Abstract
I argue that Lewis’s conception of philosophy and conception of verification should be interpreted as opposed to the logical positivism of Carnap and Schlick. Specifically, I claim Lewis’s insistence on the importance of normative and metaphysical discourse, as well as his conception of verification that underwrites the meaning of normative and metaphysical statements, indicates a subtle but crucially important conflict with logical positivism. Lewis’s and Schlick’s disagreement over verification signals more than differing internal positions on a given issue; it arises from different conceptions of philosophy that go largely unarticulated in their debate. In light of these more fundamental considerations, pragmatism – at least in Lewis’s hands – should not be interpreted as aligned with logical positivism.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
“Logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” are used interchangeably throughout this chapter (mainly because various primary sources oscillate between the preferred terms). Outside of citations, I use “logical positivism” because it is Lewis’s preferred term.
- 3.
- 4.
Although no exact record exists of Lewis’s earliest encounter with logical positivism, there is an undated essay on Carnap’s work in Lewis’s archival holdings at Stanford. Murphey (2005) contains an insightful discussion of this document consistent with my position earlier.
- 5.
Lewis was described as defending such a traditional conception of philosophy against logical positivism. See Morton White’s recollections of the relationship between Lewis and Q.V.O. Quine in White (1999).
- 6.
Of course, even some logical positivists count metaphysical and normative claims as meaningful. For the logical positivists (most notably Schlick and Ayer), normative claims count as meaningful insofar as they express or illicit a given psychological or sociological state (a fact acknowledged in Lewis 1936).
- 7.
In his response to Lewis, one of Schlick’s major concerns is rejecting Lewis’s claim that Carnap’s methodological solipsism makes transcendence of immediacy impossible. Schlick argues for the importance of a “neutral position” concerning the “location” of experiences (i.e., is it the metaphysical concept of “me,” or my body, or the “I” of apperception?). See Schlick (1936).
- 8.
This dispute continues to repeat itself between pragmatists and non-pragmatists (even between pragmatists). See Johnson (2014) as one recent example.
- 9.
See Murphey (2005, p. 219).
- 10.
Some of Lewis’s later correspondence indicates a strong interest in metaphysics toward the end of his career. See chapter 9 in Murphey (2005).
- 11.
- 12.
I have not addressed Lewis’s arguments against logical positivism when it comes to normative discourse. See Lewis (1936).
- 13.
Carnap and Lewis disagree with Schlick’s conflation. See Carnap (1936, pp. 423–424).
- 14.
See Schlick 1939, p. 353.
- 15.
I offer a longer argument for this distinction in the conclusion of Olen (2016).
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Olen, P. (2017). Diverging Paths? Conceptual Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism. In: Olen, P., Sachs, C. (eds) Pragmatism in Transition . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52863-2_4
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