Abstract
At a time of increasing tensions between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the chapter analyses some of the key bilateral and multilateral arms control and non-proliferation agreements. The core of the analysis is the issue of distrust between the parties, which is regarded as the major obstacle to a successful accord. Asymmetry in the number and quality of nuclear weapons and the lack of national consensus to negotiate are also addressed as major barriers to arms control agreement. Practical recommendations on how to overcome those issues are presented and discussed.
Originally published in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., Reassessing Arms Control (London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984): 81–89.
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Notes
- 1.
Barbara Tuchman, The Alternative to Arms Control (Los Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Studies, University of California, 1982).
- 2.
Ibid.
- 3.
Roger Fisher and William L. Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In (London: Penguin Group, 1981).
- 4.
Ibid.
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Bunn, G. (2018). Nuclear Arms Control: Obstacles to Agreement. In: Foradori, P., Giacomello, G., Pascolini, A. (eds) Arms Control and Disarmament. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62259-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62259-0_10
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