Abstract
A protocol defines a structured conversation aimed at exchanging information between two or more parties. Complete confidentiality is virtually impossible so long as useful information needs to be transmitted. A more useful approach is to quantify the amount of information that is leaked. Traditionally, information flow in protocols has been analyzed using notions of entropy. We move to a discrete approach where information is measured in terms of propositional facts. We consider protocols involving agents holding numbered cards who exchange information to discover each others’ private hands. We define a transition system that searches the space of all possible announcement sequences made by such a set of agents and tries to identify a subset of announcements that constitutes an informative yet safe protocol.
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Notes
- 1.
Please check http://www.cmi.ac.in/~spsuresh/projects/russian-cards-z3/ for the full code.
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Khadir, A.A., Mukund, M., Suresh, S.P. (2017). Knowledge Transfer and Information Leakage in Protocols. In: D'Souza, D., Narayan Kumar, K. (eds) Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis. ATVA 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10482. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68167-2_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68167-2_16
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