with the same democratic dilemma of how to defend democracy against antidemocrats. This chapter introduces a largely neglected Dutch theorist of militant democracy: George van den Bergh. His 1936 inaugural lecture as a professor of constitutional law at the University of Amsterdam offers important insights on militant democracy, and, more importantly, it presents precisely that what is lacking from Loewenstein’s work: a political-philosophical justification for confronting antidemocrats. First, Loewenstein’s approach is outlined. Second, Van den Bergh’s work is introduced and contextualized (as a response to Kelsen’s relativist conception of democracy), before offering two interpretations of his ideas. It is argued that the second interpretation, ‘democracy as self-correction’, offers his most original and fruitful contribution to the militant democracy debate. This conception is then further elaborated by comparing it with another virtually unknown, but interesting, participant in 1930s debates on the defense of democracy, Van den Bergh’s French contemporary Milan Markovitch. The chapter concludes by discussing the harsh reception of Van den Bergh’s ideas in the Dutch interwar debate on democracy, and his 1960 farewell lecture, in which he addresses the issue for the first, and last time, after the Second World War.
This contribution is an abridged and reworked version of: Bastiaan Rijpkema. 2018. Militant Democracy: The Limits of Democratic Tolerance. London/New York: Routledge, p. 22–68 (the English edition of: Bastiaan Rijpkema. 2015. Weerbare democratie: de grenzen van democratische tolerantie. Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam). An earlier version appeared in Dutch as an introduction to: George van den Bergh. 2014. Wat te doen met antidemocratische partijen? De oratie van George van den Bergh uit 1936. Amsterdam: Elsevier. All quotations from original Dutch, German and French sources have been translated to English.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Cited in Keane 2010, p. 570.
- 3.
A.A. de Jonge writes of a ‘minor crisis’ (in the functioning of government institutions) and a ‘major crisis’ which really ‘damaged the idealistic foundations of democracy’: ‘firstly only among a few thinkers, but soon in broad swathes of society: instead of democratic thinking, the opinion gains ground that the average man on the street is not rational and thus not capable of political judgement, that the great mass is eternally immature and merely in need of hard guidance by the small group of the more highly talented, that political freedom is thus also harmful and that people are not equal but in fact unequal by nature.’ See de Jonge 1968, p. 9–10, see also Keane 2010, p. 570.
- 4.
Van den Bergh 1936a.
- 5.
The description of the ceremony given here is based on a report in the newspaper Het Volk : ‘Grote belangstelling voor prof. v.d. Bergh’s rede’ (‘Great interest in Professor Van den Bergh’s speech’), Het Volk, 29 September 1936, and ‘Democratie en Dictatuur’ (‘Democracy and Dictatorship’), in Het Christelijk Historisch Weekblad, 17 October 1936. All newspaper and magazine articles relating to Van den Bergh can be found in the International Institute of Social History: G. van den Bergh, Archief George van den Bergh (Archive of George van den Bergh): ARCH00037, box 3, and/or digitally via the Delpher database: <www.delpher.nl> (up to 1995), and/or via LexisNexis Academic NL (covers 1990 to present).
- 6.
‘An extremely interesting question’, the newspaper the Haagsche Post thought, in ‘Hoe kan ik u weer kwijt?’ (‘How can I get rid of you again’?), 3 October 1936; Vrijheid, Arbeid, Brood called it ‘sharp’ and ‘impressive’ in ‘Een dictator aanstellen is gemakkelijk genoeg’ (‘Appointing a dictator is easy enough’), 1936 (exact date unknown, appears in G. van den Bergh, Archief George van den Bergh (Archive of George van den Bergh), Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis: ARCH00037, box 3); ‘Dangerous proposition’ was the headline in De Amsterdammer: Christelijk Volksdagblad on 7 October 1936; ‘Political science’ was the title of a critical piece in the Nieuw Rotterdamsche Courant on 14 October 1936.
- 7.
In 1956, for instance, in a Dutch news report on the banning of the communist party in West Germany referred to Van den Bergh’s lecture; see ‘Verboden partij’ (‘Banned party’), Het Vrije Volk, 6 October 1956. Van den Bergh has also been mentioned in Dutch discussions of party bans; see for instance: Elzinga 1982; Bellekom 1982; Nieuwenhuis 2003.
- 8.
Greenberg shows that, even before his famous two-part article on militant democracy (published in 1937, as discussed below), Loewenstein already pleaded to ban antidemocratic parties on a conference of German constitutional scholars (with Jellinek, Kelsen and Radbruch present, among others), see Greenberg 2014, p. 180.
- 9.
- 10.
Van den Bergh’s inaugural lecture was re-issued (in Dutch) as Van den Bergh 2014.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
Loewenstein 1937a, p. 423.
- 14.
Loewenstein 1937b, with an overview of the different countries on p. 638–644 and a thematic discussion on p. 644–656.
- 15.
See for example Loewenstein 1937b, p. 652–654. These measures are not unproblematic: due to vague concepts and narrow dividing lines between the legal and illegal use of political rights, judges are forced to pass judgement on what should be political problems by using judicial reasoning (p. 654).
