Abstract
This paper examines the need to control power through the courts and civil society in States with an overwhelming influence of political parties, which tend to invade most areas of their citizens’ lives. For the analysis of political parties ’ performance, which reveals their present excess of power, we provide some general considerations that apply, to some extent, to the vast majority of Western democracies. Then, we take the situation in Spain as a departure point, because of its still weakly structured and relatively untested civil society; for the study of control systems, we focus our analysis on the Spanish model of social and political interaction. In particular, we delve into issues that demonstrate the lack of control over economic and financial issues affecting political parties and the citizens’ new perception of their role and the necessity for accountability.
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Notes
- 1.
Spanish Constitution 1978, Sect. 6: http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf
See Judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court (hereinafter STC) of 21 February 1983, on the nature of political parties; also STC 3/1981, dated February 2, wherein they are defined as “constitutionally relevant social organizations”; a similar statement is to be found in STC 18/1984, of February 7. The STC of June 25 of 1986 on the relationship between articles 6 and 22 CE: “It is true that, in article 6 of the Spanish Constitution, specific conditions have been established for political parties in relation to the constitutional order and to its internal democratic structure and character, but such requirements are added to, not a substitute for, those in article 22, because they are established at a different level; and, in any case, they do not have an impact on the area of the right to set up, but, as established by the scientific literature on this subject, their existence depends on the tasks which the parties are called upon to play from an institutional perspective.”
- 2.
In the most recent poll of opinion conducted by CIS (Sociological Research Center), political parties are seen by the Spanish people as one of the main problems of our country. See: http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/Archivos/Marginales/3000_3019/3013/es3013mar.pdf [Access: 06/03/2014].
- 3.
Common definitions of ‘political corruption’ involve the above mentioned elements: “Political corruption means the abuse of political power by the government leaders to extract and accumulate for private enrichment, and to use politically corrupt means to maintain their hold on power. […] Political corruption can be of two forms. The first one includes both accumulation and extraction and where government officials use and abuse their hold on power to extract from the private sector, from government revenues, and from the economy at large. […] The second form of political corruption is one in which extracted resources (and public money) are used for power preservation and power extension purposes. This usually takes the form of favouritism and patronage politics. It includes a favouritist and politically motivated distribution of financial and material inducements, benefits, advantages, and spoils.” See: http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/political-corruption/ [Access: 03/08/15].
- 4.
“The political corruption is the betrayal, usually kept secret, of the popular trust (directly or indirectly) awarded to the rulers, through the breaking of the rules governing such relationship, due to the interest in obtaining a benefit granted by a third party. Such rules include a heterogeneous set of rules (legal and ethical) that it is impossible to identify with precision from a constitutional standpoint, but that can be achieved through the adoption of texts of a quasi-constitutional nature” (Bustos Gisbert 2010, 101 & ff.) [My translation].
- 5.
Recommendation Rec (2003) of the Committee of Ministers to member states on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns.
- 6.
“The main ‘pathologies’ usually have their origin in the instrumentalization of the members’ institutional positions that are used to generate cronyism with social and economic agents, benefits of which often do not end in the political organizations themselves, but in the illicit enrichment of some of their members.” (Ruiz Rico 2014, 223–241). [My translation].
- 7.
The conclusions of GRECO’s latest report, dated 2013, are said to be most disappointing: Spain has shown little interest in establishing political parties’ financing and control systems that minimally meet the standards contained in the above-cited recommendation, which was endorsed in 2003.
- 8.
He notes the danger posed by the totalitarian nature that sometimes cripple the parties and recognizes that, in fact, every Government is oligarchic, since it involves the Government by a small number of people over a majority. As stated by Rousseau: “Rigorously, there has never been a true democracy and never will exist. It goes against the natural order of life, that the largest number governs and the fewer is governed”.
- 9.
In fact, the courts, in general, have not tried the internal operation of parties on the grounds that they are private associations.
- 10.
“The growing centralization increasingly decreases the influence of the members on the leaders; on the contrary, it increases the influence of the latter on the former. […] Members’ discipline increases … the critical spirit is removed in exchange for a sort of spirit of adoration […]. The parliamentarians themselves are subjected to this obedience by the leaders of the party, an obedience that transforms them into voting machines. This way political parties become some sort of special agencies, closed, disciplined, machine-like, monolithic, external structures of which resemble an army; but their means of organization are infinitely more flexible and effective, resting in a training of souls, rather than the bodies. The dominion over men is deepened: the political parties become totalitarian. They require of its members a more intimate adherence: they constitute self-contained, closed systems with restrictive world views and interpretations. Fervour, faith, enthusiasm and intolerance reign in these ‘churches’ of modern times; partisan struggles become wars of religion.”
- 11.
Socialist Party’s (P.S.O.E.) and United Left’s (I.U.) regulations prohibit anonymous donations.
- 12.
For this author, the elimination of the consideration of subsidies (to the Parliamentary groups of the Cortes Generales and the Parliamentary groups of the Regional Assemblies) as economic resources of the parties is advisable, since the revenue from the Parliamentary groups is incorporated to their budget, and they have freedom of drawdown. In this way, the raison d’être of the subsidies to the groups is undermined, because they do not meet the purpose to justify their existence, which is facilitating the performance of their parliamentary duties.
- 13.
It is necessary to move on to a new model of electoral campaign, as well as to restructure the debates and general access to the media. Also necessary is a new regulation for outdoor advertising and for the advanced payment of the subsidies. It is our understanding that the latter cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining Government loans.
- 14.
The Court of Auditors’ 2013 report includes the following data: Resources from public funding received by the political parties with representation in the Congress of Deputies or, where appropriate, in the autonomous parliaments, total 299.5 million euros: for regular operating expenses 237.3 million euros; revenue from private sources in the financial year 2008 amounted to EUR 76.8 million, of which contributions from affiliates and supporters during 2008 was EUR 44.7 million.
- 15.
It is noteworthy that, in Spain, the Court of Auditors itself has recommended to expand its purview-audit powers, so that they can evaluate the adequacy of the management of the economic and financial activity of the political parties under the principles of economy and efficiency. Report of the Court of Auditors in 2013. See: http://www.tcu.es/tribunal-de-cuentas/es/search/alfresco/index.html?entrance=FIS
- 16.
In Spain, foundations have reported a total of 9,123,283 euros in donations in 2008.
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Pérez-Ugena Coromina, M. (2017). The Role of Civil Society in the Control of Public Power. In: Arnold, R., Martínez-Estay, J. (eds) Rule of Law, Human Rights and Judicial Control of Power. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 61. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55186-9_7
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