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The Conceptual Discussion on Terrorism

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Terrorism Revisited

Part of the book series: Contemporary South Asian Studies ((CSAS))

Abstract

This chapter reviews the existing literature on the conceptual, historic and semantic meaning of “terrorism” and argues that the term must be consistently defined, either as a specific form of political violence characterised by its disproportionate horrifying impact, as suggested by Martha Crenshaw, or as a phenomenon with diverse historical traits. As Walter Laqueur showed, in its purest form, terrorism was seldom successful, and, therefore, we argue it must always be considered within the political strategy that encompasses it. Whereas most authors see terrorism as mostly, or even necessarily, a rational political tool, there is no academic consensus, and the recent analysis of Fethi Benslama sees a strong correlation of terrorism and psychopathologies. Fanatic political violence encompassing terrorism appears as a socio-psychological phenomenon defined by David Terman as a “paranoid gestalt”, and this approach is seen as the most promising to understand the challenges posed by contemporary extreme political violence. Nevertheless, a set of conditions must be in place to envision and support this approach. Most in particular, for it to be functional, it needs a clear conceptualisation of the complex socio-psychological phenomenon as completely different from the sum of personal psychologies. Two potential reactions of the victims of this violence are appeasement and a knee jerk reaction injuring innocents rather than the real culprits. Both reactions are equally damaging to the victims of terrorist acts. Following Albert Bandura’s advice, a strong case is made for refusing to use euphemistic language such as “radical”, “militant” or “extremist” when dealing with criminal acts related to terrorism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Alonso et al. (2008, p. 6). The authors of the report quote one legal European Union definition of the term, the one adopted in the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA) as the “European one”. The authors take the meaning of “framework decision” literally, as if this would be the only EU definition. However, it is not the only definition and it is not even the most important, because the previous Common Position 2001/931/CFSP was not repealed by the aforementioned and it remains the basis for most EU decisions on terrorism. As we shall see, both definitions are quite different. It is a tell-tale sign of the opacity of the European legal framework that not even a European expert group on the issue managed to fully understand it.

  2. 2.

    We believe these two works by Laqueur are essential to understand terrorism in a historic perspective.

  3. 3.

    “Terrorism has long exercised a great fascination, especially at a safe distance, but it is not an easy topic for discussion and explanation. The fascination it exerts (Shelley’s “tempestuous loveliness of terror”) and the difficulty of interpreting it have the same roots: its unexpected, shocking and outrageous character. War, even civil war, is predictable in many ways; it occurs in the light of day and there is no mystery about the identity of the participants. Even in civil war, there are certain rules, whereas the characteristic features of terrorism are anonymity and the violation of established norms” (Laqueur, 1977, p. 3). This idea can also be found elsewhere, for instance in Crenshaw (op. cit. p. 2) Today’s terrorism—mostly masterminded by leaders hidden but with publicised images and by suicidal operatives who proudly claim their actions—is far from this anonymity trait, whereas it shares its unexpected, shocking and outrageous character with other criminal and warfare activities.

  4. 4.

    This is indeed the case in the classic views on terrorism and is also why these views are not helpful to understand the issues at stake. Just to mention the most well-known case of ISIS, the organisation that now considers itself the Sunni Caliphate developed exactly in this way. Should we therefore consider it now out of our radar of studies of terrorism?

  5. 5.

    Laqueur even dedicated two different books to the history of the two different subjects of terrorism and guerrilla warfare (Laqueur, 1976, 1977), although he admitted later on that the differences between the two phenomena—as well as with the other two factors of criminality and sadist pathological behaviour—were vanishing (Laqueur, 1999, most in particular on the Algerian case, pp. 131–132). Hoffman (1998, 35–41) tries to make a clear distinction between guerrilla, insurgency and terrorism, although admitting the existence of overlaps. In later works, like his classic book on Iraqi insurgency (2006), this distinction is ever more blurred.

  6. 6.