- 16.
Loewenstein 1937b, p. 654. As an example of such glorification Loewenstein mentions Hitler’s expression of support for a political murderer who had been condemned to death in 1933.
- 17.
Cliteur and Rijpkema 2012, p. 238.
- 18.
See Loewenstein 1937a, p. 431.
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
The Hungarian sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) is sometimes mentioned alongside him. In 1943 he argued in his Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist for a ‘militant democracy’, see Thiel 2012, p. 275 and Klamt 2012, p. 31; Klamt sees Mannheim more as a descriptive sociologist who offers no clear solutions.
- 22.
This involves more or less all literature on militant democracy in law and political science; to gain an impression, see among others Tyulkina 2015, p. 13; Kirshner 2014, p. 2; Capoccia 2013 208, Bourne 2012, p. 1080; Klamt 2012, p. 2; Thiel 2009 p. 4; Issacharoff 2007, p. 1409; Sajó 2012, p. 562; Klamt 2007, p.133–134; Sajó 2004, p. 210; Pfersmann, 2004, p. 48.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
Loewenstein 1938, p. 617, note 90.
- 29.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 3–4; Bonger 1934, p. 17, for a discussion of the definition, see p. 10–17. Within the Social Democratic Workers’ Party, Bonger’s book became the most important work on democracy and was used as material on courses for party officials, see: Hartmans 2012, p. 205. See also Bart van Heerikhuizen 1983, p. 131.
- 30.
Bonger 1934, p. 129.
- 31.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 4.
- 32.
See Schmitt 2014, p. 1–2 and 86–87; for the concept of ‘commissarial dictatorship’, as opposed to sovereign dictatorship, in Schmitt 2011, see De Wilde 2008, p. 96; see also Schmitt’s reading of Article 48 of the Weimar constitution in these terms: Schmitt 2011, in particular p. 310–312, also published as an appendix in Schmitt 2014, and on this subject De Wilde 2010, p. 144–145. See also Schreuerman 1999, p. 31–32.
- 33.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 4–5. On the definition of ‘antidemocratic parties’ see also Tromp 1991, p. 85–87. Tromp also makes a distinction between groups which reject democracy outright and those which support a different idea of democracy (a ‘true democracy’). The former group consists of those who seek to go ‘back in time’, thus defending the ancien regime , while the latter are antidemocrats that want to move ‘forward’, towards a new ‘democratic order’, consisting of a left-wing variant (anarchism and particular forms of socialism) and a right-wing variant (fascism and national socialism).
- 34.
- 35.
And at the time criminal justice was equipped for the task in more or less all European countries; see Loewenstein 1937b, p. 645.
- 36.
- 37.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 6.
- 38.
- 39.
See Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 7.
- 40.
- 41.
See Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 8.
- 42.
See ‘Democratie. Ook jegens niet-democraten’ (‘Democracy. Towards non-democrats too’), Vooruit, 6 October 1936.
- 43.
In 1940 Kelsen , like Loewenstein, left Europe, and after a stay at Harvard, became a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, see Jabloner 2002, p. 68. As a representative of the idea of relativist democracy Eskes primarily mentions Gustav Radbruch , see Eskes 1988, p. 249, note 616. On Loewenstein and Kelsen, see: Greenberg 2014, p. 174–75.
- 44.
Greenberg 2014, p. 174–75.
- 45.
Kelsen 2002 (1929), p. 107–108. The same line of reasoning can be found in the first edition of 1920: Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Tübingen: Mohr 1920, p. 36–38. Kelsen connects democracy not only with relativism , but also with positivism and scientific thinking; see the observations in Schmitt 2005, p. 49. More problematic in Schmitt’s view was the confusion of democracy (not equality of individuals) with liberalism (which is equality of individuals as individuals; an individualist-humanist ethics and worldview) in Kelsen’s ideas; see Schmitt 1988, p. 13.
- 46.
Kelsen never joined a political party, but entertained a certain sympathy for the Austrian social democrats (see Jabloner 2002, p. 71–72).
- 47.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 8.
- 48.
See Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 8–9.
- 49.
Urbinati and Acetti 2013, p. 7.
- 50.
Kelsen 1955, p. 31.
- 51.
Kelsen 2006 (1932), p. 237.
- 52.
See also Jabloner 2002, p. 74 and Greenberg 2014, p. 174. Jabloner stresses that Kelsen’s attitude of ‘non-opposition’ to a democracy abolishing itself does not necessarily follow from legal positivism, since (as for instance H.L.A. Hart argues in his well-known article ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, see Hart 1958, p. 620), the legal status of a law is a different, and separate, question, next to the duty to obey that same law; this also holds for a law that would abolish a democracy (see Jabloner 2002, note 7 to p. 74).
- 53.
- 54.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 9.
- 55.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 19–20, 22.
- 56.
Van den Bergh 1936a, first on p. 6–7, and later in detail on p. 23–24.
- 57.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 23–24.
- 58.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 23.
- 59.
Popper 2013, p. 581–582 (note 4 in chapter 7 of part 1).
