Abstract
Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that most women employees at the firm are administrative assistants—motivate moral encroachment. I then describe weaknesses of moral encroachment. Finally I explain how we can countenance the moral properties of such beliefs without endorsing moral encroachment, and I argue that the moral status of such beliefs cannot be evaluated independently from the understanding in which they are embedded.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Stroud (2006: 518).
- 3.
- 4.
Stroud (2006: 519).
- 5.
Stroud (2006: 522, emphasis in original).
- 6.
Stroud (2006: 519–22).
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- 8.
I am not committed to evidentialism; in this paper I defend evidentialism against a family of arguments pressed by advocates of moral encroachment. Moral encroachment denies the strong evidentialist claim that the justificatory status of a belief depends only on evidential factors. Some versions of moral encroachment—such as that advanced by Schroeder (forthcoming)—are consistent with the weaker evidentialist claim that only evidence can contribute to the justification of a belief; Schroeder holds that moral factors can influence the threshold of evidential support required for a belief to qualify as justified.
- 9.
See James (1956/1896) and Aikin (2008) for discussion of a related Jamesian idea: that antecedent beliefs concerning a prospective friendship might be necessary conditions for the success of the friendship, before the evidence supports those beliefs. The (evidentially unsupported) beliefs are thus necessary for their own (future) truth.
- 10.
Thanks to Clayton Littlejohn for helpful discussions on this topic.
- 11.
Thanks to Rima Basu for helpful discussion of these issues. Armour (1994: 795) suggests ‘race-based predictions of an individual’s behaviour insufficiently recognize individual autonomy by reducing people to predictable objects rather than treating them as autonomous entities’ but, unlike Basu, Armour does not claim this is a distinctively epistemic error.
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Alfano (2013: 108).
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For further examples of recent theorists arguing that factors deemed non-epistemic by orthodox epistemology bear on the epistemic status of a belief, see Rinard (2015, 2017), McCormick (2015), Pace (2011), Dotson (2008, 2014), Ross and Schroeder (2014), Stanley (2005, 2015, especially chapter six), Fantl and McGrath (2002), Guerrero (2007), and Buchak (2014). These theorists either argue that epistemic norms answer to norms in other domains, or deny there are distinctively epistemic norms. For further discussion, see also Hazlett (2016), Fritz (2017), Natalie Ashton (2015), Ashton and McKenna (forthcoming), and Arpaly (2003: chapter 3).
- 14.
Advocates of moral encroachment include Basu (Submitted a, b, c, d), Schroeder (forthcoming), Basu and Schroeder (forthcoming), Moss (forthcoming), Bolinger (Submitted), and Pace (2011). See also Munton (Submitted), Fritz (2017), and Enoch (2016) for discussion. See also Arpaly (2003: chapter 3) for related discussion. Note that Arpaly’s discussion concerns the normativity of false morally relevant beliefs; in Arpaly’s view morally wrong beliefs also exhibit orthodox epistemic error.
- 15.
Schroeder (forthcoming) specifies that on his view there are only non-evidential epistemic reasons against belief; there are no non-evidential epistemic reasons for belief.
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See Franklin (2005: 4; 340) and Gendler (2011). Gendler invokes this example to illustrate a putative tension between the demands of morality and the demands of epistemic normativity. Basu (Submitted a), Schroeder (forthcoming), Basu and Schroeder (forthcoming), and Bolinger (Submitted) have since invoked Franklin’s experience to motivate moral encroachment. See also the similar ‘Mexican restaurant’ case in Basu (Submitted b: 5). This kind of error is ubiquitous. As Obama observes in Westfall (2014), ‘there’s no black male [his] age, who’s a professional, who hasn’t come out of a restaurant and is waiting for their car and somebody didn’t hand them their car keys.’
- 17.
Adapted from Moss (forthcoming).
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Adapted from Basu (Submitted a: 3).
- 19.