    The Chinese “cultural revolution” is the model for Cambodia’s genocide, as we can understand from reading Leys’ (1987, originally published in 1971) masterpiece on it. The absence of reference to this historical event by both Laqueur and Hoffman is also astonishing, as we believe it fits squarely into their vision of terrorism. We think it was one of the most important state-sponsored terrorist movements of modern times. The Cultural Revolution was supposed to be a spontaneous grassroots movement, but it was in fact masterminded by Mao Zedong and the parts of the state apparatus he controlled. Its ultimate aim was to “horrify” whoever would dare to question the wisdom and the blind devotion to the Chinese leader into paralysis. In fact, it went further than that as it tried to annihilate the Chinese elite, forcing it to hard labour in the countryside and destroying higher education, and in this sense, it can also be seen as a specific sort of “class genocide”. Otherwise, acts of unprecedented violence did characterise the communist power takeover in China. The Stalinist purges (which can also be seen as a form of genocide) and the Ukrainian genocide were done directly by the state apparatus, supposedly without any attempt of using grass roots revolutionaries. In this sense, they do not share the non-state character which both Hoffman and Laqueur consider essential to constitute a terrorist act.

  7. 7.

    Although the towns were located in an Al Ba’aj Arab majority district, they housed a Yazidi majority.

  8. 8.

    In a more recent field trip (December 2014) in the Iraqi Kurdish province of Dohuk, I visited several refugee camps where tens of thousands of Yazidi refugees surviving the genocide were scattered; I then developed a much deeper understanding of this extensive crisis, thanks to my host, Dr. Mirza Dinnayi. In the twenty-first century, jihadists are recreating actions already done in the nineteenth century, now targeting the Yazidi population. As was the case before, this issue has been sidelined again by the Western public opinion and the media.

  9. 9.

    Edwin Shuker, a Jewish civil society activist and businessman living in London, has been an invaluable source of information in this domain.

  10. 10.

    Due to the strong objection of the Soviet Union, genocides committed for political reasons were excluded from the United Nations definition of genocide. Some academics consider the neologism “politicide” to qualify genocide for political reasons, whereas others consider that the letter of the UN text is secondary to his spirit and political genocides should be considered genocides as such. Perhaps the most recent, massive and unpunished of these types of genocide has been the 1988 Iranian mass killing of all of those political dissidents in prison, the vast majority of them, adherent to the People’s Mujahedin of Iran.

  11. 11.

    This attack is reported in the database of the University of Chicago, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1980&end_yearonly=1981&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=110&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

  12. 12.

    Martin Kramer, “The moral logic of Hizballah” in Reich (1990, p. 141) refers to the “unprecedented wave of suicidal bombings carried out by Lebanese Shi’ites from the spring of 1983 to the summer of 1985”. In the same book, p. 204, Ariel Merari “The readiness to kill and die” says: “Suicidal car-bomb attacks started in Lebanon in April 1983”. Most of the other fundamental literature does not expressly say that the Hezbollah suicidal bombing operations were the first, but oversees the previous attacks. From a Western point of view and the horror they caused in the public opinion, the Hezbollah attacks were indeed the first. But this only confirms a Western point of view.

  13. 13.

    Whereas the first attack was done in the name of the Iraqi Al-Dawa, the following ones were done in the name of the Islamic Jihad, one of the labels used by the Lebanese Hezbollah. The distinction in operational terms is most probably irrelevant, as all of these attacks were likely decided at the highest level of the Iranian theocracy and executed by the same operational structures on the ground. As Kramer (op. cit. p. 147 explains: “According to one lesser cleric in Hizballah, acts of “self-martyrdom” (itishhad, as opposed to suicide, intihar) “were carried out by our youth under our inspiration. Some came to consult me about acts of self-martyrdom. I explained to them that this requires a fatwa from one of the highest authorities, that is, the Imams Kh’oi or Khomeini, for a believer will do nothing without giving consideration to the principles of law.” On page 155, he further explains that “Islamic decision making” is “a euphemism in Hizballah’s lexicon for Iran”.

  14. 14.

