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EU Competition Law After Directive 2014/104/EU and Its Implementation in Italy

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Abstract

The admissibility of damages actions has not come as a surprise in Italy, when the Court of Justice of the European Union first upheld it in the Courage case. Nevertheless, Directive 2014/104/EU is to be welcome in order to grant more legal certainty in national proceedings. The Italian legislator has enacted the Directive by decreto legislativo 3/2017 (legislative decree). This chapter aims at analysing the new rules on private enforcement under the light of the Italian transposition and relevant praxis. It finally highlights the general line of continuity between the previous case law and the current system, and, at the same time, points out some meaningful breaks with the traditional solutions of the Italian legal system.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2001, p. 1).

  2. 2.

    Case 127/73 BRT [1974] ECR 313, ECLI:EU:C:1974:6.

  3. 3.

    Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.

  4. 4.

    According to Komninos (2008), p. 165, and Jones and Sufrin (2016), p. 1060, the Francovich case (Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] I-5357, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428) was a consistent precedent, since it stated the general rule of the admissibility of damages actions for the infringement of EU Law. In the case at stake, the infringer was the State, but it can easily be an individual too, provided that the relevant EU Law provisions are directly applicable.

  5. 5.

    Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi and others [2006] ECR I-6619, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461.

  6. 6.

    Case C-199/11, Otis [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:684.

  7. 7.

    Case C-557/12, Kone AG and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:1327.

  8. 8.

    For further details: Domenicucci (2014), p. 179; Iannuccelli (2015), p. 131.

  9. 9.

    Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1). The adoption of this Directive has not been uncontested. The Commission started working on it back in 2005, the same period when the Manfredi case was discussed. This notwithstanding, the Directive codifies the CJEU’s case law to a large extent (Pallotta 2017, p. 626). For an analysis of the backgrounds of the Directive see: Meyring (2012), p. 126; Vreck (2012), p. 278; Benacchio (2013), p. 16; Jones and Sufrin (2016), p. 1070; Rossi dal Pozzo (2017), Wils (2017), p. 21; Lianos et al. (2015), p. 33.

  10. 10.

    The updated information is available at EUR-LEX. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32014L0104&qid=1503475032452. Accessed 19 Apr. 2018.

  11. 11.

    Case C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream, Ltd. [2000] ECR I-11369, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689.

  12. 12.

    The rule is so absolute that it applies to Appeal Courts, too. If a NCA’s decision, or a first instance judgment is appealed, and the Commission adopts any measure in the meantime, the appeal court must overrule the decision conflicting with the Commission’s subsequent decision (Case T-289/01 Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschland GmbH [2007] ECR II-1691, ECLI:EU:T:2007:155). The same principle cannot be extended to comfort letters, or to any non-definitive measure which does not conclude the proceedings.

  13. 13.

    Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452.

  14. 14.

    Komninos (2008), p. 77 stresses that there was no full faith and credit among NCAs and national Courts at the time of enacting the Regulation, on which a “mutual recognition” of the decisions might be grounded.

  15. 15.

    Law of 10 October 1990, No 287, Rules on the safeguard of the competition and the market (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (Italian Official Journal) [1990] 240).

  16. 16.

    On these debates, more recently: Castelli (2012), p. 35; Catalozzi (2013), p. 275.

  17. 17.

    Castronovo (2004a), p. 469; Castronovo (2004b) p. 1168. As a consequence, consumers should sue only their contractual counterparty before a first instance court.

  18. 18.

    Libertini (2004), p. 933; Libertini (2005), p. 237.

  19. 19.

    For example, Cassazione Civile sez. I (Supreme Court, Civil Section, First Chamber) 4 March 1999, No 1811; Cassazione Civile sez. I (Supreme Court, Civil Section, First Chamber) 9 December 2002, No 17475 concluded that consumers have no legal standing according to Article 33(2) of Law No 287/1990. Therefore, the first instance Court—and not the Court of Appeal—must be seized.

