Abstract
While shame can be both destructive and constructive, healthy shame, with its roots in personal conviction, is inherently associated with values and self-evaluation. Understood thus, it is an integral part of wholesome human functioning in the personal, social and cultural realms. This chapter investigates these statements in four stages drawing on relevant scholarship both past and present. First, it examines briefly the relational foundations of shame. Second, in the moral area, it taps into the tradition of virtue ethics as represented by Thomas Aquinas and approached through the virtue of charity. Third, it investigates shame’s educative aspect in two forms: personally, in terms of shame’s correlative quality, namely, honour; collectively, through three examples of cultural learning in relation to shame and injustice in the Australian context. Fourth, from spirituality, it uses insights from James and Evelyn Whitehead’s (and others’) discussion of shame in relation to spiritual growth. In doing so, it suggests briefly individuals who have transcended social shame and directed it to be a subversive and transforming influence.
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Notes
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Thomas Aquinas treats of shame as a foundational moral response in ST I-11.24.4, as one of the six species of fear in ST 1-11.41.4 and as an integral part of the virtue of temperance in ST 11-11.144. He also has treatments in his Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics Book 4, 17 a-m et passim. Summa Theologiae 1.2. 24.4; 1.2. 41.4; 2.2. 141-144 (henceforth ST). For translations of the Summa, the author has consulted the Latin/English (Blackfriars) version of the English Dominican Province (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1963–1975), the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2nd rev. ed. 1920, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province in the on-line version www.newadvent.org/summa/ and the new translation by Alfred J Freddoso, online version at http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm accessed 20/12/2008. Unless indicated, translations are from the Blackfriars’ version. Summaries or paraphrases are the author’s.
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By contrast, an emotion evil by its very nature is envy. It is part of our humanity to recognize what is good in others and to have a basic response of pity and compassion to their suffering. To take pleasure in another’s plight or be sad at their gifts or success indicates defective self-esteem. Ones moral character is flawed.
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This is consistent with Aristotle’s view that appropriate self-regard (philautia) is integral to human flourishing. Shame is entailed in self-care as moral sensitivity to actions that could reflect, or have reflected, badly on oneself (and a sense of remorse and even a desire to atone. See Oakley (1992, 74). Nussbaum notes that shame “requires self-regard as its essential backdrop. It is only because one expects oneself to have worth or even perfection that one will shrink from or cover the evidence of one’s nonworth or imperfection” (Nussbaum 2001, 196).
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It is not suggested here that one is reflectively and consciously aware at that particular time that one is experiencing shame. Evaluation certainly involves that one accept that it is legitimate for one to feel shame (whether consciously or not) through acknowledging the temporary sense of exposure or “fragility” it brings. All it may mean, at a basic level, is that one may feel shame (blush), withdraw a bit, and because that blush was not pleasant, avoid the situation in future.
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It is interesting that we can feel shame when others incorrectly perceive us as engaging in unworthy action. Even in such a situation, we have a deeper interest in being good as opposed to merely appearing to be good. Further, despite the social nature of shame, it is true to say that what shames you may not shame me.
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We can also feel shame for others, particularly our children. Moreover, while I can have passing moments of feeling fragile and exposed, I can desire (and will) myself to have a sense of shame. Further, a greater sense of shame can be cultivated by a voluntary examination of self.
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Given the spontaneous nature of emotional responses, one often hears them described as psychological facts that are “morally neutral.” This is understandable particularly when it comes to the “negative” emotions (those that make us feel uncomfortable, such as anger, shame or fear). The danger is because we feel “bad” (our equilibrium is disturbed) we conclude that we are “bad” morally (that we have done something wrong). For our purposes here, it suffices to say that Aquinas considers that we do have some level of responsibility for our emotions and our emotional life. They can be morally significant in themselves and not just from our attitude to them. It is through our emotions that we are affected by and respond in the world of relationships and, hence, need the affective virtues. See Harak (1993), Murphy (1999) and Ryan (2001a).
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Honour as “recognition” and appreciation is due to moral excellence. He says that “the honourable amounts to the same as being virtuous” (ST 2.2.145.1).
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While Benedict’s distinction is perhaps an overly simple generalization, its use is still evident in recent and current literature. A shame-culture is collectivist in that “persons understand themselves as parts of groups or collectives such as family, tribe or nation” (Triandis 1995, 2). They are defined by those groups and do not understand themselves as having a “separate identity.” In contrast with an individualist or “guilt-culture”, members are motivated by “group norms rather than individual needs or aspirations.” See Rohrbaugh (2002, 27–43, at 30 citing Triandis 1995). A sharper picture is offered by Hiebert (1985) in noting that “(I) n a shame-culture (sometimes referred to as “honour-shame culture”), what other people believe is much more powerful. Indeed, my principles may be derived from the desire to preserve my honour or avoid shame to the exclusion of all else” Hiebert (1985, 212).
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For the terms “disgrace” and “discretionary” shame, see Schneider (1992). He relates them to two words in French: “honte” which is Aquinas’ “shamefacedness” (erubescentia) = “discretion-shame” and “pudeur” which is equivalent to Aquinas’ “shame” (verecundia) = “disgrace-shame” See ST 2.2.144.2.
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This phrase is used to describe the policy of the removal of aboriginal children from their families and tribes. The review of the policy was in “Bringing Them Home”—the Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families April 1997. Concerning land rights, Mabo v Queensland (1992) was a landmark High Court of Australia decision recognising native title in Australia for the first time.
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We can consider the analogy of a person who has caused the death of someone in circumstances where that person is totally without blame. They will still speak of “feeling responsible” of the memory still “eating away at them”—language similar to that conveyed by “remorse” in its etymological roots. Darin Strauss’ book Half a Life is a memoir about his experience after he hit and killed a cyclist. He describes his feeling as that of “blameless guilt.” He says how the incident was “branded on his brain” and that “I was eating myself out from the inside.” See Todd Leopold, “You caused a death. Can you forgive yourself?” See CNN June 23, 2011 at http://edition.cnn.com/2011/LIVING/06/22/forgiving.yourself/. Accessed 26 June 2015.
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See Maguire (1986, 258) citing Aquinas’ de Malo, Q. 16, a 6 ad 13 and ad 8 for the phrase “ratio practica seu affectiva.”
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It is interesting to find Aquinas adopting a similar approach. For instance, in ST 1. 2. 38. 1–5, one finds a five-step strategy to deal with sadness, depression, loss, and grief.
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Myers cites Weil (1951) but without a page reference to the original text of her Waiting on God.
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Ryan, T. (2017). The Positive Function of Shame: Moral and Spiritual Perspectives. In: Vanderheiden, E., Mayer, CH. (eds) The Value of Shame. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53100-7_4
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