See for example, Moss (forthcoming) and Bolinger (Submitted). For the role of relevant alternatives in epistemology, see Lewis (1996) and Dretske (1970).
- 20.
Basu (Submitted a, c), Schroeder (forthcoming), Basu and Schroeder (forthcoming), and Fritz (2017). Bolinger (Submitted) also emphasises the epistemic significance of the harms of error, including the aggregate harms of many people committing the same errors based on demographic evidence. For more on the role of stakes in pragmatic encroachment, see Fantl and McGrath (2002) and Stanley (2005).
- 21.
See especially Basu (Submitted a, b, c), Basu and Schroeder (forthcoming), Bolinger (Submitted), and Gendler (2011) for statements of this view. The racist structure of society also plausibly affects the epistemic rationality of non-racist beliefs based on race. Charles Mills (2003: 43) writes,
Especially in a time period […] of blatant racial domination […] whites were socialized to be racist, looked down on people of color, and treated them accordingly. So in their relations to their nonwhite fellow-humans, most whites were indeed “bad”—and a generalization […] to this effect would be perfectly reasonable on Bayesian grounds. Indeed, we would be justified in questioning the rationality of a black person who, in the depths, say, of turn-of-the-twentieth century Mississippi, expected fair treatment from whites!
- 22.
Strictly speaking Schroeder suggests that evidentialism should embrace moral encroachment by allowing that, even though only evidence can justify a belief, what qualifies as sufficient evidence for justification can vary depending on the moral stakes. I will not evaluate whether the resulting view can qualify as a species of evidentialism, but it certainly differs from how evidentialists have hitherto understood the view.
- 23.
See, for example, Appiah (1990), Begby (2013), Mills (1997, 2003, 2007), Ikuenobe (2011), Clough and Loges (2008), Gordon (1995, 2000), Shelby (2002, 2016), Memmi (2014), Lengbeyer (2004) Arpaly and Schroeder (2014), Arpaly (2003), Fricker (2007) and the discussion of ‘restricted accounts’ in Basu (Submitted a). See also Munton (Submitted), who describes an underappreciated epistemic error commonly infecting racist beliefs about statistics.
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This example is inspired by Moss (forthcoming).
- 25.
For background on the proof paradox and the inadequacy of merely statistical evidence, see Thomson (1986), Gardiner (forthcoming, Submitted), Bolinger (Submitted), Buchak (2014), and Smith (2010). See also the related lottery paradoxes (Kyburg (1961), Harman (1968)), Nelkin (2000), and Hawthorne (2004)). If belief aims at knowledge and beliefs based on merely statistical evidence fail to be knowledge, this might explain the fault of outright belief based on merely statistical evidence: even if correct the belief cannot (in principle) be knowledge on that kind of evidential basis. Beliefs with faults such as poor testimony, misidentifying an anticipated greeter, or misinterpreting anecdotes do not share this flaw. See also Moss (forthcoming: 166). Note the beliefs might well be flawed in more than one way. A belief might be faulty because based on statistical evidence and also faulty because the evidence is insufficient given the high stakes. Thanks to Sarah Moss for emphasising this point.
- 26.
Perhaps extremely-probabilifying statistical evidence can support outright belief. Perhaps, for instance, believing your ticket did not win the national lottery is epistemically justified. But purely statistical demographic evidence on this order does not typically arise. Cases about gender, race, sexuality, and so on with this kind of extreme statistical evidence are rare, and I am not sure we have good intuitions about these cases. Normal cases have much weaker and more complicated demographic evidence. I return to this in Sect. 11.6.
- 27.
See also Basu and Schroeder (forthcoming).
- 28.