  20. 20.

    Cassazione Civile Sezioni Unite (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Grans Chamber) 4 February 2005, No 2207. The judgment gave rise to a strong debate; for criticism: Casoria and Pardolesi (2015), I, 2752; instead, Inzitari (2005), p. 498, welcomed it. For more information on the current legal standing of consumers in Italian legal system: Fattori (2013), p. 285.

  21. 21.

    Court of Appeal of Milan, 18 July 1995; more recently: Court of Appeal of Milan, 11 July 2003; Cassazione Civile, sez. I (Supreme Court, Civil Section, First Chamber) 13 February 2009, No 3640.

  22. 22.

    Legislative Decree 27 June 2003, No 168, Undertakings Tribunal (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (Italian Official Journal) [2003] 159).

  23. 23.

    Legislative Decree 19 January 2017, No 3, Implementation of Directive 2014/104 (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (Italian Official Journal) [2017] 15. The first Italian complete comment of the decree is available in Meli et al. (2018), pp. 119–268.

  24. 24.

    Therefore, the Directive applies to claims based both on EU Competition and/or national Competition Law (Article 2(1)(1)). Article 2(1)(b) of Legislative Decree No 3/2017 offers the same definition (Zoboli (2016)). The parallelism implements the principle of equivalence: internal and EU situations are subject to the same set of rules.

  25. 25.

    Wils (2017), p. 24.

  26. 26.

    Nevertheless, this should not be considered as a gap in the Directive. The CJEU’s case law does not recognise any relevance to the psychological element of the violation of EU Law, whether the infringer is the State or an individual. Consequently, it should not have any weight even in the scope of application of EU Competition Law. Contra: Libertini (2014), p. 489, who refers to the general provisions of the Italian Civil Code and the consequent application of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence; see also: Reich (2007), p. 705.

  27. 27.

    Consumer class actions can be an important tool within private enforcement, due to the frequently low value of the claims (Dunne 2015, p. 583; Scuffi 2015, p. 67; Villa 2015, p. 304). Nascimbene (2013), p. 269; Libertini (2014), p. 468, submit that the absence of EU harmonisation is a deficiency within the Directive. Article 140bis of the Italian Consumer Code (Decreto legislativo 6 September 2005, No 206 on the reform of the regulation for the protection of the consumer (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (Italian Official Journal) Supplemento Ordinario (Ordinary integration) [2005] 162) introduces a form of opt-in class action. According to Article 1(1) of Legislative Decree No 3/2017, the harmonised rules on damages actions are applicable to class actions, too. The sole common EU measure is the Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress” (COM/2013/401 final). The Communication has a horizontal scope, since it is applicable to all forms of collective redress, notwithstanding the subject matter and the object of action. The Commission suggests an opt-in system.

  28. 28.

    Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (OJ L 351, 20.11.2012, p. 1).

  29. 29.

    Case C-386/05 Color Drack [2007] ECR I-3699, ECLI:EU:C:2007:262.

  30. 30.

    Supposing that the place where the harmful event has occurred (Article 7(1)(2)) is Palermo, we wonder how Tribunale delle Imprese of Naples can be considered close to the factual situation.

  31. 31.

    Joined Cases C-400/13 and C-408/13 Sanders and Huber [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461.

  32. 32.

    Case C-283/16 M.S. [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:104.

  33. 33.

    The position of the Court in Manfredi was less clear-cut, but stressed the compensative aim of the damages action.

  34. 34.

    Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 167, 3.6.2013, p. 19).

  35. 35.

    The preference among various methods depends necessarily on the information available for each single case at stake: Caprile (2016), p. 697. In the Italian Brennercom saga, the experts in economics, required to assist the judge, presented structured opinions on the economic methods for the quantification of harm; Carli (2017), p. 105. The methods are contested from both a practical and an economic perspective, but according to Buccirossi (2014), p. 323, the outcome of the analysis should be subject to an evaluation of its intrinsic consistency, rationality and solidity. Indeed, a “but for” analysis requires a comparison with a hypothetical situation, which leads to practical difficulties and uncertainties: Dunne (2015), p. 592; Rose and Bailey (2013), p. 1249; Al Mureden and de Pamphilis (2017), p. 140; Lianos et al. (2015), p. 161.

