Abstract
When we consider early modern philosophers who engage with sceptical arguments, Nicolas Malebranche is not usually among the first names to come to mind. But, while Malebranche does not spend much time with this topic, the way in which he responds to it when he does is nevertheless valuable. This is because his response underlines the central role of a particular principle in his system: the utter dependence of all created things on God. In this paper, I argue that the end of Malebranche’s engagement with scepticism in general is to show that it is a position, like atheism, that is only possible if one has a disordered imagination. And, importantly, one feature of a disordered imagination is the questioning or denial of what Malebranche takes to be a foundational principle of human knowledge: that we, and all other finite things, utterly depend on God for everything.
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Notes
- 1.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.188/LO 86.
- 2.
Malebranche’s attitude about this kind of perverse behavior calls to mind Descartes’s claim in his letter of February 9 1645, thought to be sent to Mesland. There, Descartes seeks to take a clear position on what he takes the “indifference” to mean in “freedom of indifference.” He states that, on his view, to be in a state of indifference is to be in a state where reason does not move us in one direction or another. It is not taken to mean a state where one possesses the freedom to act against the weight of reason. However, Descartes tells Mesland that “when a very evident reason moves us in one direction, although morally speaking we can hardly move in the contrary direction, absolutely speaking we can. For it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will be so doing.” (The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume 3, 245/AT IV 173). This ability to purposefully turn away from reason in order to demonstrate the extent of our freedom is what Kenny has called “the liberty of perversion” (“Descartes on the Will,” 155–57).
- 3.
This echoes Descartes’s position on the usefulness of the right kind of doubt. For detailed discussion of the kind of doubt endorsed by Descartes, and whether this doubt indeed distances him from the Pyrrhonians in the way he thinks it does, see Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, chapters 9 and 10, respectively.
- 4.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.188/LO 86.
- 5.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.187–8/LO 86.
- 6.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.55/LO 10.
- 7.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.55/LO 10.
- 8.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.46–47/LO 5. A complication of this view immediately arises when we wonder how Malebranche can affirm anything about human freedom when he is committed to the causal theory of occasionalism. For the purposes of this paper, I wish to put this worry to one side. For an argument that there is a way to make the prima facie contradiction between human freedom and occasionalism less intractable, see Walsh and Lennon, “Malebranche, the Quietists, and Freedom.”
- 9.
For more on the interpretation of Malebranche’s conception of freedom as negative, see Walsh and Lennon, “Malebranche, the Quietists, and Freedom.”
- 10.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.54–55/LO 10.
- 11.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.57/LO 11.
- 12.
In the preface to his Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion [Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion; hereafter Entretiens] added to the third edition of the work in 1696, Malebranche elaborates on why he takes the vision in God to be the best explanation of the nature of ideas. The editor of this volume, André Robinet, notes that this preface was likely penned in reaction to both the on-going polemic with Arnauld and in the wake of his quarrel with Régis (Entretiens, OC XII.ix). In Entretiens, Malebranche underlines the fact that his theory of the vision in God tracks Augustine’s own explanation of the nature of ideas. He does this because, as he notes, the vision in God is received as “a paradox that revolts the mind, or rather the imagination of most people” (Entretiens, Preface, OC XII.10). Malebranche appeals not only to Augustine but also to Plato and Aquinas in order to show the authority behind the vision of things in God. For discussion of the relationship between Malebranche and Augustine on ideas, as well as between Malebranche and Descartes see Alquié, Le Cartésianisme de Malebranche, 185–99. See also Gouhier, La philosophie de Malebranche et son expérience religieuse, 244–49.
- 13.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.41–42/LO 2.
- 14.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.43/LO 3.
- 15.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.77/LO 23. Malebranche devotes much time, across almost all of his works, to detailing the reason for the corruption of our freedom: Adams’s sin.
- 16.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC II.309/LO 446.
- 17.
For more on Malebranche’s view of “appearances” and how he reasons from sensory modifications as appearances to the conclusion that we have true but imperfect knowledge of our own souls see Schmaltz, Malebranche’s Theory of the Soul, 42–43.
- 18.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC II.309/LO 446.
