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Isabelle Modelchecking for Insider Threats

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Data Privacy Management and Security Assurance (DPM 2016, QASA 2016)

Abstract

The Isabelle Insider framework formalises the technique of social explanation for modeling and analysing Insider threats in infrastructures including physical and logical aspects. However, the abstract Isabelle models need some refinement to provide sufficient detail to explore attacks constructively and understand how the attacker proceeds. The introduction of mutable states into the model leads us to use the concepts of Modelchecking within Isabelle. Isabelle can simply accommodate classical CTL type Modelchecking. We integrate CTL Modelchecking into the Isabelle Insider framework. A running example of an IoT attack on privacy motivates the method throughout and illustrates how the enhanced framework fully supports realistic modeling and analysis of IoT Insiders.

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Correspondence to Florian Kammüller .

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Kammüller, F. (2016). Isabelle Modelchecking for Insider Threats. In: Livraga, G., Torra, V., Aldini, A., Martinelli, F., Suri, N. (eds) Data Privacy Management and Security Assurance. DPM QASA 2016 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9963. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47072-6_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47072-6_13

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47071-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-47072-6

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