What Does a Phenomenological Language Do? (Revisiting Some Remarks on Logical Form in Its Context)

Abstract

First, I point out that the literature on Wittgenstein’s phenomenological language has not explained what it was and how it was supposed to work (introduction). Second, I elucidate Wittgenstein’s negative remarks (in the 1930s and 1940s) on Some Remarks on Logical Form, the paper published in 1929 where he presented guidelines of that project (Sect. 5.1). Third, in Sects. 5.2 and 5.3 I argue that the phenomenological language was an elementary level complement of the old symbolism of the Tractatus. This will show why it was needed and how it could solve Wittgenstein’s problems at the time. Finally, in Sect. 5.4 I explain why he thought that the forms of propositional function and argument do not express correctly the forms of elementary propositions (thus, the title of the 1929-paper). I briefly conclude the paper in Sect. 5, where I also indicate Wittgenstein’s strategy after the phenomenological language project.

The title pays homage to Diamond (1996). Essentially, the reasoning that sustains Sects. 2–3 appears in Engelmann (2013), chapter 1. Here I further develop my views and explain the status and significance of Some Remarks on Logical Form. I also take into account Lugg (2013) and Pichler (2016).

I will use the following abbreviations: T: Tractatus Logico-philosophicus; SRLF: Some Remarks on Logical Form; MS: manuscript (according to the numbering system of the Nachlass); WVC: Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle; WiC: Wittgenstein in Cambridge.

This paper was written with the support of a CNPq grant.