  36. 36.

    The Italian legal system does not provide for the award of punitive or multiple damages. Therefore, the application of foreign law and the recognition of a foreign judgment may give rise to practical difficulties, insofar as the overcompensation has deterring functions. For further details see Busnelli (2009), p. 909.

  37. 37.

    Villa (2015), p. 302; Bruzzone and Saija (2017), p. 14.

  38. 38.

    Article 2056 of the Italian Civil Code on torts refers to the very same provisions on the quantification of harm, which are included in the chapter devoted to obligations in general.

  39. 39.

    Court of Appeal of Milan, 11 July 2003.

  40. 40.

    Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, ECLI:EU:C:2003:513; Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006] ECR I-5177, ECLI:EU:C:2006:391.

  41. 41.

    Al Mureden and de Pamphilis (2017), p. 135.

  42. 42.

    ICA Decision No 8546, 28 July 2000.

  43. 43.

    Court of Appeal of Naples, First Civil Chamber, 27 April 2005, No 1310/05: Osti and Prostaro (2012), p. 242.

  44. 44.

    Cassazione Civile, sez. III (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Third Chamber) 2 February 2007, No 2305; Cassazione Civile 23 April 2014, No 9116; Cassazione Civile, sez. I (Supreme Court, Civil Section, First Chamber) 22 May 2013, No 12551; Cassazione Civile, sez. I (Supreme Court, Civil Section, First Chamber) 28 May 2014, No 11904.

  45. 45.

    Casszione Civile, sez. I (Supreme Court, Civil Section, First Chamber) 19 September 2013, No 21480; Court of First Instance of Milan, 26 May 2016, No 6666. This schizophrenic approach of the Supreme Court brings uncertainties in the first instance and appeals Courts regarding the legal value of the ICA’s decision (Giudice di Pace di Lecce, 30 January 2003; Giudice di Pace di Roma, 21 March 2003, No 13638), or in the request of the proof thereof in follow-on cases, too (Court of Appeal of Naples, 14 April 2008, No 1430).

  46. 46.

    For an Italian case note: Botta (2013), p. 11.

  47. 47.

    Meyring (2012), p. 135; Rose and Bailey (2013), p. 1242; Whish and Bailey (2015), p. 317. The topic of the passing-on is not new in a comparative perspective: the first cases were decided in the USA in the mid-1960s Harris and Sullivan (1979), p. 269.

  48. 48.

    Harris and Sullivan (1979), p. 272.

  49. 49.

    Afferni (2009), p. 500; Wils (2017), p. 19; Ashton (2018), p. 43.

  50. 50.

    The scope of protection of EU Competition Law and the role of the consumer are still debated; see, recently: Andriychuk (2009), p. 77; Parret (2010), p. 339; Iannuccelli (2015), p. 13; Ioannidou (2015), p. 79.

  51. 51.

    The standard rules on the burden of proof require the evidence of the quantification of the overcharge. The Directive and its Italian implementation do not provide for any simplification thereof. The Commission has published the Study on the Passing-on of Overcharges, offering some possible economic approach to its quantification. In this case, too, the national Court has a duty to scrutinise economic models, and would need a technical expert to assist in its evaluations.

  52. 52.

    Afferni (2009), p. 510; Frignani (2012), p. 53, challenge the admissibility of a damages claim presented by the former workers of the excluded undertaking(s) presuming that it is not too direct an effect of the cartel. The authors submit that a purchase under the umbrella-pricing effect is not an immediate consequence of the cartel, too, but still the purchaser is a victim of the cartel according to the Kone case.

  53. 53.

