Abstract
In this article Werhane and Simone de Colle discuss the implications of focussing on the moral motivation accounts offered by main ethical theories for improving the design of corporate ethics programs. Virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarianism offer different criteria of judgment to face moral dilemmas: Aristotle’s virtues of character, Kant’s categorical imperative, and Mill’s greatest happiness principle each provide criteria to answer the question “What is the right thing to do?” The paper then deals with the problem of moral motivation, and points out the relation between moral motivation and the concept of rationality in the different approaches in addressing the question whether acting morally is seen as an expression of rational behavior. This analysis of moral motivation provides a useful framework to improve the understanding of the relationships between formal and informal elements of corporate ethics programs. The authors suggest that the concept of moral imagination can provide a unifying approach to enhance the effectiveness of corporate ethics programs, by providing an intangible asset that supports the implementation of their formal components into management decision making.
Original publication: De Colle, Simone and Werhane, Patricia H. “Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories: What Can We Learn for Designing Corporate Ethics Programs?” Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 81:751–764. ©2008 Reprinted with permission.
De Colle, Simone and Werhane, Patricia H. “Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories: What Can We Learn for Designing Corporate Ethics Programs?” Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 81:751–764. ©2008 Reprinted with permission.
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Notes
- 1.
See Ed Hartman (2000: 64).
- 2.
See the comments by Christine M. Korsgaard in her Introduction of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- 3.
Norman Bowie argues that it is possible to defend a more flexible interpretation of Kant on this issue, by recognizing that there might be multiple motives to act – that is, it is possible that an action is done from duty and for practical prudence at the same time. See Bowie (1999: 120-125).
- 4.
The citation method used here refers to the volume and page number of the Academy (AK) edition.
- 5.
The idea that moral motivation can spring from reason is rejected by many other philosophical approaches. W.M. Sibley, for example, refers to the moral philosophy of Hume (1739), who famously stated that “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” to argue that Kant was wrong in trying to derive moral behavior from reason: “...what reason then tells me is not simply: “Be reasonable!” but rather: “Be reasonable – if you have to!” It issues only hypothetical imperatives. Hume is thus correct in seeing that morality does not spring from reason alone.” See Sibley (1953: 558).
- 6.
As our purpose here is to discuss the issue of moral motivation within utilitarian theory, we cannot further elaborate on this. However, as discussed in Gustafson (2001), at least the following three points must be noted:
-
(i)
Utilitarianism is not just about myopian, short-term maximization: The GHP does not state that the moral action is the one which generates the greatest actual and immediate happiness, but the one which tends (as a general rule) to promote happiness in society in the long term;
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(ii)
Utilitarianism is not selfish, but social: by differentiating between act and rule utilitarianism, Mill in fact recognizes the importance of acting in conformity with rules that ultimately provide for the greatest happiness, meaning that the theory allows to act in such a way that is not directly linked with the agent’s immediate self-interest, if it supports socially desirable rules of conduct (in other words, it recognizes the intrinsic importance attached to following certain rules of behavior, beyond their instrumental use);
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(iii)
Utilitarianism distinguishes higher from lower pleasures: “It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others” (Utilitarianism, 2.4.26). Higher pleasures – such as justice, noble feelings and moral sentiments – are ‘intrinsically superior’ as they are what qualifies human beings; they arise from the intellect and stimulate our imagination to think beyond the world of sense.
-
(i)
- 7.
See Harsanyi (1999: 272).
- 8.
As we have discussed in the previous section, for Kant actions done for self-interest can be in conformity with duty, but if self-interest is the agent’s primary motivation, her actions have no genuine moral worth.
- 9.
In fact, Gustafson (2001) uses the term Social Utilitarianism with reference to Mill.
- 10.
US Federal Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, Chapter 8 – Sentencing of Organizations. Part B – Remedying Harm from Criminal Conduct, and Effective Compliance and Ethics Program; §8B2.1. Effective Compliance and Ethics Program.
- 11.
See on this aspect the interesting discussion on the ‘Problem of community’ in Dunham et al. (2006).
- 12.
Such as AA1000 for Stakeholder engagement processes; SA8000 for monitoring working conditions along the supply-chain; OHSHA18000 for health and safety issue, and many others (see, for example, Leipziger, 2003).
- 13.
A problem that Freeman (2007) has defined as the Separation Fallacy: “It is useful to believe that sentences like, “x is a business decision” have no ethical content or any implicit ethical point of view. And, it is useful to believe that sentences like “x is an ethical decision, the best thing to do all things considered” have no content or implicit view about value creation and trade (business)”. This way of thinking, suggests Freeman, fails to recognize that almost every business decision has some ethical content.
- 14.
Rorty (2006) has assumed a more radical position concerning moral imagination, affirming that “Her (Werhane, 1999) book argues that moral imagination is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral decision-making. I suspect that it may, in fact, be sufficient as well”. Rorty thinks that moral reasoning skills are not useful at all in the process of moral deliberation: “I think of moral imagination not as a supplement to moral theory and moral reasoning skills, but as pretty much all you need. [...] When it comes to ‘moral reasoning skills’, I am less certain than Werhane that there are such things”. Rorty concludes that moral motivation is fundamentally time and context-depending: “There is no connection between skill at justifying one’s beliefs – rhetorical effectiveness – and having the right beliefs. Being able to have the right beliefs and to do the right thing is largely a matter of luck – of being born in a certain place and a certain time.” While the first part of the argumentation seems valid – there is not a causal relationship between the agent’s ability to exercise imaginative moral thinking and her actual moral behavior – Rorty’s conclusion appears dangerous: it risks throwing the baby out with the bath water. As noted in Werhane (2006: 405), Rorty’s idea that moral imagination is “pretty much all you need” threatens to reduce moral judgments to intuition and story-telling. Refusing the direct causal link between moral imagination and moral behavior does not imply that moral reasoning skills have no role to play at all. On the contrary, we believe that moral reasoning skills can enable the agent to ‘see’ what is the right thing to do, that is, they help the agent in identifying possible alternatives for moral actions – which we do not see how one could reasonably argue as not being a key phase in the process of choosing to do the right thing.
- 15.
In Thick and Thin Walzer (1994) explains the distinction between a thin set of universal principles, which we can think of as a “core morality” shared across different cultures, which become thick through a process (or, more precisely, the many different processes) of elaboration which reflect cultural, political, social and historical differences.
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Werhane, P.H., de Colle, S. (2019). Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories: What Can We Learn for Designing Corporate Ethics Programs?. In: Bevan, D.J., Wolfe, R.W., Werhane, P.H. (eds) Systems Thinking and Moral Imagination. Issues in Business Ethics(), vol 48. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89797-4_6
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