Firms’ Cooperative Innovation Behaviors and Evolutionary Mechanism of Innovation Ecosystem

Abstract

The success of an innovating firm often depends on other innovators’ efforts in its innovation ecosystem. This study investigates asymmetric firms’ cooperative behaviors of innovation ecosystem based on the evolutionary game model. To analyze the evolutionary mechanism of innovation ecosystem, bounded rationality and opportunism are considered in the process of cooperation between core and complementary firms. By examining the impact of technology licensing on the decision of technology sharing and cooperative attitude, we find that both “sharing/positive cooperation” and “no sharing/negative cooperation” are evolutionary stability strategies of innovation ecosystem. When core firms enhance the licensing fee of key technology, complementary firms will reduce the cooperative chance with core firms, then “no sharing/negative cooperation” will become the evolutionary stability strategy of system. When complementary firms enhance the technology input, core firms will increase the sharing rate of key technology, then “sharing/positive cooperation” will become the evolutionary stability strategy of system. This study highlights the value of interoperability between asymmetric firms, and stresses that value cocreation and appropriation are not mutually exclusive strategies in interfirm cooperation.