    The “Israel—Palestine” conflict (excluding anti-Semitism) is also part of the obsession of Western analysts. Martha Crenshaw (2011, p. 7) as most of the literature presents hijackings as an innovation in the late 1960s initiated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In my own country, Portugal, the passenger cruise Santa Maria was hijacked with thousands of passengers on board for several days in January 1961, whereas an aircraft transporting bank notes was hijacked a few months later. Both actions were done by national oppositionists. The first United Nations convention against “offences committed on aircraft” dates from September 14, 1963. See https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/conv1-english.pdf. Perhaps not surprisingly, Portugal appears in the list of the countries ratifying the convention, in 1964. In any circumstance, this happens considerably before the end of the 1960s.

  15. 15.

    Martha Crenshaw (2011, p. 181) unequivocally distances herself from the concept of “war on terrorism” by stating: “wars are waged against adversaries, not methods”. However, she develops her analysis of the “war on terrorism” under the terrorism studies perspective.

  16. 16.

    The same report also concludes that “Perceived injustice, need for identity and need for belonging are common vulnerabilities among potential terrorists”. However, terrorism studies have nearly unanimously rejected the thesis that terrorism is a general consequence of objectively defined injustice.

  17. 17.

    Martha Crenshaw (2011, p. 4) recognises that it is rare to find organisations which exclusively use terrorism and hence the term “terrorist organisation” to be contentious. She quotes Abu Nidal as the single exception. However, she not only uses the term but makes of it the basis of her analysis.

  18. 18.

    The famous “murderous identities” of Amin Maalouf (1998) are a lighter and literarily more interesting way of getting into the issue.

  19. 19.

    Jihadism is certainly anti-Semitic. This has to do with reasons that might be different from the anti-Semitism that is widespread in the West, but it does not specially consider Christians as its main target. Yazidis, as we have seen, are a more obvious victim. All Muslim obedience that can be seen as a rival to the Jihadi domain becomes also a more obvious target. Iranian authorities, for instance, considered its Islamic opposition as the most dangerous and acted accordingly.

  20. 20.

    Other than Martha Crenshaw (op. cit.), see David George review of Reich (1990) available online: https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/15027

  21. 21.

    Frederick Hacker (1977) significant title “Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies” tells us much on his views on the way these three main violence archetypes from which terrorism might be understood.

  22. 22.

    See Laqueur (1999, pp. 107–116 or pp. 229–231) for instance, on the US brand.

  23. 23.

    On contemporary Jihad, we can consult the works of Walid Phares (2005, 2007, 2008) and Kepel (2000).

  24. 24.

    The link between the two most important and extreme terrorist organisations external to the jihadi sphere—Tamil Tigers and “Sendero Luminoso”—with the Iranian Jihadi outfit in Lebanon deserves, however, careful consideration.

  25. 25.

    Referred to as “modern” in Laqueur terminology.

  26. 26.

    My anecdotal, empiric experience of contact with the USA, local authorities, displaced people and refugees from Iraq was that group survival/economic reasoning was crucial to suicide terrorism. In 2005, the quoted price of a suicidal terrorist act was 50,000 dollars, whereas 2 years afterwards it had gone down already to 10,000 dollars. The chosen ones for these activities—mostly self-conscious young males in the beginning—became in later stages those less apt or physically handicapped similar to girls who had been victims of sexual aggression. More recently, on January the 21st 2016, I had the opportunity to discuss the issue with Dr. Kamal Al Labwani, a leading Syrian democratic opposition in exile. He is convinced it is clearly possible to create profiles of the several terrorist characters: the ideologue, the ring-leader, the suicide bomber and the supporter.

  27. 27.

    The efforts to move the studies of violence into the quantifiable domain—pioneered by academics such as Professor Raymond Tanter (1966)—are a promising way forward. We should remark that the mindset approach to terrorism developed here is quite different from the ideological approach as defined by Marx. Whereas for Marx, ideology reflected objective interests, the terrorist mindset comes from a distorted—even paranoid—reading of reality.

  28. 28.

    We could not find any objective base for the elaboration of the list of the terrorist organisations she presents in pages 204–205.

  29. 29.

    Laqueur uses “modern terrorism” to describe nineteenth century terrorism, although he does not always use the term consistently.

  30. 30.

    SADF had the privilege of being assisted by Professor Yonah Alexander in the first steps we took concerning the study of terrorism.

