Abstract
This paper examines the role of Pyrrhonian and Academic scepticism in Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. At issue is whether the entire project of natural theology can be dismissed on general sceptical grounds even prior to any detailed examination of its arguments. The paper seeks to characterize the kind of scepticism employed by Philo and to assess its implications for natural theology by identifying two general sceptical arguments advanced by Philo. The first involves the “reasonable” sceptic’s unwillingness to engage in “abstruse” and “remote” inquiries. Convinced of the irrefutability of Pyrrhonian arguments against the reliability of sense perception and reason, the sceptic will confine his philosophical activities to the natural and moral sciences. Cleanthes, however, offers a cogent and even compelling response to this sceptical consideration. By pledging to pursue natural theology using the same empirical data and reasoning patterns of the natural sciences, he effectively presents reasonable sceptics such as Philo with a dilemma. Even in the Enquiry Hume does not hold that mitigated scepticism of itself is a philosophically sufficient response to natural theology. The second main sceptical argument involves a kind of scepticism with regard to reason that has no clear equivalent in the Enquiry. This argument is more ambitious in that it attempts to show that unlike the beliefs of ordinary life, belief in the conclusions of natural theology does not survive confrontation with Pyrrhonian arguments. Once again Cleanthes is able to meet this general sceptical challenge.
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Notes
- 1.
References to the Dialogues are to Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (New York: Social Sciences Publishers, 1948), cited in the text as “D” followed by section and paragraph, and page number.
- 2.
In what follows I shall use the terms “Academic sceptic” and “mitigated sceptic” interchangeably.
- 3.
James Noxon, “Hume’s Agnosticism,” Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 248–261. Philip Stanley, “The Scepticisms of David Hume,” The Journal of Philosophy 32 (1935), 421–431.
- 4.
Stanley Tweyman, Scepticism and Belief in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 27.
- 5.
Tweyman 1986, 28.
- 6.
David O’Connor, Hume on Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 46. Cf. “Cleanthes himself embraces ‘reasonable scepticism’, while seeing Philo as an unmitigated Pyrrhonist” (O’Connor 2001, 83).
- 7.
References to the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding are to David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed., Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), hereafter cited in text as “EHU” followed by section and paragraph, and to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed., revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), hereafter “SBN” followed by page numbers.
- 8.
Terence Penelhum, God and Skepticism (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1983), 127.
- 9.
Penelhum 1983, 130.
- 10.
Terence Penelhum, “Comments and Responses,” in Faith, Skepticism and Personal Identity, J.J. MacIntosh and H. A. Meynell, eds (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1994), 270.
- 11.
Miriam McCormick, “A Change in Manner: Hume’s Scepticism in the Treatise and the first Enquiry, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29:3 (1999), 431–447.
- 12.
McCormick 1999, 446; McCormick’s emphasis.
- 13.
Robert J. Fogelin, “The Tendency of Hume’s Skepticism” in Philosophical Interpretations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 114–131.
- 14.
“…there are no arguments that will refute Pyrrhonian scepticism and thus there can be no arguments that will justify a more mitigated version of scepticism. The mitigated scepticism that Hume recommends is thus the causal consequence of the influence of two factors: Pyrrhonian doubt on the one side and natural instinct on the other. We do not argue our way to mitigated scepticism, we find ourselves there (Fogelin 1992, 130)”
- 15.
For a partial response to this consideration, see Ira Schnall, “Hume on ‘Popular’ and ‘Philosophical’ Skeptical Arguments,” Hume Studies 33:1 (2007), 41–66.
- 16.
For further details, see my “Hume’s Reply to Baylean Scepticism” in Plínio J. Smith and Sébastien Charles, eds. Scepticism and the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), pp. 128–138.
- 17.
It is worth remembering that the principle that whatever can be clearly and distinctly conceived is capable of existence is of particular importance in the context of the Dialogues, since it serves as the basis of the Cosmological Argument in Part IX.
- 18.
That Philo seeks to undermine natural theology without having recourse to global Pyrrhonian doubt can be seen from his treatment of scepticism with regard to the senses. It is a striking feature of Philo’s discussion of Pyrrhonian arguments in Part I of the Dialogues that he declines to press the kind of scepticism concerning the external world that Hume elsewhere acknowledges would undercut any attempt to establish the existence of God by philosophical argument. In his discussion of scepticism with regard to the external world in Part 12 of the Enquiry Hume rejects the Cartesian appeal to divine veracity to prove that our impressions of sense are caused by external physical objects. Such reasoning, Hume suggests is circular, since any plausible argument for the existence of God presupposes the existence of the external world as its evidential basis. According to Hume, “if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes (EHU 12.13; SBN 153).” Hume is not simply making the familiar point that because no matter of fact is capable of demonstration, the existence of God must be based on an argument from experience. Rather, his claim is that knowledge of the existence of God presupposes knowledge of the existence of the external physical world. Thus, by declining to insist on Pyrrhonian arguments against the senses, Philo effectively forgoes what Hume himself had argued would be a decisive sceptical objection to the design argument, or indeed any philosophical attempt to establish the existence and nature of God. Why then does Philo not make use of these more “profound” sceptical objections to our knowledge of the external world? The most natural response is that Hume does not want his critique of natural theology to turn on a sceptical argument that would equally undermine the beliefs of ordinary life and the natural and moral sciences. The same observation holds a fortiori for Hume’s doubts concerning inductive reasoning, which are also largely passed over by Philo.
