Abstract
This article argues that “justification ” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epistemology. It is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?” Sections 2 and 3 exploit some of the upshots of Sect. 1 in order to show that classical reliabilism , accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justified” in distinct technical ways.
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Meylan, A. (2017). The Pluralism of Justification. In: Coliva, A., Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, N. (eds) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_5
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