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Models of the Development of Scientific Theories

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Introduction to Formal Philosophy

Part of the book series: Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy ((SUTP))

Abstract

The three basic kinds of theory development are expansion, contraction and revision by empirical evidence (Sect. 25.1). Under empiricist assumptions, the history of scientific evidence can be represented by a sequence of true and cumulatively increasing evidence sets which in the limit determine the complete structure of the world (Sect. 25.2). Under these assumptions it turns out that purely universal hypotheses are falsifiable with certainty, but verifiable only in the limit, ∀-∃-hypotheses are falsifiable in the limit but not verifiable in the limit, and ∀-∃-∀-hypotheses are neither nor (Sect. 25.3). In the consequence, hypotheses with complex quantification structure can only be confirmed probabilistically (Sect. 25.4). While these results are based on “empiricist” assumptions, the revision of theories which contain theoretical concepts requires either a given partition of possible hypotheses out of which the most promising one is chosen (rational choice paradigm), or it requires steps of abductive belief revision (construction paradigm) (Sect. 25.5). Revision of scientific theories is based on a Lakatosian preference structure, following the idea that in case of a conflict between theory and data, only peripherical parts of the theory are revised, while the theory’s core is saved from revision as long as possible (Sect. 25.6). Surprisingly, the revision of a false theory by true empirical evidence does not necessarily increase the theory’s truthlikeness (Sect. 25.7). Moreover, increase in empirical adequacy does not necessarily indicate progress in theoretical truthlikeness; a well-known attempt to justify this inference is Putnam’s no-miracles argument (Sect. 25.8).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An alternative to the sentential representation of a theory T as a logically closed set of sentences is the model-theoretic (or “structuralist”) representation of T by the set of semantic models or possible worlds which verify T (cf. e.g. [9, 17]).

  2. 2.

    A sentence set S ⊆ S(𝓛) is maximally consistent iff S is consistent and has no consistent proper extension in S(𝓛) and S is ω-complete iff whenever φ[ai] ∈ S for all individual constants ai, then ∀xφ[x] ∈ S (for φ[ai] an arbitrary 𝓛-formula containing ai).

  3. 3.

    The constraint of error-correction in the limit would not be sufficient.

  4. 4.

    Example: If E 2 = {Raa, Rab, Rbc}, then h = ∃x∀yRxy is neither falsified nor verified by E 2 over Dom(E 2) = {a,b,c}, though it is verified over {a,b}.

  5. 5.

    The older view of Carnap [5] on “logically given” prior probabilities is hardly tenable; cf. Howson/Urbach ([14], 60); Earman ([8], 15).

  6. 6.

    A base contraction function ÷ is stringent iff for each T and e, T÷e is a preferred maximal T-subset not implying e.

  7. 7.

    Asterisks (*) indicate recommended readings.

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Asterisks (*) indicate recommended readings.

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  1. University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Gerhard Schurz

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  1. Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, Sweden

    Sven Ove Hansson

  2. Center for Information and Bubble Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Vincent F. Hendricks

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Schurz, G. (2018). Models of the Development of Scientific Theories. In: Hansson, S., Hendricks, V. (eds) Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_25

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