  31. 31.

    See for instance: https://www.cigionline.org/articles/2005/03/annan-proposes-definition-terrorism

  32. 32.

    Alexander’s definition introduces an important element of precision by restricting it to random violence. Classical war strategies target infrastructures and non-combatants whom are crucial for the war effort.

  33. 33.

    Martha Crenshaw (2011, p. 3) also considers the combatant/non-combatant distinction to be impracticable.

  34. 34.

    The conference was held at the occasion of her coming to Belgium for receiving a “Honoris Causa” Doctorate from the University of Ghent. It was held on September the 14th in the University Foundation and titled “Why is counter-terrorism so difficult”.

  35. 35.

    For an in-depth analysis of this policy and its widespread influence on all branches of the US government, see F.G. Gaffney and C.L. Lopez, “See No Sharia”, 2016, Center for Security Policy, pp. 103–107, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/See_No_Sharia_Final.pdf

  36. 36.

    During the above-mentioned conference, Martha Crenshaw explained that the use of the term “radical” became commonplace after the 9/11 attack, but she did not give a particular importance to it. However, she considered the term was now standard and unavoidable within the profession.

  37. 37.

    “Le champ sémantique de la radicalisation s’est. ainsi, au cours des dernières années, considérablement appauvri pour devenir synonyme de terrorisme islamique, dans la presse écrite”. This is a euphemism for terrorism. However, as Professor Lafaye correctly points out it became the opposite—that is, a pejorative qualification—for every radicalisation process, which became a dirty expression. For instance, being a militant—which literally means active member—of the Italian based Radical Party, I can say I have an extreme view of these euphemisms. I think they are simultaneously insulting to radicals and condone criminal activity.

  38. 38.

    A recurrent explanation for this state of affairs is that terms like “Islamic terrorism” or “Jihadism” would promote “Islamophobia”. This view is highly questionable. The use of twisted language by the authorities promotes a public perception that the authorities are not telling the truth and that they have something to hide, which actually promotes islamophobia.

  39. 39.

    The author is a professor of Social Science in Psychology at Stanford University.

  40. 40.

    Definition, see: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/horror

  41. 41.

    Fear is a more general term which covers the precedent expressions in a vaguer and less intense way. Intense fear might be therefore replaced by shock or revulsion.

  42. 42.

    Elsewhere, Martha Crenshaw’s definition of terrorism is not as concise as here. In different parts of her work, she gives different and often contradictory views on it. The author emphasises terrorism is meant to “shock, frighten, excite or outrage” but when exemplifying the impact, the author refers to air raids in the Second World War (p. 25), that is, she makes the exact contrary point from the expected. On page 23, referring to her definition of terrorism made on the basis of the study of FLN action in Algeria she considers the “revolutionary” characteristic as essential in two of the four items, but some pages later (p. 40) she acknowledges terrorists might as well be “reactionaries acting to prevent change from the top (such as the Secret Army Organisation during the Algerian war).

  43. 43.

    In Reich’s collective work, part IV is entirely dedicated to the horror impact under the title “Responding to terrorism: Decision making and the pressures on leadership”. It is a very limited approach either on the object of the impact or on the mechanisms of the impact under consideration.

  44. 44.

    Perhaps the most famous in this perspective is Walter’s Laqueur (2010) “The political psychology of appeasement” which does not refer to terrorism as normally considered. Other case in point is Schulman’s piece we refer to in the subsequent pages.

  45. 45.

    A similar process is known in the profession by “Traumatic bonding”, and it works along a relationship rather than a punctual act. A medical description of child abuse can be found here: http://www.johnbriere.com/stm.pdf which does not use these concepts but describes situations where the victim adapts to the aggression. For a general characterisation of the phenomenon, we can see https://victimsofpsychopaths.wordpress.com/traumatic-bonding/ Most of the existing literature on religious traumatic syndrome relates to Christian fundamentalism bluntly ignoring the fact this is a relatively benign in comparison with the much more pervasive Islamic fundamentalism. In this regard, see also Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoeffler “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism” (2004). The authors highlight the lack of analysis revolving around the psychological realm in terrorism studies.

