Abstract
In the present contribution, the phenomenological unconscious is approached not in the sense of the psychoanalytic unconscious but on an “infra-conscious” level, below the “given,” as it were. I outline a threefold account of the “pre-conscious.” The three fundamental types of the phenomenological unconscious (in the narrow sense of the word) are: the genetic phenomenological unconscious, the hypostatic phenomenological unconscious, and the reflexive phenomenological unconscious. I explore how the phenomenological unconscious intervenes in the articulation between consciousness and self-consciousness. It is the Husserlian model of an “omni-intentionality” with its “nuclei” that makes it possible to clarify the status of self-consciousness (at the level of the phenomenological unconscious). I end by highlighting the plurality of fields corresponding to different “spheres” of the phenomenological unconscious.
The expression “generative phenomenology” stems from the work of Anthony Steinbock. Even if there is an overlap in our terminology, there are nevertheless fundamental differences. For Steinbock, “generative” is approached in a literal sense, with a special accent on the difference between “normality” and “abnormality.” In my own usage, “generative” refers to a surplus of meaning both beyond and below phenomenology’s descriptive framework. In this respect, generativity clarifies our understanding of phenomenology as transcendental insofar as it attends to the genesis of meaning itself. In short, my usage of “generative phenomenology” is distinct from Steinbock in the same respect that the term “constructive phenomenology” is distinct from the thought of Fink.
Translated by Audrey Petit-Trigg
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Notes
- 1.
In the sense of a “transcendental genesis” (which is to say, I insist on a “constructive phenomenology”).
- 2.
In distinction to “phantasy” and “reflexibility” (cf. the next note).
- 3.
Let us note, however, that this “imaging process” must be understood as having three meanings. First, phantasy operates at the level of a genetic phenomenological unconscious; second, the imagination operates at the level of a hypostatic phenomenological unconscious; finally, reflexibility operates as that of a reflexive phenomenological unconscious.
- 4.
This expression is by P. Loraux.
References and Endnotes
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———. 2010. En face de l’extériorité. Levinas et la question de la subjectivité. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2011. Le sens se faisant. Marc Richir et la refondation de la phénoménologie transcendantale. Bruxelles: Ousia.
———. 2015. La déhiscence du sens. Paris: Hermann.
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Schnell, A. (2017). Reflections on the Phenomenological Unconscious in Generative Phenomenology. In: Legrand, D., Trigg, D. (eds) Unconsciousness Between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 88. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55518-8_2
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