- 60.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 24; for Popper’s variant, see Popper 2013, p. 581–582 (note 4 in chapter 7 of part 1). Popper’s solution, however, is dissatisfying; see Rijpkema 2012, p. 93–96. See also Eric Weber’s response, in which he suggests that John Dewey approached the problem in a manner comparable to Van den Bergh’s; see Weber 2013, p. 177.
- 61.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 24.
- 62.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 24.
- 63.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 25
- 64.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 25.
- 65.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 8. In his interpretation of Van den Bergh, Gelijn Molier emphasizes this very aspect of the inaugural lecture, in particular Van den Bergh’s insight that respect for the individuality of every human being can only exist by the grace of reciprocity. See Molier 2014, no. 22 (see under 4).
- 66.
To Chou an ‘anything-goes’ mentality is an example of ‘too much democracy’, which can subsequently lead to democratic suicide; see Chou 2013, p. 69.
- 67.
See Bellekom 1982, p. 117.
- 68.
- 69.
- 70.
- 71.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 9.
- 72.
- 73.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 9
- 74.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 9.
- 75.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 9–10. Van Poelje and Hartmans also emphasize this aspect of the inaugural lecture; see Van Poelje 1960, p. 3, and Hartmans 2012, p. 185; see also Eskes 1988, p. 251, who sees this as a ‘first justification’. Van den Bergh’s idea was also noted in the first judicial comments; Kramer 1936a offered a positive comment (see p. 821–822), and on the critical side Langemeijer 1936a p. 883–884. The ‘possibility of self-correction’ is also mentioned in a master’s thesis worth reading by H.C. Wichers Hoeth; see H.C. Wichers Hoeth 1980, p. 8–9 and 26. The Austrian judge and lawyer Rudolf Thienel also draws a distinction between possible changes in the law which fits closely with Van den Bergh’s idea: ‘There is an obvious difference between – for instance – a tax law, which is backed by the majority and can be changed by a future majority, and a constitutional change abolishing the democratic participation itself – without the possibility of returning to democratic rule if a future majority so wishes. The consequence is quite clear: In order to secure democratic participation for future generations, it is justified and necessary to deny radical political movements the possibility of destroying the democratic system – even if they try to achieve their goal not by violence, but by means of a “march through the institutions”.’ See Thienel 2008, p. 64–65.
- 76.
I also use this example in Rijpkema 2012.
- 77.
To illustrate this point: the Dutch minister of education, culture and science Jet Bussemaker initially refused to place a burned down but restored windmill dating back to 1787 back on the list of monuments, arguing that it was a ‘replica’. Bussemaker: ‘The essence of a monument is its authenticity, and this is not authentic. What would we do if The Night Watch were burned? Surely we would not suddenly pronounce a replica to be the true Night Watch?’ Eventually, after protest from the House of Representatives, the minister revised her decision on the basis that it was a ‘unique case’. See ‘Molen Burum geen rijksmonument’ (‘Burum Windmill not a national monument’), nos (online), 8 September 2014, and ‘Molen Burum toch Rijksmonument’ (‘Burum Windmill a national monument after all’), nos (online), 6 October 2014.
- 78.
This term was introduced in Cliteur and Rijpkema 2012, p. 240 to describe this interpretation of Van den Bergh’s inaugural lecture.
- 79.
Marinus Van der Goes van Naters , letter to George van den Bergh, with attachment, 6 October 1936, in the personal archive of George van den Bergh, owned by Van den Bergh’s heirs.
- 80.
See Marinus van der Goes van Naters 1937, p. 118.
- 81.
Markovitch 1933.
- 82.
For an overview of Duguit’s ideas, see Laborde 1996, p. 227–244 (in particular p. 235–236 and 239–240); Duguit placed the ‘functional representation ’ of economic and social groups in opposition to the ‘individualist basis’ of the representative democracy. It would offer the French republic a more ‘solid structure’ than the ‘democratic, individualist and parliamentarian framework’. Although Duguit saw himself as a democrat, and although part of the parliament would be elected by the regular democratic route, in his thinking citizens unmistakably fulfil a more passive role as ‘those governed’ without direct participation. Duguit’s ideas also have technocratic characteristics, according to Laborde.
- 83.
For a summary of that criticism, see Markovitch 1933, p. 275–277, including ‘La représentation professionnelle est. aux antipodes du parlementarisme rationalise qui est. le couronnement logique et nécessaire de toute démocratie individualiste et de la souveraineté populaire. Ainsi, uniquement le système démocratique d’organisation politique conditionné par la vie et adéquat à elle, .... Essayer de la remplacer par l’organisation de la représentation professionnelle est. après cela, vraiment impossible. Introduire le mauvais, étant donné tous les défauts, vices et inconvénients de la représentation professionnelle, pour remplacer le bon est. contraire à toute logique. Et la représentation professionnelle réalisée au Parlement le serait certainement. D’où et pour cette raison, la proposition de Duguit de donner aux professions organisées dans tous les syndicats les rênes pouvoirs est. sans aucun doute impossible et inacceptable’; see also p. 255–256.
- 84.
Markovitch 1933, p. 256–257.
- 85.
Markovitch 1933, p. 257.