- 19.
After summarizing Cleanthes’s rejoinder that speculative sceptics such as Philo must, by parity of reasoning, reject abstruse theories in natural sciences as well as in natural theology, William Sessions observes, “of course, Cleanthes’s comments do not touch Philo, whose scepticism is neither brutish nor ignorant. Why then does Cleanthes even bother with a broadside that seems so badly off the mark?” Sessions, Reading Hume’s Dialogues (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 47.
- 20.
That these are the agreed terms upon which the discussion will be pursued is confirmed by Philo’s observation in Part VI that “the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always to accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely neglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries” (DNR 6.6: 172)”.
- 21.
For Locke’s account of the relation between faith and reason, see Essay concerning Human Understanding Bk. 4, Ch. 18.
- 22.
An account of religious faith similar to the one here endorsed by Cleanthes had already appeared in the discussion of the philosophical arguments for the doctrine of an afterlife in Section 11 of the Enquiry. There Hume’s ‘friend’ had asserted that “all the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life (EHU 11.27; SBN 146).”
- 23.
To my knowledge, the commentator whose reading is perhaps closest to my own is Andrew Pyle. See his Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion: Reader’s Guide (Continuum, 2006), Chapter 1. Pyle recognizes that Cleanthes means to accuse Philo of a double standard in so far as natural science too involves abstruse reasoning and conclusions contrary to common sense (Pyle 2006, 33–4). What Pyle does not stress is Cleanthes’ crucial claim that experimental natural theology employs the same methods of reasoning and the same empirical data as those of natural and moral science.
- 24.
Schnall 2007, 64, note 9.
- 25.
For similar reasons, Brian Ribeiro has questioned Hume’s commitment to Academic or mitigated scepticism in so far as it prescribes restricting our intellectual activities to those domains that lie closest to the concerns of everyday life. According to Ribeiro, Hume’s commitment to Academic scepticism is called into question by his apparent violations of these restrictions, including, among other things, authoring a book-length philosophical investigation into questions of natural theology. Brian Ribeiro, “Hume’s Changing Views on the ‘Durability’ of Scepticism,” The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7(2), 215–236. See especially note 13 (p. 234) where Ribeiro states his worry succinctly: “But the puzzle is obvious: What status do the subject-matter restrictions [of mitigated scepticism] have if Hume (a) repeats them in two of his works, (b) offers a clear rationale for them, and then (c) persists in refusing to obey them?”
- 26.
Alan Bailey and Dan O’Brien, Hume’s Critique of Religion: ‘Sick Men’s Dreams’ (New York and London: Springer, 2014), 85. Bailey and O’Brien attempt to relieve the alleged tension by maintaining that ultimately Cleanthes will be unable to show that we can arrive at sound conclusions concerning the deity by the use of reliable belief forming mechanisms of the kind that operate in scientific reasoning (Bailey and O’Brien 2014, 88). But this is really beside the point. The question was whether Philo’s speculative scepticism as such casts sufficient doubt on the project of natural theology so as to obviate the need for the kind of detailed examination of Cleanthes’s arguments that Philo will undertake in Part II and beyond.
- 27.
“If Good prevail much above Evil, we may, perhaps, presume, that the Author of the Universe, if an intelligent, is also a benevolent Principle. If Evil prevail much above Good, we may draw a contrary Inference. This is a Standard, by which we may decide such a Question, with some Appearance of Certainty…” in M. A. Stewart, “An Early Fragment on Evil” in Hume and Hume’s Connexions, M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright, eds (Reading, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 166.
- 28.
This is not, of course, to deny any overlap between natural theology as Philo portrays it and the experimental theism that Cleanthes will defend in subsequent discussion. My point is rather that Philo is clearly taking aim at a much more ambitious conception of natural theology than the one to which Cleanthes subscribes.
- 29.
Richard Fiddes, Theologia Speculativa, or The First Part of a Body of Divinity under that Title (London, 1718).
- 30.
Cf. “It is true; if men attempt the discussion of questions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the oeconomy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience; nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided…(EHU 8.1; SBN 80. Italics added).”
- 31.
