Skip to main content

Cooperatives in the Age of Sharing

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Collaboration in the Digital Age

Part of the book series: Progress in IS ((PROIS))

Abstract

Airbnb and Uber are two outstanding examples of the sharing economy, a recently observed tendency that people are willing to share their property or to rent property instead of owning it. There is a vast literature on the prospects of the sharing economy and on the economics of platforms, which enable the sharing economy. Less research is found on the reasons for this development and on the question whether these new types of transactions require new governance frameworks. In this paper we will show, what explains the individual ownership decision and how changing preferences and changing transaction costs may lead to the sharing economy. Platforms play a crucial role in lowering the transaction costs, but they come along with new dependencies because they tend to become monopolies over time. Thus, platforms may start to exploit their dominant position at the expense of platform users. We will show that the—up to now purely fictitious—idea of a platform operated as a cooperative, i.e. a platform that is owned by its users, would significantly mitigate the users’ exploitability and reduce their dependency costs. We will distinguish different types of platform cooperatives and we will classify them according to applicability in the sharing economy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    For this extended view see for example PwC (2016), p. 3.

  2. 2.

    This only refers to the CPU use, for which it makes no difference whether the processor is running idle or is actually computing.

  3. 3.

    Peitz and Schwalbe (2016), p. 233.

  4. 4.

    Miller (2016), p. 150.

  5. 5.

    Sundararajan (2014).

  6. 6.

    This differentiation follows Demary (2015) or Rauch and Schneider (2015), p. 11, who discriminate between peer-to-peer sharing and asset hubs.

  7. 7.

    See for example Katz (2015), p. 1073 explicitly mentioning the peer-to-peer characteristic.

  8. 8.

    See for example Dittmann and Kuchinke (2015), p. 245, Peitz and Schwalbe (2016), p. 235, Fraiberger and Sundararajan (2015), Katz (2015), p. 1070.

  9. 9.

    Horton and Zeckhauser (2016) is one of the rare papers discussing the ownership-rental decision in an economic model, but is not taking into account the criteria listed below.

  10. 10.

    This research is based on the pathbreaking contributions by Coase (1937), Williamson (1985) for a transaction cost perspective and Hart (1995) for a property rights view. A textbook presentation extending the number of criteria can be found in Picot, Dietl, Franck, Fiedler, and Royer (2015), p. 70.

  11. 11.

    One exception is the joint use of products like for BlaBlaCar, where the supply od the service can only be offered if the owner uses the good (in the case of BlaBlaCar the car).

  12. 12.

    Cf. Malone, Yates, and Benjamin (1987) and Malone (2004). Clemons, Reddi, and Row (1993) provide are more detailed analysis of transaction cost in make-or buy decisions of the firm.

  13. 13.

    The characteristics of two-sided markets have been analyzed extensively in Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006).

  14. 14.

    For a more detailed differentiation of indirect network externalities see Peitz (2006).

  15. 15.

    Rare exemptions are smaller platforms that create additional value for their members like a certain specialization, which over-compensates the size benefits of larger platforms.

  16. 16.

    See Monopolkommission (2016), no. 1233 on the impediments of switching platforms.

  17. 17.

    These power law or long-tail effects have been initially described by Anderson (2006).

  18. 18.

    In cooperatives demand or supply can be bundled. In the following we will confine ourselves to the demand side. Nevertheless, all arguments also apply to supply-side cooperatives.

  19. 19.

    Type I and type II cooperatives resemble the peer-to-peer sharing and the asset-hubs by Demary (2015) or Rauch and Schneider (2015), p. 11.

  20. 20.

    One example is OSADL eG. OSADL is a cooperative that produces open source software solutions for companies of the machinery industry. Members of the cooperative are companies from the machinery industry (demand side) and IT companies programming the software (supply side).

References

  • Armstrong, M. (2006). Competition in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 668–691.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, Ch. (2006). The Long Tail, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clemons, E. K., Reddi, S., & Row, M. C. (1993). The impact of information technology on the organization of economic activity: The “Move to the Middle” hypothesis. Journal of Management Information Systems, 10(2), 9–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Demary, V. (2015). Competition in the sharing economy. Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, IW Policy Paper No. 19, Cologne.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dittmann, H./ Kuchinke, B. (2015): Ordnungsökonomische Aspekte der Sharing Economy. In ORDO – Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Vol. 66, pp. 243–262).

    Google Scholar 

  • Fraiberger, S., & Sundararajan, A. (2015). Peer-to-peer rental markets in the sharing economy. NET-Institute Working Paper No. 15-19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart, O. (1995): Firms, Constracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horton, J. J., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (2016). Owning, using and renting: Some simple economics of the “Sharing Economy”. NBER Working Paper No. 22029.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katz, V. (2015). Regulating the sharing economy. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 30(4), 1067–1126.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malone, Th. W. (2004). The Future of Work, Boston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malone, Th W, Yates, J., & Benjamin, R. I. (1987). Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies. Communications of the ACM, 30(6), 484–497.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Monopolkommission. (2016). Wettbewerb 2016. Einundzwanzigstes Hauptgutachten, Baden-Baden.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peitz, M. (2006). Marktplätze und indirekte Netzwerkeffekte. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 7(3), 317–333.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peitz, M., & Schwalbe, U. (2016). Kollaboratives Wirtschaften oder Turbokapitalismus. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 17(3), 232–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Picot, A., Dietl, H., Franck, E., Fiedler, M., & Royer, S. (2015). Organisation – Theorie und Praxis aus ökonomischer Sicht, 7th ec. Stuttgart.

    Google Scholar 

  • PwC. (2016). Assessing the size and presence of the collaborative economy in Europe. http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/16952/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native.

  • Rauch, D. E., & Schleicher, D. (2015). Like Uber, but for local governmental policy: The future of local regulation on the “Sharing Economy”. George Mason University Law and Economic Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 15-01.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rochet, J-Ch., & Tirole, J. (2006). Two-sided markets: A progress report. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 645–667.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sundararajan, A. (2014). Peer-to-peer businesses and the sharing (collaborative) economy: Overview, economic effects and regulatory issues. https://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/1-15-2014_revised_sundararajan_testimony.pdf.

  • Williamson, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism, New York et al.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Theresia Theurl .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Theurl, T., Meyer, E. (2019). Cooperatives in the Age of Sharing. In: Riemer, K., Schellhammer, S., Meinert, M. (eds) Collaboration in the Digital Age. Progress in IS. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94487-6_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics