Abstract
Both Aristotle and Gilbert Keith Chesterton asserted that virtue can be analyzed by means of a ‘tripartite’ scheme, viz. as being opposed to its two ‘correlated’ extremes (the excess of or the deficiency in a passion or action to which the virtue refers). However, while according to Aristotle virtue is radically different from its ‘correlated’ extremes (is ‘the mean’ between them), according to Chesterton, virtue, rather than being radically different from extremes, is a paradoxical synthesis of them, holding them in an ethically creative tension. The paper aims at elucidating this—Chestertonian—account of virtue, providing examples of virtues which can be plausibly analyzed in accordance with it (including, for instance, courage, modesty, charity), and comparing it to Aristotle’s account.
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Notes
- 1.
Of moral virtues, only justice has as its object actions (more specifically: actions by which we deal with external things in interpersonal relations); the object of the other moral virtues are passions. Cf. Aristotle (1947) (EN 1106b15).
- 2.
Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874–1936), a Christian writer, essayist and philosopher, was one of the towering figures of the British intellectual life in the first half of the twentieth century.
- 3.
Chesterton (2010), pp. 85 and 86.
- 4.
Ibid., p. 85.
- 5.
Ibid., p. 88.
- 6.
Ibid., pp. 85–86.
- 7.
Ibid., p. 86.
- 8.
Ibid., p. 87.
- 9.
Chesterton (2009), pp. 80–81.
- 10.
- 11.
Chesterton (2010), pp. 85–86.
- 12.
Ibid., p. 86.
- 13.
Horace (1995), pp. 130–131.
- 14.
Chesterton (2009), pp. 79–80.
- 15.
Cf. the following quotation: “Of the faults that are committed one consists in fearing what one should not, another in fearing as we should not, another in fearing when we should not, and so on; and so too with respect to the things that inspire confidence. The man, then, who faces and fears the right things and from the right motive, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in whatever way the rule directs.” (EN 1115b15–19, trans. Ross).
- 16.
This objection was raised, e.g., by Hans Kelsen; cf. Kelsen (1957), pp. 125–136.
- 17.
Hursthouse (1980), p. 61.
- 18.
Ibid., pp. 67–68.
- 19.
Regarding Hursthouse’s claim that “what fearing death ‘the right amount’ comes to (…) is fearing an ignoble death but not fearing an honourable one” Howard J. Curzer aptly remarked that “the courageous person fears both death and baseness. An ignoble death is a combination of these and so should be feared more than either, but even a noble death should be feared” (Curzer 1996, p. 133). It is also worth adding that Howard J. Curzer provides an interesting, even if slightly strained, argument in favour of such interpretation of right reason according to which it is a mean between too many and too few reasons; he writes as follows: “A person can have too many reasons for acting courageously by having all of the right reasons plus more. Tom typically stands fast in battle not only (a) to acquire or maintain his courage, and (b) to win the battle, but also (c) to win honour, and (d) to avoid penalties. Similarly, a person can have too few reason for acting courageously. Bill typically stands fast in battle only for the sake of (a) and not (b). Of course, it is possible to have the wrong reasons without having too many or too few reasons for acting courageously. Fred typically stands fast in battle only for the sake of (c) and (d) and not (a) or (b) (Ibid., pp. 134–135).” Regarding Hursthouse’s claim that “what fearing death ‘the right amount’ comes to (…) is fearing an ignoble death but not fearing an honourable one” Howard J. Courzer aptly remarked that “the courageous person fears both death and baseness. An ignoble death is a combination of these and so should be feared more than either, but even a noble death should be feared” (Ibid., p. 134).
- 20.
Curzer (1996), p. 134.
- 21.
Chesterton (2010), p. 85.
- 22.
This remark only stresses Chesterton’s originality, though it was not his intention to be original: he believed to only have made explicit what was implicit in the Christian ethics.
- 23.
Thomas Aquinas (1981), I–II, q. 59, a. 1.
- 24.
Ibid.
- 25.
Aquinas gives the example of faith “in one Person and two natures”, saying that it is “the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintains the existence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature” (Ibid.).
- 26.
Edition used: Aristotle (1952).
References
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———. 1952. Eudemian Ethics. In Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution; The Eudemian Ethics; On Virtues and Vices, Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, MA: W. Heinemann and Harvard University Press.
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Chesterton, Gilbert K. 2009. Heretics. New York: Wilder Publications.
———. 2010. Orthodoxy. New York: Simon & Brown. https://www.worldcat.org/title/orthodoxy/oclc/49293360&referer=brief_results.
Curzer, Howard J. 1996. A Defense of Aristotle’s Doctrine That Virtue Is a Mean. Ancient Philosophy 16 (1): 129–138.
Horace. 1995. The Odes and Epodes. Translated by C. E. Bennett. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1980. A False Doctrine of the Mean. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 57–72.
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Zaluski, W. (2018). Virtue as a Synthesis of Extremes Versus Virtue as a Mean Between Extremes: A Comparison of Chesterton’s Account of Virtue with Aristotle’s. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 121. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_14
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