Abstract
Proportionality is the standard that guides the balancing of human or fundamental rights in law, requiring that the interference with rights must be justified by reasons that keep a reasonable relation with the intensity of the interference. One may well regard the principle of proportionality as a universal standard of rationality, which any legal system must recognise. Thus, when applied to human rights, proportionality presents a universal human rights principle. However, the thesis of the universal validity of the principle of proportionality faces various objections. I will refute these objections. First, I will distinguish diverse meanings of the universal character of principles and argue that the principle of proportionality is in a certain sense universally valid. In the second part, I will analyse the content of the principle of proportionality as part of a general framework of balancing and suggest a general scheme for examining the justification of the interference with a fundamental right according to the standard of proportionality.
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Notes
- 1.
Thus, elementary normative arguments are a compound of deontic operator (O), norm content (p), and ascription of validity (VAL).
- 2.
Accordingly, “requirement for validity” should in general, if not indicated otherwise, be read as “requirement for definitive validity”.
- 3.
Validity is understood here in a normative sense, that is, as the implication that a valid norm ought to be applied and followed.
- 4.
Although one finds attempts to analyse normative conflicts by means of normative statements or propositions, for example, by means of optimising requirements, prima facie- or pro tanto-norms, or defeasible norms, these conceptions weaken the content or the character of validity of the respective norms in a way that makes them incapable of figuring as arguments in the situation of conflict. See Sieckmann (2011).
- 5.
As to the notion of norms in a semantic sense see Sieckmann (1990).
- 6.
- 7.
Concrete or particular case must not be understood as a single or individual case. Any description of a case must include general features and hence define a certain type of individual cases. Consequently, balancing is aimed at establishing general rules of priority.
- 8.
Similarly Alexy (1985, p. 83); (2002, p. 54). However, his “law of collision” (Kollisionsgesetz) does not include a reference to the respective result of the balancing.
- 9.
The idea of optimisation is ambiguous and contested. For a critique see for example Slote (1989). Nevertheless, it seems at least possible to integrate critiques, such as the suggestion that one should choose a second best solution, into a more complex model of optimisation. In addition, it is not clear whether the critiques against optimisation apply to the model of autonomous balancing proposed here.
- 10.
This goes beyond the original meaning of this criterion and also of its use in economics and practical philosophy. However, the criterion explicates a central feature of rational decision-making when choices between incompatible options must be made. There is no need to restrict it to the positions, utilities or preferences of individuals.
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Sieckmann, J. (2018). Proportionality as a Universal Human Rights Principle. In: Duarte, D., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Proportionality in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89647-2_1
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