- 86.
Markovitch 1933, p. 257.
- 87.
Markovitch 1933, p. 257.
- 88.
Markovitch 1993, p. 256, and also p. 258, with the elections as the instrument.
- 89.
Markovitch 1933, p. 257–258: ‘loi de réaction, c’est-à-dire la possibilité de changements de systèmes d’organisation politiques’, p. 255: ‘de la loi vitale de toute société qu’est. la loi de reaction,’ and p. 256: ‘Il est. juste aussi bien logique que celui qui subit le poids d’un système soit l’arbitre souverain de sa valeur. Sans cela, l’homme sera enchaîné, opprimé, terrorisé, ce qui est. tout à faire contraire a sa quaité (sic) d’homme, à son rôle social primordial, donc à toute la vie sociale.’ On man, or humanity, as a point of departure, see also p. 256: ‘L’homme, c’est. la vie. Chaque système, s’il veut être tel., est. nécessairement oblige de correspondre a cette vie, parce que l’homme est. tout et partout,’ and p. 251: ‘L’individu est. tout et partout. S’il n’est. pas seul en dernier ressort, c’est. toujours lui, l’individu. Donc, il est. partout.’
- 90.
Markovitch 1933, p. 258: ‘Seule, la démocratie, système d’organisation politique où le peuple est. l’unique souverain, ne nie et ne s’oppose à la loi de réaction.’
- 91.
Markovitch 1933, p. 258.
- 92.
Markovitch 1933, p. 255: ‘La démocratie présente, en tant que système d’organisation politique, une valeur incontestablement supérieure à tous les autres modes d’organisation de la puissance politique. Ses qualités propres sont innombrables. Elle seul assure nettement la pleine expression de la loi vitale de toute société qu’est. la loi de reaction.’ See also p. 271.
- 93.
Markovitch 1933, p. 276: ‘Le principe de la démocratie est. inattaquable,’ see also p. 255 and 258.
- 94.
Markovitch 1933, p. 258.
- 95.
Markovitch 1933, p. 258: ‘Apparemment oui, mais au fond, non.’
- 96.
Markovitch 1933, p. 258.
- 97.
Markovitch 1933, p. 258–259: ‘Toute réaction légale est. possible, sauf une seule: la réaction qui veut consciemment ou non, peu importe, supprimer la possibilité d’une nouvelle réaction donc ignorer et pratiquement détruire la loi vitale de la société qu’est. la loi de réaction, en justifiant et en codifiant ainsi la révolution, le feu et le sang, ce qui évidemment, ne doit nullement cadrer avec l’homme et son ambition d’être autre chose qu’un animal ordinaire, sans esprit et conscience.’
- 98.
‘Here too the emphasis is on the legal reaction of those intending oppression, and here too every legal reaction is tolerated, except that which seeks to interrupt the possibility of a new reaction!’ according to Van der Goes van Naters in his letter to Van den Bergh; see Marinus Van der Goes van Naters, letter to George van den Bergh, with attachment, 6 October 1936, in the personal archive of George van den Bergh, owned by Van den Bergh’s heirs.
- 99.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 6.
- 100.
‘De democratische Staat. Tegenover niet-democratische partijen’ (‘The democratic State. Against non-democratic parties’), De Residentiebode, 23 December 1936.
- 101.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 6.
- 102.
Markovitch 1933, p. 259.
- 103.
Which taken literally is a circular argument: democracy is the best system because it fulfils the law of reaction, which in turn means it is a democracy; see Markovitch 1933, p. 259 and note 1. See also, p. 258: ‘La démocratie se présente comme le seul système politique compatible avec la vie, qu’elle doit rester dan tous les temps et chez tous les hommes.’
- 104.
Markovitch 1933, p. 256: ‘L’homme, c’est. la vie. Chaque système, s’il veut être tel., est. nécessairement oblige de correspondre a cette vie, parce que l’homme est. tout et partout’; for comparable formulations see p. 251–252 and 273.
- 105.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 9: ‘One of the strongest elements of democracy can be attributed to its “self-correction”. Every democrat admits that democracy often leads to erroneous decisions. However, it offers more safeguards than any other system to ensure that these decisions, as soon as it becomes apparent that they are incorrect, are revised. In democracy the circles of the stakeholders and those who make the decisions in the final instance overlap. The people make the decisions and feel the consequences directly. They know their responsibility, they correct their own mistakes.’ Markovitch comes closest to this when he writes, ‘L’homme, créateur du système et objet de son application, va être le seul juge de son opportunité et de son utilité. Il est. juste aussi bien que logique que celui qui subit le poids d’un système soit l’arbitre souverain de sa valeur. Sans cela, l’homme sera enchaîné, opprimé, terrorisé, ce qui est. tout à faire contraire a sa quaité (sic) d’homme, à son rôle social primordial, donc à toute la vie sociale’ (Markovitch 1933, p. 256).
- 106.
