Abstract
This chapter argues that is it not just the academic literature on the privatization of security that is going beyond PMSCs, but PMSCs themselves stretch conceptual boundaries. In fact, what we so casually refer to as ‘the PMSC industry’ is but an assemblage of extremely diverse and fluid corporations whose activities converge and intersect with parallel industries. How can we explain this slippery nature? Drawing on evolutionary economics and sociological institutionalism, this contribution advances a co-evolutionary framework for explaining how and why firms in the U.S. ‘market for force’ have evolved and developed over time. The analysis suggests that major transformations within the industry, from ‘kitchen porter’ kind of functions to armed security provision, to today’s multi-service organizations, are market-induced. They reflect the interests and preferences of the U.S. government as the single largest client of private military and security services. At the same time, the twentieth century norm of the state monopoly over violence has placed major constraints on the development of the industry, pushing PMSCs to divest themselves from combat roles and armed security services. This retreat, however, often remains a merely symbolic one since PMSCs continue to compete for lucrative security contracts and have resurfaced in quasi-combat roles: as operators of drones and cyber warriors.
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Notes
- 1.
Of course, this presupposes the availability of tools to oversee, regulate and, if necessary, sanction the activities of PMSCs should they be found to be in contravention of existing laws (Herbst 2013, p. 283). The problem with these companies, however, is that it is often unclear which laws, if any, apply to them and who is legally responsible for their conduct (Pattison 2014, p. 144; Schreier and Caparini 2005, p. 56). In that regard, it is important to note the push for more (self-)regulation of the industry which has been a constant endeavor since the 1990s when the UK government first published a Green Paper setting out different options for regulating the activities of PMSCs. With the Green Paper process under way, PMSCs had to fear no less than the end of their enterprise should a ban on their activities materialize. Since 2009, however, the UK government has veered towards a lighter regulatory framework, encompassing a government-backed system of self-regulation to control the activities of UK-based PMSCs (FCO 2009; Hague 2010; Simmonds 2012). There is a consensus in both the U.S. and U.K. in favor of some kind of permissive control of the industry which is currently embodied in initiatives such as the Montreux Document, a restatement of the existing international legal obligations and good practices of states pertaining to the use of PMSCs in conflict zones, and the International Code of Conduct for Security Service Providers (ICoC) in which PMSCs, by singing, voluntarily agree to abide by the principles of international human rights law and codes of good practice for the responsible provision of security services.
- 2.
The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is the prime tool for managing the DoD’s use of contractors in full-spectrum logistical support of contingency operations.
- 3.
“Sandline ist das einzige eingetragene Unternehmen, das sich öffentlich zu echten Kampfeinsätzen bekennt. Unser Interesse war stets der operative Einsatz. All die anderen Aufgaben, die das Militär jetzt an Private abtritt Lagerverwaltung, Küchendienste, Nachschub, Reparaturen, haben mit dem Militärischen kaum etwas zu tun. Militärische Dienstleistungen im engeren Sinne, echte PMF so wie wir, erleben zwar durch den Irak-Krieg einen ungeheuren Schub. Aber es ist Unsinn, uns, die wir die Drecksarbeit wirklich mit der Waffe in der Hand erledigen, mit all den Bohnen-und Brokkoli-Lieferanten gleichzusetzen.“ (Grunberg 2004).
- 4.
The fact that the U.S. also acted as potential consumer of PMSC services added to this normative pressure.
- 5.
The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) of 1998 defines inherently governmental functions as “so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees”, specifically if it can “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons” (1998).
- 6.
However, the circular does explicitly not prohibit contracting for guard services, convoy security services, or the operation of prison or detention facilities.
- 7.
According to the Copenhagen school, policy issues are securitized if they are turned into existential threats that require extraordinary responses (Buzan et al. 1998).
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Prem, B. (2018). Who Am I? The Blurring of the Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) Category. In: Bures, O., Carrapico, H. (eds) Security Privatization. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63010-6_3
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