It is also worth recalling that at this stage in the discussion, Philo has specifically undertaken to defend Demea’s conception of natural theology against philosophical objections by attacking the capacity of human reason. Moreover, Demea himself summarizes his theological views as “the most established doctrines and opinions” (D 1.2: 131). Thus, Hume has both a dramatic and a philosophical reason for having Philo portray natural theology in such traditional terms. Dramatically, it represents the kind of orthodox theological view that Demea himself endorses and Philo has pledged to defend. Philosophically, it allows Hume to insist that natural theology so understood is utterly lacking in rational foundation.
- 32.
The pattern of using broad sceptical arguments to winnow the field of philosophically respectable forms of natural theology extends into the initial exchanges of Part II. There Philo offers a quick, not to say crude, empiricist argument against the conceivability of the divine nature. According to Philo “our ideas reach no farther than our experience: We have no experience of divine attributes and operations: I need not conclude my syllogism…” (D 2.4: 142–143). By claiming to establish knowledge of the deity on the basis of the design argument, Cleanthes is able to circumvent Philo’s objection, since an essential element of the analogical argument is that the first cause of the universe must resemble something of which we do have immediate experience, namely the human mind (Cf. Tweyman 1986, 36). Thus, Cleanthes shows how experimental theism is able to account for our idea of God despite our having no direct experience of him. As a result, Philo is forced to pursue the discussion using a more targeted set of sceptical objections. While Philo’s objection proves not to be a telling criticism of Cleanthes, the brief exchange accomplishes two broader goals: it narrows the range of legitimate methodologies with regard to natural theology and establishes the basis upon which the remainder of the discussion will proceed.
- 33.
References to the Treatise are to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), cited in text as “T” followed by Book. Part.Section.Paragraph and to A Treatise of Human Nature, ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), cites in text as “SBN” followed by page numbers.
- 34.
For an insightful discussion of some main philosophical and interpretive issues surrounding Hume’s argument, see David Owen, “Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” in Donald C. Ainslie and Annemarie Butler, Cambridge Companion to Hume’s Treatise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 101–134.
- 35.
Some commentators have claimed to find traces of the first stage of Hume’s sceptical argument against reason in his discussion of Descartes’ antecedent scepticism. While I cannot enter into the matter here, I find this reading unconvincing. See Owen 2015.
- 36.
There is some reason to doubt whether it is truly the case, as Philo suggests, that “all sceptics” reason in this manner. Not only is it difficult to find clear antecedents for Hume’s negative arguments in T 1.4.1, but more importantly, the solution to these doubts is based on an account of belief as enlivened ideas that Hume clearly takes to be one of his most novel contributions to the science of human nature.
- 37.
Robert Fogelin also takes Philo’s argument to be an allusion to the sceptical argument of 1.4.1. See “The Tendency of Hume’s Skepticism,” in his Philosophical Interpretations (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 124. See also Owen 2015.
- 38.
Hume makes no mention in the Treatise of the effect of these sceptical arguments on natural theology, observing only that “even after all we retain a degree of belief, which is sufficient for our purpose, either in philosophy or common life” (T 1.4.1.9; SBN 185. Hume’s italics).
- 39.
In his letter to Gilbert Elliott of March 10, 1751 concerning the manuscript of the Dialogues, Hume expresses puzzlement that our confidence in the conclusion of the design argument does not seem to diminish as much as it ought in the face of criticism. However, Hume’s reference there to “other Dissimilitudes” suggests that the objections he has in mind are the detailed criticisms of the analogical inference offered in Part II, rather than the general sceptical argument of D 1.11. J. Y. T. Greig, ed., The Letters of David Hume, vol. 1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), 153–157.
- 40.
Cleanthes signals that he means to introduce a new consideration by prefacing his argument with the phrase “let me observe here too”.
- 41.
Robert Fogelin also links Cleanthes’ argument in Part III with the scepticism of the Treatise. However, Fogelin suggests that Philo is “silent” not because Cleanthes has offered a cogent response to Philo’s earlier sceptical argument, but because Cleanthes is now claiming to base his belief in a designing God on a mental mechanism that involves no inference. That is, Cleanthes’s so-called Irregular Argument is not an argument at all and so Philo’s scepticism concerning demonstrative and probable reasoning simply does not apply to it. Indeed, according to Fogelin, because Cleanthes does not claim to ground his belief on any kind of argument, no sceptical consideration can, or need, be adduced to undermine its epistemic credentials (Fogelin 1992, 125–26). However, I believe the text will not support this interpretation. To take just one consideration, Philo does not simply “fall silent” as Fogelin suggests. Rather, he is observed by Pamphilus to be “a little embarrassed and confounded”. Such a reaction would hardly be warranted if Cleanthes were now offering a consideration that was simply irrelevant to Philo’s earlier sceptical arguments. Cf. Hume’s comment to Gilbert Elliot that “the Confusion in which I represent the Sceptic seems natural” (Letter to Gilbert Elliott, March 10, 1751, p. 155).
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Ryan, T. (2017). Academic Scepticism and Pyrrhonian Scepticism in Hume’s Dialogues . In: Smith, P., Charles, S. (eds) Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 221. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45424-5_15
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