In Rijpkema 2015 other ‘approximations’ of Van den Bergh’s ‘democracy as self-correction ’, in particular Karl Popper’s ‘democracy as science analogy’, are discussed at length, see p. 149–152 (see also Rijpkema 2018, p. 134–136). Interestingly enough, it could also be argued that the idea of ‘self-correction’ is approximated by Hans Kelsen , see Hong’s interpretation of Kelsen called ‘democracy as self-restraint’, in Hong 2012, and the comparison in Molier 2018.
- 107.
Experiences in post-war Germany might serve as an illustration of these possibilities; see Müller 2013, p. 1258–1260.
- 108.
See Müller 2013, p. 1258, who speaks of the influence of Loewenstein’s ideas on the German constitution. H.C. Wichers Hoeth also links Van den Bergh expressly with the German ‘streitbare Demokratie’; to my knowledge, this is the first interpretation of Van den Bergh in these post-war terms; see Wichers Hoeth 1980, p. 25). In 1995 Van den Bergh surfaces, along with the term ‘weerbare democratie’ (militant or defensive democracy) in an article for the newspaper Trouw on the AIVD, the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (then the BVD): Cornelisse 1995. In response to the judgement of the echr on the Refah case, Eskes mentions Van den Bergh’s inaugural lecture in Trouw and draws a direct line to the German ‘streitbare Demokratie’; see Eskes 2011. In his comments on the same Refah case, in the context of militant democracy, Alkema too mentions Van den Bergh; see echr 13 February 2003, 41,340/98, 41,342/98 and 41,344/98, nj 2005, 73, incl. Note E.A. Alkema (Refah Partisi/Turkey ) .
- 109.
See Thiel 2012, p. 292.
- 110.
See Thiel 2012, p. 293, and Klamt 2007, p. 137. The question, of course, is whether this means that the constitution can never be overturned. The answer is probably no, in the light of gg Article 146: if the people set up a new constitution and it comes into effect, the old one is deactivated. See Bovend’Eert and Burkens 2012, p. 69, and Preuss 2011, p. 443. It can be argued, on the other hand, that, given the structure of the constitution, gg Article 146 anticipates the establishment and adoption of a constitution after a civil war (or at least, after a lengthy disturbance to public order), rather than the hypothetical situation in which a new constitution is written and adopted in parallel with the current constitution. At the same time the wording of the article does not rule this out. It creates the remarkable situation in which revision of certain parts of the Grundgesetz is impossible, but complete replacement might be formally permitted. This explanation appears also to apply to the Federal Constitutional Court: the eternity clause can only be overruled by the ‘directly expressed will’ of the German people (see Preuss 2011, p. 443).
- 111.
- 112.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 26.
- 113.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 31.
- 114.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 28–29. For criticism of Van den Bergh’s proposal only to allow the Supreme Court to ban a party on a unanimous vote, see Kramer 1936a, p. 824, who fears that this exacting requirement might ‘endanger the intended protection of our democratic state institutions’; ‘does this not put too much power in the hands of one single councillor?’ That fear is not unfounded, as becomes apparent from experiences with the requirement for a two-thirds majority in Germany; see Rensmann 2003, p. 1134: ‘The real victim of the decision (in the case of the extreme right npd , BR), however, is the normative authority of Article 21 para. 2 of the Basic Law. At least as long as the minority judges remain in office and wield their veto power, the possibility of a successful application to ban a political party in Germany is for all intents and purposes excluded, save in exceptional cases of clear and present danger to the “free democratic basic order.” Normativity is largely reduced to virtuality and symbolism. According to the minority a single informer in the party leadership is sufficient to thwart any attempt to dissolve a political party. On the other hand the minority opinion imposes a considerable burden on the applicants to substantiate the claim of unconstitutionality with sufficient evidence. Such evidence cannot, however, be obtained without the help of informers.’
- 115.
Donations of 4500 euros and more have to be made public, see Article 25 of the 2013 Political Parties Funding Act (Wet financiering politieke partijen). Donations were first made public by the minister of the interior Ronald Plasterk on 1 October 2014; see ‘Giften politieke partijen openbaar’ (Donations to political parties made public), nos (online), 1 October 2014.
- 116.
‘Politieke wetenschap’ (‘Political science’), Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant , 14 October 1936. A day later this suggestion was repeated in a second piece on the lecture: ‘Wet op de staatkundige partijen?’ (‘Political parties act?’), Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 15 October 1936.
- 117.
‘Een lastig probleem’ (‘An awkward problem’), De Avondpost , 6 October 1936.
- 118.
As cited in ‘Gevaarlijke stelling’ (‘Dangerous proposition’), De Amsterdammer: Christelijk Volksdagblad, 7 October 1936. The example of De Dageraad (an organization now known as De Vrije Gedachte) turned out to be attractive. Had Thorbecke not named faith and religious piety ‘the nation’s most noble characteristic’? Would it not be possible, then, to ban the atheist De Dageraad by Van den Bergh’s reasoning, De Avondpost asked a few weeks later? ‘We are not arguing for that,’ but ‘not obstructing is not the same as encouraging,’ see ‘Twee gevaren’ (‘Two dangers’), De Avondpost, 20 October 1936. De Vrijzinnig-democraat came to the same conclusion as Het Volk ; see ‘Democratische Staatsbeleid: de houding tegenover dicatuur-stromingen’ (‘Democratic State Policy: the position on dictatorship trends’), De Vrijzinnig-democraat, 17 October 1936. In response to the review, the Dagblad van Noord-Brabant concluded, ‘It is understandable that the social democrats prefer not to use this double-edged sword in defence of their democracy.’ See ‘Verbod van ondemocratische partijen?’ (‘Ban on undemocratic parties?’), Dagblad van Noord-Brabant, 16 October 1936.