- 19.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.414/LO 217. For a discussion of Arnauld’s objection to the statement that everyone agrees that we do not see objects directly, see Schmaltz “Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision in God,” 68–71.
- 20.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I. 418–36/LO 220–29. Schmaltz remarks that in Locke’s critique of Malebranche’s theory of ideas, he notes that there is nothing in Malebranche’s discussion that argues for the exhaustiveness of the other possible explanations for how ideas come to the mind. Schmaltz then outlines an interesting proposal from Connell (“La passivité de l’entendement selon Malebranche”), who suggests that Malebranche’s list has its origin in Suárez. See “Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision in God,” 70–71. Pyle also mentions Connell in this context (Malebranche, 52).
- 21.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.437/LO 230.
- 22.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.438/LO 231. Emphasis mine.
- 23.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.439/LO 231.
- 24.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.439/LO 231.
- 25.
For Malebranche’s discussion of occasionalism that highlights the dependence aspect of finite beings, see Recherche, OC II.309/LO 446–52. For a discussion that focuses more on the absence of a necessary connection between “natural causes” and their effects, see Entretiens, OC XII.147–72. See also Nadler, “Malebranche on Causation.”
- 26.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.445/LO 234.
- 27.
Malebranche, Entretiens, OC XII.319. For more on the relationship between occasional causes and laws, see Adams, “Malebranche’s Causal Concepts” and Walsh and Stencil, “Malebranche on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Particular Volitions.”
- 28.
Malebranche adds three other reasons why the vision in God is the preferred theory of ideas: he endorses something that resembles Plato’s argument for a kind of reminiscence theory, and ties this to the ability to conceive of universal or general ideas; he suggests something very much like Descartes’s causal proof for the existence of God in the third meditation: we possess the idea of the infinite and such an idea could not have been created by a finite mind; finally, he states that because God creates only for His own glory, it would not make sense for God to create the human mind with the ability to perceive without at the same time perceiving Him in some way (Recherche, OC I.440–47/LO 232–35).
- 29.
Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle, 256.
- 30.
Though Foucher’s error was, perhaps, for good reason. As Watson notes, upon the publication of the first three books of the Recherche, “No volume number is given and the only indication that the three books it contains do not constitute a complete work is a one-sentence paragraph in Chapter IV of Book I which lists six topics to be treated; the volume closes with the word FIN” (Downfall, 40). As Watson also notes, Malebranche did, indeed, modify certain parts of the Recherche either in response to Foucher or at least as a measure to prevent other people from interpreting his text in the same way.
- 31.
For the dispute with Arnauld over the vision in God, see Denis Moreau, Deux Cartésiens. For the dispute as engaged by Régis, see Jolley, The Light of the Soul and Schmaltz, Malebranche’s Theory of the Soul. For the dispute with Mairan, see the immensely clear and detailed introduction to the 1947 edition of Mairan’s correspondence with Malebranche, “Malebranche et le spinozisme,” by Joseph Moreau. See also Getchev, “Some of Malebranche’s Reactions to Spinoza as Revealed in his Correspondence with Dortous de Mairan,” and Rodis-Lewis, Nicolas Malebranche, Ch.5. These texts provide a very good explanation of why Malebranche’s theory of ideas brings him uncomfortably close to Spinozism, and the extent to which he can escape the charge. Finally, for much more detail on the vision in God in general, and about how to understand the role of representation in Malebranche’s theory of ideas in particular, see Nadler’s Malebranche and Ideas. A good overview of the general problems with the vision in God is found in Pyle, Malebranche.
- 32.
For a compelling discussion of Foucher’s philosophical position that is much more nuanced than what I can sketch here, see Maia Neto, “Foucher’s Academic Cartesianism.”
- 33.
Watson, Downfall, 49.
- 34.
Watson, Downfall, 49. Watson gives a rich discussion of the various criticisms leveled by Foucher against Malebranche, of which only a handful is considered here. See Downfall, 40–63.
- 35.
Foucher, Critique, 47. Cited in Watson, Downfall, 50.
- 36.
Foucher, Critique, 52. Cited in Watson, Downfall, 51.
