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Congestion Games with Complementarities

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Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 10236))

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Abstract

We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study \(L_p\) norms and analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally, we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.

This work was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the Collaborative Research Centre “On-The-Fly Computing” (SFB 901).

The full version of this paper is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07304.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Heinz Nixdorf Institute and Department of Computer Science, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany

    Matthias Feldotto, Lennart Leder & Alexander Skopalik

Authors
  1. Matthias Feldotto
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  2. Lennart Leder
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  3. Alexander Skopalik
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Correspondence to Matthias Feldotto .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. National Technical University of Athens, Zografou, Athens, Greece

    Dimitris Fotakis

  2. National Technical University of Athens, Zografou, Athens, Greece

    Aris Pagourtzis

  3. Université Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France

    Vangelis Th. Paschos

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Feldotto, M., Leder, L., Skopalik, A. (2017). Congestion Games with Complementarities. In: Fotakis, D., Pagourtzis, A., Paschos, V. (eds) Algorithms and Complexity. CIAC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10236. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-57586-5

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