- 119.
See ‘De zelfverdediging der democratie. Revolutionaire kiezers en revolutionaire Ambtsdragers’ (‘The self-defence of democracy. Revolutionary voters and revolutionary Officials’), Algemeen Handelsblad, 28 October 1936. To the same effect, see ‘Niet aldus’ (‘Therefore no’), De Standaard, 8 October 1936, ‘Democratie: ook jegens niet-democraten’ (‘Democracy. Towards non-democrats too’), Vooruit, 6 October 1936, and ‘Democratie en Dictatuur’ (‘Democracy and Dictatorship’), Het Christelijk Historisch Weeklbad, 17 October 1936.
- 120.
‘We do not deceive ourselves that the execution of these propositions will provide wonderful possibilities; yet the writer’s reasoning is fully deserving of attention.’ See ‘Hoe kan ik u weer kwijt?’ (‘How can I get rid of you again’), Haagsche Post , 3 October 1936.
- 121.
‘Het Probleem van deze Dagen’ (‘The Problem these Days’), Haagsche Post, 31 October 1936.
- 122.
‘Verbod van ondemocratische partijen?’ (‘Ban on undemocratic parties?’), Dagblad van Noord-Brabant , 16 October 1936.
- 123.
Josephus Jitta 1936.
- 124.
Josephus Jitta 1936. Previously Josephus Jitta expressed himself in similar words in a personal letter to Van den Bergh: ‘I received your speech half an hour ago and read it through in one breath. Yesterday evening I was somewhat shocked by the title. I thought, good heavens, has he indeed lost sight of the vague boundaries between politics and science. But that fear has been swept away. ... An hour ago I still took the view that a democracy cannot [view?] a dictatorial party as a prohibited association, although I felt dissatisfied with that. Now I am completely converted. Your speech, which is also in all respects praiseworthy, has thrown an entirely new light on a problem which we thought had been inspected from all sides. Is any greater praise imaginable for an inaugural lecture?’ (A.C. Josephus Jitta , letter to George van den Bergh, 29 September 1936, in the personal archive of George van den Bergh, owned by Van den Bergh’s heirs).
- 125.
‘Prof Josephus Jitta over democratie. Instemming met de inaugurale rede van mr. dr. v.d. Bergh.’ (‘Professor Josephus Jitta on democracy. Approval of the inaugural lecture of Professor van den Bergh’), Het Volk , 6 October 1936. See also ‘Conferentie Vrijzinnig-Democr. Jongeren Organisatie’ (‘Conference of the Free-Thinking Democratic Youth Organization’), Het Vaderland , 6 October 1936.
- 126.
A summary appeared as ‘Liberale Staatspartij de Vrijheidsbond: Opening van de verkiezingscampagne te Amsterdam’ (‘Liberal State Party : Opening of the election campaign in Amsterdam’), Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant , 13 October 1936.
- 127.
‘De democratische Staat. Tegenover niet-democratische partijen’ (‘The democratic State. Against non-democratic parties’), Residentiebode, 23 December 1936. A similar conditional approval was voiced by his fellow SDAP-member Willem Drees, and later Dutch Prime-Minister (1948–1958); in a letter to Van den Bergh he writes, ‘The argument which formed the main content of your speech stirs one to reflection. I am not yet at the point of complete endorsement, although I acknowledge the moral right of democracy to oppose its enemies[,] even by methods different from those which have so far been considered normal.’ (Willem Drees, letter to George van den Bergh, 2 October 1936, in the personal archive of George van den Bergh, owned by Van den Bergh’s heirs.)
- 128.
See ‘Duys over de S.D.A.P. Vernietigend bewijsmateriaal’ (‘Duys on the S.D.A.P. Damning evidence’), Volk en Vaderland , 4 December 1936. The same goes for the earlier article, ‘Een dankbare professor: de “objectieve wetenschap gediend”’ (‘A grateful professor: “serving objective science”’), Volk en Vaderland, 2 October 1936. The article by Duys (former SDAP member, and later nsb member), on which the former article was based, in fact gathered an unpleasant following when it was published as a separate booklet, Democraten op Fascistenjacht (Democrats on the hunt for fascists), from which his views on the (lack of) scientific content in Van den Bergh’s inaugural lecture were sometimes adopted in other journals. It must have been a particularly traumatic experience and Van den Bergh personally urged a number of editors to rectify the situation; he felt it was nothing less than slander (see ‘Eer is teer’ (‘Honour is fragile’), Deli Courant, 12 March 1937). The editors generally reluctantly complied, the Residentiebode writing, ‘Rereading the details, we must confess to having been swept along by Mr. Duys’ boisterous writing. It turns out that Professor van den Bergh’s scientific character is in good working order, and we would therefore now like to withdraw the conclusions previously reached from Duys’ book.’ (Residentiebode, 23 December 1936) Similarly, De Tijd : ‘Professor van den Bergh is indignant at this term (‘a stillborn child from a scientific perspective’, BR) and on closer consideration we admit that these words would have been better omitted.’ See ‘Een verdediging. Prof. G. van den Bergh over zijn inaugurale rede’ (‘A defence. Professor G. Van den Bergh on his inaugural lecture’), De Tijd, 22 December 1936. Het Vaderland refuses to commit itself; see ‘De inaugureele rede van prof. v.d. Bergh’ (‘The inaugural lecture of Professor van den Bergh’), Het Vaderland , 29 December 1936.