    Castelli (2012), p. 70.

  54. 54.

    The Commission’s proposal did not envisage such exceptions and the subsequent preparatory measures do not justify them (Wils 2017, p. 28).

  55. 55.

    Schepisi (2017), p. 91.

  56. 56.

    De Cristofaro (2018), p. 541.

  57. 57.

    Ameye (2016), p. 405.

  58. 58.

    Biavati (2007), p. 105.

  59. 59.

    Cassazione Civile, sez. I (Supreme Court, Civil Section, First Chamber) 4 June 2015, No 11564: Geraci (2015), p. 537; Di Via and Leone (2015), p. 233.

  60. 60.

    The general rule in Italian civil procedure would require the determination of every single item of evidence. The request—and the order—would most probably look like “the email sent on …between X and Y, concerning the methods of calculation of the price of product A in the first half of 2015”. It can be very easily submitted that claimants cannot be so precise in their request to the judge. If they were, they would barely need the disclosure of documents.

  61. 61.

    Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). For its application to Competition cases: Komninos (2008), p. 108; Rose and Bailey (2013), p. 1227; Pace (2014), p. 247; Iannuccelli (2015), p. 131.

  62. 62.

    Schettino (2013), p. 154.

  63. 63.

    Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389; Case C-536/11, Donau Chemie [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:366. Further: Bastianon (2013), p. 111.

  64. 64.

    Chieppa (2014), p. 285.

  65. 65.

    Ameye (2016), p. 403.

  66. 66.

    Article 8 of the Directive gives Member States the duty to provide for effective sanctions for the infringement of disclosure orders. These are established in Article 6 of Legislative Decree No 3/2017, which provides for administrative sanctions.

  67. 67.

    The possible stay of proceedings was provided only in the case of stand-alone class actions (Article 140bis of the Italian Consumer Code). Legislative Decree No 3/2017 avoids any difference or discrimination between individual claims and collective redress (Zoboli 2016).

  68. 68.

    Cortese (2014a), p. 145.

  69. 69.

    Cassazione Civile, sez. I (Supreme Court, Civil Section, First Chamber) 13 February 2009, No 3638; Cassazione Civile, No 3640/2009; Cassazione Civile, sez. III (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Third Chamber), 20 June 2011, No 13486; Cassazione Civile, sez. III (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Third Chamber), 22 September 2011, No 19262.

  70. 70.

    Frignani (2013), p. 441.

  71. 71.

    Pera (2012), p. 69; Pera (2013) p. 387; Chieppa (2014), p. 281. Instaed, Radicati and Russo (2011), p. 1047, and Castelli (2012), p. 120, argue that these decisions do not contain any evaluation of the supposed infringers’ conduct.

  72. 72.

    Benacchio (2011), p. 560; Rordorf (2014), p. 784; Siragusa (2014), p. 298; Morbidelli (2015), p. 7; Villa (2015), p. 306; Giliberti (2016), p. 77; Trotta (2013), p. 361, analyse these issues in the light of the coordination between public and private enforcement in Italy.

  73. 73.

    The full-review jurisdiction of a first instance court seems more consistent with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Case No 43509/08, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, according to which Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights requires at least one instance, decided by a court, where the case is again reviewed in fact and in law. On the impact of this judgment on the Italian legal system: Siragusa and Rizza (2013), p. 408; Zagrebelsky (2014), p. 1196.

  74. 74.

    Pallotta (2017), p. 633.

  75. 75.

    Nascimbene (2017).

  76. 76.

    Bariatti and Perfetti (2009), p. 26. These concerns seem typical of the Southern EU countries (Cortese 2014b, p. 105).

  77. 77.

    Germany used two different approaches in follow-on and stand-alone cases. In the first, the aim of consistency was pushed to the greatest extent granting the primacy to public enforcement. In the second, the national Court was under no obligation to stay the proceedings and to wait for the Bundeskartellamt decision (OLG Düsseldorf VI-W (Kart) 6/06). As for UK case law see Whish and Bailey (2015), p. 335.

