Abstract
Why are even ostensibly strong interests, such as “big business”, sometimes less influential in shaping policy outcomes than weak interests, such as labour unions and non-governmental organisations? In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework for studying interest group influence in the European Parliament. I do so by focusing on a number of key factors that may further, or limit, the ability of interest groups to shape policy outcomes. These relate to interest group factors (the ability to stand united), issue factors (the complexity and saliency of issues) and institutional factors (decision-makers’ receptiveness to certain arguments and interests). Together, these factors explain why interest groups with a high potential for influence often see their powers curtailed.
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Dionigi, M.K. (2017). What Are the Conditions for Interest Group Influence?. In: Lobbying in the European Parliament. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42688-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42688-4_3
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