- 129.
See Polak 1936.
- 130.
See Polak 1936.
- 131.
‘Kroniek van de week’ (‘Chronicle of the week’), De Tribune , 10 October 1936.
- 132.
‘Over democratie en dictatuur’ (‘On democracy and dictatorship’), De Tribune, 8 October 1936.
- 133.
‘Over democratie en dictatuur’ (‘On democracy and dictatorship’), De Tribune, 8 October 1936.
- 134.
Wichers Hoeth attributes the criticism of the daily newspapers entirely to party ideologies (Wichers Hoeth 1980, p. 22), which appears to me to be too strong a statement. We should not underestimate how widespread the relativist notion of democracy was at the time. The newspapers, as a rule, also go to great lengths to support their position with arguments.
- 135.
In my view Hartmans also sees the speech too emphatically as being at the heart of the battle against the nsb when he writes in Vijandige Broeders? (Enemy brothers?), ‘For what was now a very legalistic party like the sdap it was therefore a natural step to see whether there were a legal means of calling a halt on the national socialists. That was why the most important constitutional lawyer of the sdap, George van den Bergh, in September 1936 devoted his inaugural speech for acceptance of his professorship at the University of Amsterdam to the question of whether it was possible to ban the nsb.’ See Hartmans 2012, p. 185. It seems justified to think that Van den Bergh would have firmly denied that. Besides the fact that the nsb is not mentioned at all in the speech, this coincides with what he himself stated in a piece submitted to Het Vaderland , included in ‘De democratische Staat. Tegenover niet-democratische partijen’ (‘The democratic State. Against non-democratic parties’), De Residentiebode, 23 December 1936.
- 136.
De Tijd came to the same conclusion: ‘What good is it to the critics to be informed that Prof. C.W. de Vries has ordered 225 copies for his students?’; see ‘Een verdediging. Prof. G. van den Bergh over zijn inaugurale rede’ (‘A defence. Prof. G. van den Bergh on his inaugural lecture’), De Tijd , 22 December 1936.
- 137.
Included in ‘De democratische Staat. Tegenover niet-democratische partijen’ (‘The democratic State. Against non-democratic parties’), De Residentiebode, 23 December 1936.
- 138.
Eskes 1988, p. 254.
- 139.
Kramer 1936a, p. 824; see Eskes 1988, p. 252–253. Kramer’s main objection is directed at Van den Bergh’s choice to base the legal part of his argument on the second part of Article 3 of the 1855 Wet vereniging en vergadering (Association and assembly act). Kramer sees the third part (which Van den Bergh ignores) as more appropriate; see p. 822–823. He later hones this argument in Kramer 1936b, p. 994.
- 140.
- 141.
- 142.
‘Het begrip: “goede zeden”. Een juridische polemiek’ (‘The concept of “public morality” [goede zeden]. A legal polemic’), De Tijd , 8 December 1936. Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895), grandfather of author Aldous Huxley, called himself ‘Darwin’s Bulldog’ and faithfully defended Darwin’s ideas against ‘the many attacks from ecclesiastical and other sides’; see Cliteur 2001, p. 11–12.
- 143.
- 144.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 27.
- 145.
See Van den Tempel 1933, p. 54. For the objective principles, see p. 55–58. They are: 1) every human being must fight for the development of the entirety of humanity, and 2) the opportunity for participation in this development must be shared as equally as possible among the individuals (the equality requirement). For a detailed discussion of Van den Tempel’s dissertation see Hartmans 2012, p. 203–207 (in particular 203).
- 146.
See Van den Tempel 1933, p. 168 (transitional dictatorship) and 219–220 (dictatorship as last resort, if democracy is not sufficient). See also p. 93: ‘Freedom (here assumed to be democratic freedom, BR) can only be a means for the socialist movement.’
- 147.
- 148.
- 149.
