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About the Psychological and Logical Moment in Natural Science Teaching (1890)

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History, Philosophy and Science Teaching

Part of the book series: Science: Philosophy, History and Education ((SPHE))

Abstract

Historical studies convincingly demonstrate that the knowledge process [Erkenntnis] in natural science consists of the gradual adaptation of the thoughts to the facts. This adaptation happens through happy circumstances, which increasingly reveal the more general similarities and subtle differences of the facts. By this, the precision of the representation of the facts by the thoughts grows, so that the latter finally become an image of the former, which for certain intellectual purposes may completely substitute for them. The one who admits this sober view of the meaning of natural science will assign to natural science teaching no other purpose, but to promote the aspired adaptation of thoughts with highest economy of work on shortcuts, by artificially bringing about those favorable circumstances avoiding the unfavorable historical coincidences and delays.

One should in teaching first and foremost proceed psychologically; only secondarily and as much logically, as this is enabled through the psychological preparation so that it becomes a need. New concepts, theories, hypotheses, solutions of problems should only be introduced, when the need for this is felt in order to be able to master the topic. For each sentence, which appears during teaching, clarity and explicitness, but in general not indefeasibility from the point of view of the goal of teaching, should be required.

Translator’s note: The article was first printed in the Zeitschrift für den physikalischen und chemischen Unterricht. Berlin: Springer: 1890/1891, 1–5. Über das psychologische und logische Moment im naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht.

Translated by Hayo Siemsen: Translator’s note: For the following references in the footnotes, see Siemsen, H. (2012). Ernst Mach, George Sarton and the Empiry of Teaching Science Part I. Science & Education, 21/4: 447–484.

Siemsen, H. (2013). Ernst Mach, George Sarton and the Empiry of Teaching Science Part II. Science & Education, 22/5: 951–1000.

Ernst Mach (translated and edited by Hayo Siemsen).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Translator’s note: In Mach’s understanding , knowledge is a non-teleological process, as part of Lamarck/Spencer/Wallace/Darwin’s idea of evolution. Any development, “growth”, etc. are local, but not general. Knowledge, like Darwinian species is thus a process generally with a concrete product locally (see also Beneke, 1840, System der Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie aus den natürlichen Grundverhältnissen des menschlichen Geistes abgeleitet. Mach read this text early in his life and applied many ideas from it). Directionality depends on observations relative to a “background”, which can never be absolute. The process view was used by Newton in his concept of “interaction” in order to replace the previous “object”/“product” view. The process/gestalt view was also used by Mach in his criticism of Newton’s absolute space and time.

  2. 2.

    Translator’s note: Ernst Mach is well known for his influence in physics (spacetime), physiology (psychophysics, the inner ear), psychology (gestalt) or erkenntnis-psychology/ theory of knowledge (Erkenntnis und Irrtum). He is less known for his works on pedagogy and didactics. He has many activities in this area, but he never consolidated them into a consistent theory (see Siemsen 2014). What are these “activities”?

    Most influentially, he co-authored the physics school books, which were used from the 1880’s to the mid 1920’s in larger parts of the German speaking countries. He also wrote a teacher instruction for the school books (see Hohenester, 1988, Ernst Mach als Didaktiker, Lehrbuch- und Lehrplanverfasser. In: Haller, R. & Stadler, F. (Eds.), Ernst Mach Werk und Wirkung, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempski; part-translation Siemsen 2012, 2013). He was also founder and co-editor of a teachers‘journal in science education Zeitschrift für den Physikalischen und Chemischen Unterricht. In this function, he wrote several articles (like the one translated here) and small “thought experimental “descriptions to be used for teaching. Unfortunately, nearly all this material has not yet been translated into English (collected in German by Koller, 1997, Kommentare zu den physikdidaktischen Schriften Ernst Machs, Diploma Thesis at the Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, supervised by Adolf Hohenester). Furthermore, he used his pedagogy to transform the thoughts of his students. William James considered Mach’s lecture as “the most artistic lesson I ever heard “(see Thiele 1978, Wissenschaftliche Kommunikation: Die Korrespondenz Ernst Machs, Kastellaun: Henn; Siemsen 2014). The following article gives an account of the erkenntnis-psychological implications of Mach’s pedagogy.

  3. 3.

    Translator’s note: Mach’s clear distinction and well-known criticism of metaphysics can be found in this statement. From a Machian perspective, current science teaching is full of metaphysical errors, which are not recognized as such. If students and teachers do not “understand” the inconsistencies taught to them, one cannot thus blame them for being confused about what is confusing.

  4. 4.

    As such an outgrowth I have to call the view, which an eminent natural scientist, who at a time also had been a proficient school teacher, had advanced towards me. He stated that in geometry teaching, one had to accustom the student to judge correctly from a false figure from given premises. Admittedly, such a procedure can be exceptionally quite useful in order to make the difference between the conceptualized perception [Anschauung] process from the logical process, which basically happens in the argumentum ad absurdum; but where would one end by systematically leading to mistrust the conceptualized perception?! – Another time I heard in a group of teachers the statement that a certain topic could not be included into elementary teaching, because the definition of the basic concepts was not scientifically completed. – Also J. K. Becker seems to turn against such outgrowths, when he underlines that the proven truths are in no way better than the immediately perceived.

  5. 5.

    Luckily, nobody falls into the hands of a didact proceeding Euclid ically without themselves having at least some initial geometrical concepts.

  6. 6.

    Translator’s note: Mach is here referring to Kant ’s and Herbart’s method of criticism. Criticism is optimizing by reducing mistakes. In another article, Mach explains that first one needs to have a relatively stable “world view”, before it can be “optimized”. Children are initially lacking the stable world view (a basic model).

  7. 7.

    This circumstance is illustrated by nothing better than the comparison of the transparency and fruitfulness of modern geometrical methods with the clumsiness and barrenness of the Euclidean.

  8. 8.

    Reading the writings of some eminent researchers (e.g. Gauss), to the same degree as one enters, one feels all the more, that they have not written them for the reader, but for their own satisfaction. By this, some such text has acquired a nearly enigmatic form. One can understand the sentences of them but in one specific way, if one succeeds in understanding them at all. This way of fixing a completed knowledge is also a masterpiece, but by no means a didactical one. A few introductory words about how the researcher has reached his results, in general saves the reader some major work.

  9. 9.

    I think that one can agree to what is stated in the text, even if one does not agree to the view on abstraction, which I have detailed elsewhere (Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen. Jena 1886. pp. 149). Nobody doubts that for instance in mathematics, the understanding is based on the practicing of the operations.

  10. 10.

    In my youth I was repeatedly in the position to provide elementary teaching and could many times see for myself the barrenness of the pressing for premature abstraction. If, for instance, I provided the question for able children, who could already count quite well: How much is 5 + 3?, so I got no answer. But the answer was immediately provided for the question: How many are 5 nuts and 3 nuts? Also for my children I have often observed that the abstractions, which I had in vain tried to induce, occurred a few days later just on their own, sometimes in a completely unexpected way. I think that also in higher education, without noticing, we often commit very analogous errors. – The phenomenon (mentioned in this journal, [Zeitschrift für den physikalischen und chemischen Unterricht III, p. 111], that so many of the most important French mathematicians of the eighteenth century were technicians by training, finds its explanation in this circumstance. The technician has to concern him/ herself with many details; his/her abstractions appear later, but often more powerful than at the study of pure theory.

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Mach, E. (2018). About the Psychological and Logical Moment in Natural Science Teaching (1890). In: Matthews, M. (eds) History, Philosophy and Science Teaching. Science: Philosophy, History and Education. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62616-1_7

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