See Moss (forthcoming, especially section 10.4), Armour (1994), and Basu (Submitted d). Note Moss discusses the normativity of belief in a probabilistic content (that is, a set of probability spaces), rather than beliefs concerning likelihoods given certain contextually determined information. Some of Schroeder and Basu’s motivations for moral encroachment extend to moral encroachment about beliefs representing what is likely. Basu argues, for example, that believing someone shoplifted based on statistical evidence is wrong because it hurts (Basu Submitted a: 11). But similarly believing someone probably shoplifted on this evidence also hurts. Basu and Schroeder (forthcoming) argue that you should not believe on weak evidence that your spouse has fallen off the wagon, given the high stakes, even if the same evidence would license belief about a stranger’s drinking. But presumably similar considerations apply to the belief that your spouse probably fell off the wagon. Bolinger (Submitted) and Schroeder (forthcoming) discuss, but do not endorse, moral encroachment on credences.
- 29.
See for example Eaton and Pickavance (2015), Ichikawa et al. (2012), Worsnip (2015), and Munton (Submitted: 28–9). Schroeder (forthcoming) emphasises that his version of moral encroachment posits beliefs that are stable over time, and holds that he thereby avoids many objections that encroachment views typically confront.
- 30.
Basu (Submitted a, c), Schroeder (forthcoming), and Basu and Schroeder (forthcoming). Bolinger (Submitted) also emphasises that moral considerations arise particularly when beliefs contribute to overall patterns of oppression. Idiosyncratic beliefs about an individual based on statistical evidence, such as the belief that a black person likely cannot draw well based on their race, are less harmful than stereotypical beliefs, such as that black people consume more narcotics. See also Anderson (2010) and Armour (1994).
- 31.
Reflecting on this case also raises the concern that the edicts of moral encroachment are not psychologically possible, since it is not possible to suspend judgement despite compelling evidence. I will not evaluate in this essay the psychological availability of suspending belief despite evidence, in part because I think the evidence in these cases is weaker than usually appreciated.
- 32.
See also Eaton and Pickavance (2015).
- 33.
Thanks to Renee Bolinger for pointing out that the base rate of Asian people in the area bears on the evidential significance of race in this example.
- 34.
The effect of social group on likelihoods can be indirect. A person’s race might affect their likely economic circumstances, for example, which can affect the probability they are incarcerated.
- 35.
Basu (Submitted a).
- 36.
Kim (2017: 7) and Piller (2016). As Ichikawa, Jarvis, and Rubin (2012) comment, ‘The most widely discussed argument to date against pragmatic encroachment is that it is counterintuitive.’ Although see Grimm (2011) and Marušić (2015) for nuanced discussions of the burden of proof concerning pragmatic encroachment.
- 37.
Racists, sexists, and so on would delight in the idea that their opponents resisted impartial evaluation of the evidence when adjudicating facts about individuals based on race and other social categories, and that they did not aim to maximise true belief concerning crime, education level and so on.
- 38.
- 39.
See, for example, Munton (Submitted), Basu (Submitted d), Gendler (2011), and Armour (1994).
- 40.
To further illustrate the trouble with everyday statistical reasoning concerning crime: infamously when some white people see a black person nearby they worry about crime. (Consider, for instance, the phenomenon of women pulling their purses closer.) But most crime is committed by people of the victim’s race. This statistic indicates white people should be more suspect of other white people. But, then, this statistic is largely underwritten by the pattern that people commit crime near where they live, and American housing is not very integrated, so one ‘should’ correct for that… The ‘reasoning’ could continue. My point is not to estimate which demographics one should associate with crime risk. My point is instead that almost every association between an individual and behaviour such as crime based on a social category such as race commits basic epistemic mistakes. See also Armour (1994: 792–3).
- 41.
See Bolinger (Submitted, especially the appendix), Leslie (forthcoming), Moss (forthcoming), Hájek (2007), Venn (1866), Reichenbach (1949), and Munton (Submitted). See also Armour (1994: 791; 809–14).
- 42.
Franklin (2005: 4). Of course similar errors happened when Franklin was younger. But my point is to illustrate that there is usually counterevidence in these real life case that are not represented in artificial, oversimplifying vignettes. This counterevidence contributes to the affront. If the person were not prejudicially associating ‘Black’ with ‘staff’ she would likely heed the counterevidence.