The question is whether this puts democracy on an equal footing with socialism, or even places it higher. Van Heerikhuizen appears to suggest an equal footing (see Van Heerikhuizen 1983, p. 125–126); Tames seems to give it higher priority (see Tames 2006, p. 250). In my view there is more truth in Hartman’s interpretation that to Bonger, just as for Van den Tempel, democracy really was a means to an end, but that in Bonger’s view, in contrast with Van den Tempel , any other means would be inconceivable; see Hartmans 2012, p. 205. What Bonger writes in his Evolutie en Revolutie (Evolution and revolution, 1919) fits in with this idea: ‘The only means of achieving this great revolution which will be recognized in human history, is the gradual, peaceful way of democracy, springing from deep-rooted conviction. All other attempts, coups, dictatorships etc., since they are irreconcilable with the proper functioning of the economy, will necessarily fail, ending only in chaos and no higher order. May democracy thus conquer and be made complete and defended against attacks and never harmed,’ cited in Van Heerikhuizen 1983, p. 128.
- 150.
See Pans 1985, p. 174.
- 151.
In the speech at the Easter conference Van den Bergh puts it as follows: ‘If I had to see democracy and socialism in a means-end relationship, then in my personal view socialism would have to be seen as the means and democracy as the end,’ and, ‘We social democrats reject all tyranny , every dictatorship, even in order to achieve socialism.’ (Van den Bergh 1936b, p. 4 and 7 respectively). Van den Bergh also speaks about a certain ‘young fellow party member’ with different views on these issues (Van den Bergh 1936b, p. 6). On the Easter conference, see also Pans 1985, p. 191–192. For the relevant section in the inaugural lecture see Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 20–21 and 26–28.
- 152.
Van den Bergh 1936a, p. 28.
- 153.
Hartmans 2012, p. 206–207. Other developments undoubtedly contributed (see Hartmans 2012, p. 207–211). For instance there was a fourth influential book, the report Het staatkundig stelsel der sociaal-democratie (The political system of democracy, 1935), co-authored by Van den Bergh, which firmly rejects ‘any form of dictatorship’ in favour of a ‘plea for parliamentary democracy with strong state authority’; see Knegtmans 1994, p. 100. On the basis of this report a resolution (adopted during the sdap conference, April 1936) expressly states that the party honours democracy, ‘not only as a method in the battle for socialism, but also as a principle and as a goal’; the resolution is included in Van den Bergh 1936b; see p. 15. To Josephus Jitta the report and the following sdap conference were reasons to conclude in De Groene Amsterdammer that the sdap had once again taken a step in the direction of becoming a true democratic party (see Hartmans 2012, p. 211) . He was confronted with prickly commentary on this by sdap leader J.W. Alberda in Het Volk : in what sense was it a step in the direction of a democratic party? Alberda attempts to demonstrate in detail that the sdap has always been loyal to democracy, referring to a number of resolutions and reports. He also distances himself expressly from a few party members’ ‘personal views’, including those of Bastiaan van den Tempel . See Alberda 1936. The argument is not very convincing; one only need look to Alberda’s predecessor Troelstra to see that the claim that they were ‘always purely democratic’ requires some further qualification (on Troelstra in this connection, see Tames 2006, p. 249).
- 154.
See Knegtmans 1994, p. 63–117, especially p. 82–117.
- 155.
This famous ‘mistake by Troelstra’ was plainly percieved as an attack on democracy, see Tames 2006, p. 249.
- 156.
On this ‘dual character’, see Perry 1994, p. 61.
- 157.
Van den Bergh 1961, p. 86. The valedictory lecture is briefly mentioned in Schuijt 1995, p. 7–8.
- 158.
Based on a number of individual cases (including among others kosher food, the ban on processions, the prayer before municipal council meetings and subsidies for church building) Van den Bergh makes the broad reach of his interpretation clear (Van den Bergh 1961, p. 85–88). He does criticize the role played by confessional parties in the Dutch system of government (Van den Bergh 1961, p. 90). We read more on the subject in his 1958 book Hoofdlijnen van het Nederlandse Staatsrecht (Outlines of Dutch constitutional law ). To Van den Bergh the fundamental opposition in politics is between progressives and conservatives, which of course leaves room for more than two parties; they are simply always different mixes of the same opposition. In Van den Bergh’s view that opposition is provided by nature, because it follows from ‘the nature of human personality’; it is also necessary for the proper functioning of democracy. Confessional parties, by contrast, are grouped around statements of faith, with members often holding diametrically opposed ideas on important political problems. They have effectively organized themselves around the wrong, politically irrelevant, principles. In Van den Bergh’s words, ‘From the perspective of constitutional law, that is highly regrettable, because it means that the foundation on which democracy is built is extremely shaky.’ See Van den Bergh 1958, p. 57–58. His student A.A. De Jonge adopts this criticism in part, as shown by his critical discussion of the role of confessional parties in the democratic crisis of the interbellum; see De Jonge 1968, p. 19–20; on Van den Bergh as his teacher, see p. 3. For a recent evaluation of the future for Christian politics, see Klei and van Mulligen 2014.
- 159.
As also shown by the detailed bibliography, provided by N. Chr. E. van den Bergh-Marcus, in Van Poelje 1960; see p. 290–294.
- 160.
Van den Bergh 1961, p. 82–83.
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Rijpkema, B. (2018). Militant Democracy beyond Loewenstein: George van den Bergh’s 1936 Inaugural Lecture. In: Ellian, A., Rijpkema, B. (eds) Militant Democracy – Political Science, Law and Philosophy. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97004-2_7
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