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International Drug Conventions, Balanced Policy Recipes, and Latin American Cocaine Markets

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Abstract

This chapter explores the logic of the international drug conventions and their “comprehensive, integrated, and balanced” drug policy approach that rejects all “nonmedical and scientific” drug uses and implicitly seeks a drug-free world. It questions the logic of that policy approach, its consistency with the reasons given for the conventions, and whether the prevalent interpretation of the conventions is logically derived from them, and it explores the implicit assumptions behind the logic of the conventions. It contrasts the policy approach of the conventions with the “balanced recipe” proposed in this book, which seeks to maximize individual liberties if they do not harm others and to incorporate into policy making and implementation processes the existence of market externalities and the inconsistency of human decisions. It shows that drug phenomena are not independent of other problems arising from social vulnerabilities and structures and shows why successful, balanced drug policies must recognize the complexity of drug phenomena and the need to include all relevant nonstate stakeholders in policy formulation and implementation processes. This chapter argues that to have truly successful drug policies, countries need to tackle their social and structural vulnerabilities. A short sketch of some of the characteristics of the evolution of the cocaine markets, coca eradication, and local microtraffic in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and other Latin American countries illustrates the need for a policy approach that responds to the vulnerabilities of each country and the need for an international control system in which drug policies are formulated in coordination with all policies that confront possible social harms.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The benefits received by consumers (utility) above the value that they give to the money used to pay for the goods purchased. It is a measure of the benefits of a win-win transaction.

  2. 2.

    Political Declaration on Global Drug Control of the 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem.

  3. 3.

    The “health and welfare of mankind” are in the English, Chinese, Russian, and Arabic versions, and “the physical and moral health of mankind” are in the French and Spanish versions. Article 40 of the Single Convention of 1961 asserts that all versions of the conventions in all official United Nations languages are “equally authentic” (Thoumi 2016).

  4. 4.

    Collins (2015). Indeed, the United States hesitated to ratify the convention and did so only in 1967.

  5. 5.

    Thoumi (2015, pp. 378–385) presents a detailed listing of the characteristics and consequences of the IDCS. The INCB (2015, p. 6), however, advises “all countries that continue to retain the death penalty for drug related offences to consider abolishing capital punishment for this category of offences.”

  6. 6.

    For example, in the United States, drug policies have de facto allowed state governments to enforce drug policies disproportionally on minorities, thus subverting federal anti-discrimination laws; in the Philippines, the Duterte government has used them as a “social cleansing” instrument; in Colombia, the Uribe government’s aerial spraying of coca plantings gave priority to areas controlled by FARC guerrillas over those controlled by right-wing paramilitary groups.

  7. 7.

    The World Health Organization.

  8. 8.

    The Pan American Health Organization.

  9. 9.

    For example, Colombia has paid a very high social price for fighting illegal drugs. There is no doubt that the Single Convention of 1961 has been the most important international document signed and ratified by the country, but drug issues were so irrelevant in Colombia in 1961 that it did not even participate in the conference that negotiated and drafted the convention (Thoumi 2015, p. 379).

  10. 10.

    For example, the current drug addiction problems in Pakistan and the drug-related violence in Honduras and Mexico were expected, given those countries’ vulnerabilities, although they could not have been predicted accurately. Similar developments are likely to arise in many high-risk sub-Saharan countries.

  11. 11.

    Vehemently made by Colombian Health Minister Alejandro Gaviria at an UNGASS 2016 side event.

  12. 12.

    For example, the INCB has advanced significantly in the implementation of Internet-based systems that allow countries to have real-time data on export and import authorizations of controlled substances. These systems have worldwide acceptance.

  13. 13.

    Gootenberg (2008, p. 334) lists the names of legal cocaine producers at nine points in time from the 1920s to 1950.

  14. 14.

    See, for example, Palmer (1980).

  15. 15.

    The literature on the National Front is extensive. See, for example, Bushnell (1993, chap. 10), Safford and Palacios (2002, chap. 14), and Hartlyn (1988).

  16. 16.

    These figures are from Colombia’s National Statistics Department and the National Police and were provided to the author by Prof. Mauricio Rubio.

  17. 17.

    Finance Colombia at http://www.financecolombia.com/colombia-homicide-rate-2016-nations-lowest-since-1974/.

  18. 18.

    Thoumi (2015, pp. 495–496) questioned the importance of this policy because the data obtained from the Peruvian Air Force does not support it and because Vladimiro Montesinos, the secret service head during the Fujimori regime, controlled the country’s international drug traffic.

  19. 19.

    See Coletta Youngers’ short comment in http://fusion.net/story/185398/how-bolivia-became-a-drug-war-success-story-after-ousting-uncle-sam/.

  20. 20.

    See, for example, Rubio (2007).

  21. 21.

    Alves (2017) studies this issue in Sao Paulo and Cali.

  22. 22.

    This study focuses on the poor neighborhoods in the main Brazilian cities. The city of Avellaneda, a neighbor of Buenos Aires, had a similar experience. This development is akin to what many white, unskilled blue-collar workers are currently facing in coal mining towns in the United States.

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Thoumi, F.E. (2017). International Drug Conventions, Balanced Policy Recipes, and Latin American Cocaine Markets. In: Savona, E., Kleiman, M., Calderoni, F. (eds) Dual Markets. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65361-7_5

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