  46. 46.

    Martha Crenshaw (2011) considers as “Stockholm syndrome”—that with the passage of time terrorists will feel an emotional affinity with their captives and becomes reluctant to harm them—(p. 105). Some pages later she defines it in a considerably different way: “a short-term for the hypothesis that with time hostages and their captors will become attached with each other because of the phenomenon of identification with the aggressor”. In any circumstance, she considers this case to be inconsistent with the decisional conflict theory she sustains. Both Crenshaw definitions are different from the standard definition, which we can quote from the above-mentioned article (Fabrique et al., 2007, p. 11): “The term Stockholm syndrome was coined after the 1973 robbery of Kreditbanken in Stockholm, Sweden, in which two robbers held four bank employees hostage from August 23 to 28. During this time, the victims shared a vault and became very familiar with their captors—in fact, they wound up emotionally attached and even defended them after the ordeal. Today, people view Stockholm syndrome as a psychological response of a hostage or an individual in a similar situation in which the more dominant person has the power to put the victim’s life in danger. Perpetrators occasionally use this advantage to get victims to comply with their demands.”

  47. 47.

    In the first case: “Norwegian women must realize that we live in a multicultural society and adapt to it” (Bawer, 2007, pp. 55, 205) and in the second case: “she was slaughtered in cold blood for wanting to be—simply—a girl in a civilized nation (Wikan, 2001, p. 93).”

  48. 48.

    Nasser’s Speech 1953, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TX4RK8bj2W0

  49. 49.

    Here, we agree with a large set of authors who consider present day terrorism as a result of resistance to modernity, as for instance Jurgensmeyer, op. cit. who considers new terrorism as “postmodern” exactly because it is defined as a reaction to modernity (pp. 228–232) and others as Zafirovski (2013) and Neumann (2009).

  50. 50.

    Muslims can wear headscarves for Alabama IDs. A Christian woman sues so she can, too, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/08/31/muslims-can-wear-headscarves-for-alabama-ids-a-christian-woman-sues-so-she-can-too/

  51. 51.

    When I worked as a student during summer in a Norwegian farm, back in the 1970s, I was most impressed to realise Norwegian law provided male primogenital succession rights on farming land, a situation which was corrected afterwards. At that time, it was already unconceivable to see gender discrimination in inheritance law in my own country, Portugal.

  52. 52.

    In French, the expression used is “communitarian”, an expression which also translates well the essence of the movement.

  53. 53.

    First published in “Le Magazine littéraire” January 2007.

  54. 54.

    The French public radio “France Culture” organised a remarkable debate on the issue which is available in the net http://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/une-vie-une-oeuvre/mister-ryckmans-et-docteur-leys-1935-2014# showing how the whole of the French-speaking elite silenced and insulted Simon Leys for the very simple fact he had revealed the horror of the Maoist Cultural Revolution, whereas the French-speaking elite was fascinated by its supposed virtues. Simon Leys’s (born Pierre Rickmans) book (Leys, 1987), first published in 1971, is a masterpiece and chronicles historical events which were totally misunderstood at the time.

  55. 55.

    Whereas the author’s specific logic might not be independent of the way he, as a French-speaking Belgium born, was outrageously mistreated by the French-speaking elite; it works for understanding the general Western twisted logic towards other cultural realities.

  56. 56.

    See Laqueur (1977, op. cit., pp. 156–157).

  57. 57.

    The author’s original terminology is followed here.

  58. 58.

    Among the innumerous literature on the issue, we can recommend the following report: http://www.ceji.org/anti-semitism-in-hungary-jobbik-in-parliament

  59. 59.

    The use of demagogy is preferred to the use of populism. Whereas there is a clear-cut difference between democracy and demagogy, the difference between the substantive popular and the adjective populist is not that straightforward. Similarly, we prefer Jihadi to Islamist, although we acknowledge Jihad is not an easy expression to use either.

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Correspondence to Paulo Casaca .

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Casaca, P. (2017). The Conceptual Discussion on Terrorism. In: Casaca, P., Wolf, S. (eds) Terrorism Revisited. Contemporary South Asian Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55690-1_1

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