  78. 78.

    Nascimbene (2017) analyses the principle of mutual trust in civil and judicial cooperation, assuming that it is so strong in this field that no differences between national and foreign NCAs decisions should be admitted. The similarities of NCAs’ duties and commitments lead Pallotta (2017), p. 636 to the same conclusion.

  79. 79.

    Court of Appeal of Cagliari, 23 January 1999; Court of Appeal of Turin, 6 July 2000; Court of Appeal of Milan, 11 July 2003.

  80. 80.

    Meyring (2012), p. 145; Lianos et al. (2015), p. 231.

  81. 81.

    Under specific circumstances, the first judge seized may have jurisdiction to hear the related cases, too, if its national procedural law admits the consolidation thereof. Article 7 of Law 31 No 218 of May 1995, Reform of the system of private international law (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (Italian Official Journal) [1995] 128), is devoted to the coordination of international pending actions, if the claim is filed in a non-Member State of the EU. EU Law does not require any coordination with Third States, and it does not seem of the utmost importance in this field even from a national perspective. Indeed, if the foreign judgment risks jeopardising the EU rules on Competition Law, it must not be recognised for contrast with EU public policy (Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269). EU Competition Law requires a stricter approach to international coordination in general.

  82. 82.

    EU Law in general does not seem to provide a theory of the causal link in torts: Ashton (2018), p. 174; Caprile (2016), p. 691; Lianos et al. (2015), p. 69.

  83. 83.

    Cassazione Civile, No 2305/2007; Cassazione Civile, sez. III (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Third Chamber) 21 March 2011, No 6347.

  84. 84.

    Cassazione Civile, No 13486/2011; Cassazione Civile, sez. III (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Third Chamber) 10 May 2011, No 10211; Cassazione Civile, No 11904. In the insurance cases, the claimant only needed to present the ICA’s decision and to prove the insurance contract.

  85. 85.

    Palmieri (2011), p. 2674, and Frignani (2012), p. 429, observe that this approach jeopardises the right of the infringer’s judicial defence.

  86. 86.

    Villa (2015), p. 308, suggests stopping this automatism in the legislation implementing the Directive, but nothing in Legislative Decree No 3/2017 seems to prevent such interpretation.

  87. 87.

    Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 136, 24.5.2008, p. 3).

  88. 88.

    Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 63).

  89. 89.

    Bastianon (2017), p. 158; Zuffi (2018), p. 555.

  90. 90.

    Nascimbene and Rossi dal Pozzo (2008), p. 513.

  91. 91.

    Court of First Instance of Turin, 22 December 1998; Cassazione Civile, sez. III (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Third Chamber) 6 December 2011, No 26188; Cassazione Civile, No 2305/200.; Cassazione Civile, sez. III (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Third Chamber) 3 April 2013, No 8110; Cassazione Civile, No 12551/2013; Cassazione Civile, sez. III (Supreme Court, Civil Section, Third Chamber) 10 December 2013, No 27527.

  92. 92.

    Rordorf (2014), p. 784.

  93. 93.

    Reich (2007), p. 738.

  94. 94.

    Giannaccari (2017), p. 143.

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  1. Department of Law, Economics and Culture, University of Insubria, Como, Italy

    Silvia Marino

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  1. Department of Law, Economics and Culture, University of Insubria, Como, Italy

    Silvia Marino

  2. Institute of Applied Linguistics, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

    Łucja Biel

  3. Faculty of Law, Department of Foreign Languages, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia

    Martina Bajčić

  4. Department of Foreign Languages, Translation & Interpretation, Ionian University, Corfu, Greece

    Vilelmini Sosoni

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Marino, S. (2018). EU Competition Law After Directive 2014/104/EU and Its Implementation in Italy. In: Marino, S., Biel, Ł., Bajčić, M., Sosoni, V. (eds) Language and Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90905-9_9

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