- 37.
Foucher, Critique, 62. “[O]n serait bien aisé d’avoir de l’évidence sur une si grande Question.”
- 38.
See, for instance, Recherche, OC I.121/LO 48. Later, in Entretiens, Malebranche states that, in fact, giving a rigorous demonstrative proof of the existence of bodies is impossible. This truth must be taken on faith (Entretiens, OC XII.137). More on this below.
- 39.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC II.496. Cited in Watson, Downfall, 54. Translation mine.
- 40.
Watson, Downfall, 57.
- 41.
Foucher, Critique, 32. Cited in Watson, Downfall, 50.
- 42.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.128/LO 613.
- 43.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.148/LO 624.
- 44.
Malebranche, Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques, OC X.99. Unless otherwise stated, translations my own.
- 45.
Malebranche, Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques, OC X.99–100. This is echoed in Entretiens, OC XII.45–48. See also Recherche, OC III.58/LO 570.
- 46.
Malebranche, Réponse, OC VI/VII.55–56.
- 47.
Arnauld, Des vrais et des fausses idées, Ch. XIV, cited by Malebranche, Réponse, OC VI/VII.61.
- 48.
Malebranche, Réponse, OC VI/VII.61–62.
- 49.
This sentiment is reproduced in Malebranche’s Réponse to Arnauld from Recherche, Bk.III, Pt.2, ch.5 (“Dic quia tu tibi lumen non es” Serm. 8 de verbis Domini).
- 50.
Malebranche, Réponse, OC VI/VII.64.
- 51.
Malebranche asks rhetorically for Arnauld to choose between the reason of Saint Augustine and his (Arnauld’s) own authority (Réponse, OC VI/VII.65, and following).
- 52.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.434/LO 288.
- 53.
Malebranche, Réponse du Père Malebranche à la Troisième Lettre de Monsieur Arnauld, in Recueil de toutes les réponses à Monsieur Arnauld, OC VIII/IX.926 (dated March 1699; hereafter : Troisième).
- 54.
Malebranche, Troisième, OC VIII/IX.925. Here Malebranche cites Arnauld’s L’Art de penser, Part 4, chapter 6.
- 55.
Malebranche, Troisième, OC VIII/IX.925.
- 56.
Malebranche, Troisième, OC VIII/IX.972.
- 57.
This argument between Malebranche and Arnauld reproduces a dialogue imagined by Malebranche more than twenty years earlier in his 1677 work Conversations chrétiennes (OC IV.68–73). For more on Arnauld’s and Malebranche’s theories of ideas and on their disagreement see Nadler, Arnauld and the Cartesian philosophy of ideas, Chapters 3–5.
- 58.
Malebranche, Troisième, OC VIII/IX.926.
- 59.
Malebranche, Troisième, OC VIII/IX.972.
- 60.
Malebranche, Conversations chrétiennes, OC IV.72.
- 61.
Arnauld is quoted from his Vraies et fausses idées (ch.15) and his Défense against Malebranche’s response to this work. Cited in Troisième, OC VIII/IX.932.
- 62.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.341/LO 173.
- 63.
Kim, “Is Montanism a Heretical Sect or Penteconstal Antecedent?,” 113. The Synod of Iconium (in 230) officially excommunicated the movement.
- 64.
See, for instance, Malebranche’s attack on Quietism in Walsh and Lennon, “Malebranche, the Quietists, and Freedom.”
- 65.
Tertullian, De Pallio, 4.8. Cited in Dunn, Tertullian, 22. A full translation of De Pallio (and Tertullian’s other works) is available online courtesy of The Tertullian Project (http://www.tertullian.org/).
- 66.
Dunn, Tertullian, 22–23.
- 67.
Tertullian, De Pallio, 6.2–6.4.
- 68.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC II.342–44/LO 174. In a note on page OC II.343/LO 174, Malebranche approvingly mentions Claude Saumaise, a contemporary French scholar who edited a version of De Pallio, and included, in the dedicatory epistle, several lines indicating the obscurity of Tertullian’s writing.
- 69.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.125/LO 610.
