Lebanon: The Limits of Controlling a National Army in a Sectarian State

Abstract

Throughout the twentieth century, civil-military relations in Lebanon were marked by sectarian divisions, ultimately leading to two civil wars. Thereafter, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon from 1990 to 2006 hindered sovereign and effective reforms in the security and defense branches. Since Syria’s withdrawal, institutions for civilian control have been formally established through several reforms. Yet the actual performance of these institutions is deeply flawed. This weak performance can be traced back to Lebanese sectarianism, which up to this day dominates the civilian state apparatus. As civilian policy-making mostly builds on consensus between Lebanon’s sectarian factions, such divisions regularly paralyze the political arena. This chapter will thus focus on the consequences of sectarianism and factionalism on civilian control. It illustrates how sectarianism and factionalism can render institutions of civilian control ineffective. In the Lebanese case, civilians are neither able to agree on adequate security and defense policies, especially in regard to Hezbollah’s militia, nor locate much needed resources to counter new security threats. Further, the chapter shows that the lack of such policies and funding severely reduces the Lebanese Armed Forces’ effectiveness, as it leaves it without a clear role and adequate capacities. On a positive note, the Lebanese military has legitimized itself as a cross-sectarian institution in an environment dominated by sectarianism and is considered a model for multi-sectarian forces. Beyond that, it has developed a security plan to counter current security threats, through which it could successfully locate international resources. The Lebanese Armed Forces can thus play a stabilizing role in a state where civilian authorities fail to provide such stability.