- 43.
There may also be a moral and an epistemic flaw in persistent attention to particular facts. This flaw might also be exhibited in the vignettes marshalled by advocates of moral encroachment. I owe this suggestion to Jessie Munton and Dan Greco.
- 44.
Spencer’s noticing the trend, his keenness to find evidence, and his applying the generalised belief to Jamal might be evidence of prejudice. See Arpaly (2003) for related discussion.
- 45.
- 46.
I was writing this book chapter in a coffee shop when two young men approached and asked how my homework was coming along. I explained that I was writing a book chapter, so it wasn’t homework exactly, but that I was enjoying thinking about the topic. I do not think they wronged me by assuming I was doing homework. Perhaps most people in a cafe who look relatively young, wear informal attire, and make notes in books and papers are doing homework; not many are writing book chapters. The base rates favour their initial belief. Plausibly their belief simply accorded with the evidence. But my interlocutors couldn’t shake their initial belief. They assumed they misheard me (‘You are writing about a book chapter, you say?’) They acted extremely surprised, and it took a number of rounds of questioning before they revised their belief, such as skeptically asking for the book title. Plausibly being committed to their initial belief, and reluctant to revise this belief in light of new evidence, was morally poor treatment. But evidentialism can countenance this thought. One of the young men, who was about to enrol at a local community college, offered me some writing advice: ‘Use examples’ he suggested, ‘to explain your points’. I hope, dear reader, you appreciate the example.
- 47.
- 48.
To target versions of moral encroachment that focus on the distinctive wrong of forming a belief about a person based on statistical evidence, instead consider a relevant ‘base rate’ example.
- 49.
Joan’s understanding might also include (connections to) her relevant emotional reactions.
- 50.
Thinking about understanding can play a further role in accounting for the epistemic normativity of these kinds of beliefs. When we form beliefs there is a chance to gain true belief, which is valuable, and a risk of false belief, which is disvaluable. One question moral encroachment seeks to answer is how to weigh these competing considerations. Moral encroachment replies that the relative weight depends on the moral stakes. If the moral stakes are high, we should be risk averse in belief, and so seek more evidence. (Although see Worsnip (2015) for an objection to encroachment as a response to weighing the relative risks of error.) Wayne Riggs (2003) instead proposes that the relative values of attaining truth and avoiding error can be weighed by how beliefs contribute to, or impede, understanding. If Riggs’s proposal is fruitful it provides a second way that theorising about understanding undermines a motivation for moral encroachment.
- 51.
Note that the relationship between group averages and individual scores is often misunderstood and misinterpreted.
- 52.
We agree that moral faults, such as sexism, can cause orthodox epistemic errors such as misevaluating available evidence. But I hold that if a belief is morally amiss it must also exhibit an orthodox epistemic error, such as reflecting evidence poorly or being embedded within a faulty understanding of the world.
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Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Rima Basu, Renee Bolinger, Jon Garthoff, Sa’eed Husaini, Kevin McCain, Jessie Munton, Ted Poston, Susanna Schellenberg, Paul Silva, and Ernest Sosa for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this essay. Thanks also to Mike Ashfield, Natalie Ashton, John Bengson, Amy Floweree, Christopher Humphreys, Hilary Kornblith, Clayton Littlejohn, Sarah Moss, David Plunkett, Regina Rini, Cat Saint-Croix, and Mark Schroeder for helpful discussion about these ideas. Many thanks to audiences at Western Washington University, Australian National University, Cologne University, and the 2018 Joint Session for useful feedback. Finally, thanks to Mark Alfano, Scott Aikin, Jennifer Saul and several active members of the Facebook group Board Certified Epistemologists for drawing my attention to relevant literature.
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Gardiner, G. (2018). Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment. In: McCain, K. (eds) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Synthese Library, vol 398. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_11
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