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Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique

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Avoiding War, Making Peace

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Abstract

The strategy of deterrence rests on a number of reinforcing assumptions. They include the belief that challenges are opportunity driven, that would-be challengers conduct a rational assessment of the risks and possible gains of any challenge, that would-be deterrers can successfully fathom and manipulate the cost-calculus of adversaries, and that the best way to do this is through increasing costs by means of threats. Drawing on empirical evidence, I show how these assumptions are all questionable at best, and how the practice of immediate deterrence has the potential to provoke the very behavior it seeks to prevent. I draw on motivational psychology, rational analysis, and domestic politics to explain such outcomes.

Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique’, Perspectives on Deterrence, 1989, pp. 26-51. Copyright © 1989 Oxford University Press. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of War Studies, King’s College London, London, UK

    Richard Ned Lebow

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  1. Richard Ned Lebow
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Correspondence to Richard Ned Lebow .

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Lebow, R.N. (2018). Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique. In: Avoiding War, Making Peace. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56093-9_3

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