Abstract
Historically, it has not been uncommon to find discussions of evidentialism clustering around puzzles about the evidence of perception, introspection, memory, intuition, and inference. Evidentialists have given less attention to social epistemology, with the important exception of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. Taking its cue from this literature, in this essay I will sketch the outlines of a unified evidentialist social epistemology. At its center is a principle about higher-level evidence from the literature on disagreement, the “evidence of evidence principle,” which links our higher-level evidence about the evidence others possess for particular propositions with our own object-level evidence. I will argue that this principle is not only fruitful for understanding the effect of discovering peer disagreement, but that it also accounts for our having evidence from both group and individual testimony. The social epistemology on offer seems to accommodate the common-sense extent of our testimonial evidence, providing an insight into what is unique about social sources of evidence and what is not, as well as pointing ahead to interesting problems for evidentialists in social epistemology.
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Notes
- 1.
I am grateful to feedback on versions of this paper from Richard Feldman, Earl Conee, Edward Wierenga, Kevin McCain, Matthew Baddorf, Matthew Frise, Kolja Keller, Jonathan Matheson, and John Komdat. Parts of this paper are adapted from my dissertation, An Evidentialist Epistemology of Testimony.
- 2.
See Dougherty and Rysiew (2013).
- 3.
Feldman and Conee (2004, 83).
- 4.
I understand doxastic attitudes to be representable as n on a scale of 1 ≤ n ≤ 0. Confidence above 0.5 corresponds to belief (the higher, the more confident with 1 representing certain belief), confidence below 0.5 to disbelief (the lower, the more confident one’s disbelief, with 0 representing certain disbelief), and 0.5 corresponding with withholding. Disbelief that p will be equivalent to belief that ¬p.
- 5.
Feldman and Conee (2004) call this “well-founded belief,” 93.
- 6.
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows, “justification” stands for “ultima facie propositional justification” unless stipulated otherwise.
- 7.
- 8.
Feldman (2014, 292).
- 9.
Adapted from Matheson (2009, 270).
- 10.
van Inwagen (2010).
- 11.
Christensen (2007, 193).
- 12.
Christensen (2007, 193).
- 13.
Christensen (2007, 193).
- 14.
The language of ‘isolation’ and ‘disclosure’ come from Feldman (2005, 219 & 220).
- 15.
It is sometimes added that peers share their bases for belief thoroughly. This may be added, but is unnecessary if it is stipulated that S1 has strong evidence that S2 is her peer.
- 16.
I am only concerned here with the evidential impact of the fact of disagreement. But other features of the disagreement are often important to how we understand the a case. For example, the fact that Christensen and his peer both came to the conclusions that the share was $43 and $45, respectively, does not defeat Christensen’s evidence that they are peers about whether or not $43 is the share. But if, as he describes in another case, the friend arrives at the conclusion that the shares are $450 each (a figure vastly larger than the bill itself), there is independent evidence that it is more likely that the friend errs than that Christensen does so. That a share of a bill cannot exceed the total amount would be further evidence about p in the schematic case beyond (199).
- 17.
(6) does not conflict with (3′) because it is not new evidence, just a spelling out of what S1’s evidence supports. Likewise with (7) below.
- 18.
Feldman (2006, 223). To my knowledge, the evidence of evidence principle is first mentioned here. An earlier principle about reasons in John Hardwig’s “Epistemic Dependence” is similar (1985, 336), especially as later formulated by Frederick Schmitt as “the principle of testimony”:If B has good reasons for believing A has good reasons for believing p, then B has good reasons for believing p. (1988, 298).
- 19.
Feldman (2014, 292).
- 20.
- 21.
Feldman (2014).
- 22.
Feldman (2014).
- 23.
Feldman (2014).
- 24.
For simplicity, I am assuming the truth of the uniqueness thesis (UT), that is, “for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P” (Matheson (2011), 360). Without UT, the same conclusion follows in cases in which S 1 has evidence that S 2’s attitude toward p is outside the range of permitted doxastic attitudes toward p.
- 25.
Kvanvig (2010) comes the closest so far in outlining a view like the one that I describe in the following pages. My view differs from his in a number of ways, especially in that my view is developed without assuming that higher-level evidence is not evidence or with his emphasis on “closure of inquiry” as part of the problem of disagreement (52–53). Also see discussions in Elga (2007) of expert and novice disagreement.
- 26.
It might be objected that in such a case, Fred might have some miniscule residue of undefeated evidence for d based on the very unlikely event that he erred in his judgment that ¬d. If so, I concede it. The defeat might not be complete. But the change in attitude would be so slight that, unless Fred is doing epistemology, he would describe his attitude as unchanged.
- 27.
See discussion in Bergmann (2005).
- 28.
Lackey (2007, 352).
- 29.
Lackey (2007, 352).
- 30.
I have noted that I am dubious that Morris knows. It becomes much easier for me to imagine him knowing, however, as he proceeds. His belief may be confirmed as he starts to see signs indicating that the Sears Tower is ahead or spots what looks like it might be the Sears Tower between the other skyscrapers. In this case, the initial testimonial belief is supplemented by other experiences and the knowledge is not strictly testimonial.
- 31.
- 32.
See especially chapter 4, “Replying to the Not Enough Evidence Objection” in Rowley (2016).
- 33.
- 34.
That is, other than the mere fact that S testifies to the truth of some proposition. The manner of testifying may serve as mind-reading evidence for other propositions, such as “I would like to hurry up and finish this conversation so that I can go to the bathroom” or “I’m enjoying this restaraunt.” Thanks to Earl Conee for bringing this point to my attention.
- 35.
I have intentionally left open the possibility that S is not an individual, but a group. A worry: do groups have evidence in the same sense of “evidence” that individuals do? A way in which they might is by virtue of some member possessing evidence and that evidence contributing to the observed actions of the group. If we understand a group having evidence as entailing possession of the evidence by one or more members, then having mind-reading evidence applies to groups. If we understand groups having “evidence” in some other way, then mind-reading evidence may need restriction to individuals.
- 36.
There is a growing literature on the epistemology of groups (see Lackey (2014)). I am assuming a minimalist approach to collective epistemology which reduces the evidence possessed by groups to evidence possessed by its members. A more robust collective epistemology that would allow groups to possess evidence would make it even easier to account for group testimonial and mind-reading evidence.
- 37.
Baker and Clark (2018) have an interesting argument along similar lines, arguing that the ability to “pass the buck” is not distinctive of testimonial knowledge.
- 38.
- 39.
It might be that the distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge does not lie in the evidence. Goldberg (2006) argues that being able to pass the buck is distinctive of testimonial knowledge, though Baker and Clark (2018) suggest that this may only be distinctive of what I have called “social evidence.” Another source of the distinctiveness of testimony suggested in Moran (2006) might be in special responsibilities that testifiers have for the truth. If this is an epistemic property, it is not ruled out by HOSE.
- 40.
Perhaps we might say “minds,” because, though social epistemologists may focus on our relationships with other humans, we interact with non-human animals that possess comparable organs of perception to our own and may thereby have comparable evidence.
- 41.
Not everyone thinks that this distinction is of great epistemological importance (see Sosa (2006)). It does not rule out some uses of others as instruments, where bodies (without the interference of minds) may be used as instruments. For example, sweat might indicate warmth or goosebumps might indicate cold, even if the individual never actually felt either (e.g., if sedated).
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Rowley, W.D. (2018). An Evidentialist Social Epistemology. In: McCain, K. (eds) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Synthese Library, vol 398. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_9
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