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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Effects of Overlapping Institutions: A Preliminary Study

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The Inter-American Human Rights System

Part of the book series: Studies of the Americas ((STAM))

Abstract

While much of the scholarly literature on the effects of international human rights institutions looks at the impact of one institution or mechanism in isolation, the human rights landscape is actually quite dense, being comprised of regional and international treaties and enforcement mechanisms. States face multiple and sometimes competing demands from these various human rights institutions. In this chapter, Hillebrecht addresses the interconnectivity of this human rights framework by focusing on the relationship between the Inter-American and United Nations (UN) human rights systems, the recommendations they issue and the ways in which states implement and comply with these mandates using the examples of Uruguay, Brazil and Mexico.

Many thanks to Kate Hunt for her excellent research assistance. All errors are mine.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I take effectiveness to mean states’ revision of their policies and practices as a result of the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS’s) rulings and recommendations.

  2. 2.

    Consider, however, some of the tensions that arose between Uruguay and the IAHRS after the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR’s) ruling in the case of Gelman v. Uruguay (see below).

  3. 3.

    Of course, the US is an Organization of American States (OAS) memberstate, but it is not a member of the IACtHR.

  4. 4.

    And note that I say that this is their reputation, not necessarily their state of being.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA

    Courtney Hillebrecht

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  1. Courtney Hillebrecht
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Correspondence to Courtney Hillebrecht .

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  1. Institute of the Americas, University College London, London, UK

    Par Engstrom

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Hillebrecht, C. (2019). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Effects of Overlapping Institutions: A Preliminary Study. In: Engstrom, P. (eds) The Inter-American Human Rights System. Studies of the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89459-1_11

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