- 70.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.125/LO 611. He continues, noting that the only good that can wholly satisfy us is infinite, and “grand and obscure expressions bear its mark.” As a result, Malebranche notes that obscure things excite our desires and grandeur excites our wonder, thus fooling us into thinking that we are in contact with something greater than we are.
- 71.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.126/LO 611.
- 72.
Tertullian, On Prescription Against Heretics, 7 [428] 8–10, cited in Marrone, “Medieval Philosophy in Context,” 11; and On the Flesh of the Christ, 5.4, cited in Dunn, Tertullian, 21. But note that there is some discussion about how, exactly, to take this expression. For longer analyses, see the authors suggested by Dunn: González, “Athens and Jerusalem Revisited Reason and Authority in Tertullian” and Osborn, Tertullian: First Theologian of the West. See also Hunink, Tertullian, De Pallio: A Commentary.
- 73.
Marrone, “Medieval Philosophy in Context,” 11. (See Acts 17:28.)
- 74.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.349/LO 178.
- 75.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.349/LO 178.
- 76.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.350/LO 179.
- 77.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.352/LO 180.
- 78.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.352–53/LO 180.
- 79.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.354/LO 180. He adds, though, that Seneca does have some interesting things to say, but must be read only by people who already have the foundation of Christian morality. They are the only ones who can stay immune to his suggestions that lead to absurdity.
- 80.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.356/LO 182.
- 81.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.356–57/LO 183.
- 82.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.367/LO 189. Malebranche cites from Montaigne’s Les Essais, Book II, chapter 12 (“Apology for Raymond Sebond”).
- 83.
Lennon, The Plain Truth, 72.
- 84.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.368/LO 189.
- 85.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.369/LO 190.
- 86.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.369/LO 190.
- 87.
Malebranche, Réponse aux Réflexions Philosophiques & Théologiques de Mr. Arnauld touchant le Traité de la nature et de la grâce, Recueil de toutes les réponses à M. Arnauld, OC VIII/IX.631 (hereafter: Réponse aux Réflexions).
- 88.
Malebranche, Réponse aux Réflexions, OC VIII/IX.631.
- 89.
Malebranche, Pièces jointes, OC XVII-1.524.
- 90.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.54/LO 569.
- 91.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.55–54/LO 569.
- 92.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.55/LO 569.
- 93.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.56/LO 569.
- 94.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.58/LO 571. The gland in question here is the pineal gland.
- 95.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.59/LO 571.
- 96.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.59/LO 572.
- 97.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.60/LO 572.
- 98.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.60/LO 572.
- 99.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.61/LO 573.
- 100.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.62/LO 573. See also Réponse, OC VI/VII.107.
- 101.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.63/LO 574.
- 102.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.63/LO 574.
- 103.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.64/LO 574.
- 104.
Malebranche notes that the saints in heaven might have more knowledge about the existence of world, knowledge that comes directly from God. But we, human beings on the terrestrial plane, cannot access this kind of knowledge.
- 105.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.65–66/LO 575.
- 106.
Brown, “The Critical Reception of Malebranche,” 275.
- 107.
The question of the relationship between faith and Academic scepticism in Bayle and Descartes is explored by Lennon in “What Kind of a Skeptic was Bayle?” See also the contributions in this volume by Irwin and by Hickson for more discussion of intellectual integrity.
- 108.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC II.377/LO 484. Throughout the final book of Recherche, dedicated to method, Malebranche notes that the imagination can be useful for us to get a better grasp on our ideas related, in particular, to geometry. The notion seems to be that once we are firm in our understanding of the incorrect way to use the imagination (as elaborated in Book II of Recherche), we can, with prudence and caution, use it to visualize shapes and lines.
- 109.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC I.55/LO 10.
- 110.
Malebranche, Recherche, OC III.139/LO 619. As Lennon has put it, “Skepticism in the normative sense is simply perverse” (“Malebranche and Method,” 19).
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I thank Plinio Junqueira Smith, as well as two anonymous referees, for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this chapter.
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Walsh, J. (2017). Confusing Faith and Reason? Malebranche and Scepticism. In: Smith, P., Charles, S. (eds) Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 221. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45424-5_9
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