Abstract
Kant’s philosophy is considered a major ground for human rights. Indeed, the modern understanding of human rights is heavily based on autonomy as the root of human dignity. Nonetheless, it is arguable whether Kant’s juridical philosophy may accept all the precepts usually associated with the notion of human rights. This paper claims that, in accordance with Kant’s juridical philosophy, social rights should not be considered as a species of human rights. Basically, we aim to show that a claim for being provided with a benefit does not amount to a claim for being treated with dignity. In order to do that, we start by analyzing the three applicability conditions of the concept of right. We believe that those conditions preclude Kant from introducing social rights in his doctrine of rights. Those analyses should also help us to make clear the distinction between ethics and right, a core point for our overall interpretation, since, according to us, duties of beneficence should be placed only in ethics. Following on that, we analyze the moral obligation corresponding to our only one innate right, the one that belongs to every human being in virtue of his humanity: freedom. At this point, we support the thesis according to which such a moral obligation must be merely negative, whereas a social right corresponds to a positive obligation.
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Notes
- 1.
Flikschuh. “Personal Autonomy and Public Authority”, 2013, p. 169, n. 1.
- 2.
References to Kant’s works embedded in the text are formed by the standard abbreviations of the German titles, followed by the volume number in Academy edition (the Akademie Ausgabe) of Kant’s writings in which the work is included, and by the page number in that volume.
- 3.
Thus, Bielefeldt is therefore right to claim that Kant’s philosophy of human rights rests on the inviolability of human dignity (Bielefeldt. “A filosofia dos direitos humanos”, 2000, p. 62).
- 4.
Hart. “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, 1955, pp. 175–176.
- 5.
We believe that the term “humanity” in this passage refers to the moral property of being an end in itself because of the passage in GMS, 4: 430–431, quoted above. In other words, we see an interconnection between GMS, 4: 430–431 and MS, 6: 237. A similar point is made by Höffe (see “Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights”, 2010, pp. 84–85).
- 6.
Jonathan Wolff defines positive rights in the sense relevant to us here: “If I have a positive right to something this entails that a particular person, or in other cases everyone, has a corresponding duty to provide me with that thing, or whatever is necessary to secure it” (Wolff. Robert Nozick, 1991, p. 19). Instances of what we mean by positive or social rights are to be found at least in Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- 7.
“[B]y ‘freedom’ [in a ‘law of freedom’] he does not here mean freedom of the will, that is, morality or the disposition towards right” (Höffe. “Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights”, 2010, p. 77).
- 8.
Nozick. Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974, p. 30.
- 9.
Höffe. “Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights”, 2010, p. 87.
- 10.
“[S]omeone can be his own master (sui iuris) but cannot be the owner of himself (sui dominus) (cannot dispose of himself as he pleases)” (MS, 6: 270).
- 11.
Due to these considerations, we disagree with Höffe regarding the possibility of a broader scope for the term “coercion” in Kant’s text: “The term ‘coercion’ is often taken to refer to physical violence. There are however plenty of other types of coercion, and not only direct coercion, but also indirect coercion, such as that which results from social dependence or economic poverty. Since Kant does not describe the broad spectrum of possible kinds of coercion, one often assumes he is employing a restricted concept that is reduced to physical violence. In fact it remains open in Kant’s text whether the coercion is physical or economic, whether it can be easily perceived or instead is hidden, and whether it applies directly or indirectly” (Höffe. “Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights”, 2010, pp. 82–83).
- 12.
This is why Höffe and Kersting, for instance, consider a juridical community to be a community grounded in the freedom of responsible agents, and not in solidarity with the needy (See Höffe. Introduction à la philosophie pratique de Kant. La morale, le droit e la religion, 1993, p. 182; Höffe. Immanuel Kant, 1986, p. 199; Höffe. “O imperativo categórico do direito”, 1998, p. 217; Kersting, “Politics, freedom, and order: Kant’s political philosophy”, 1992, p. 345). More recently, Höffe explicitly says: “The ‘spirit of brotherhood,’ which the first article of the UN ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ requires that human beings show toward to one another, […] does not have the rank of an innate human right for Kant” (Höffe. “Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights”, 2010, p. 89).
- 13.
This means that the categorical imperative can command the fulfillment of the principle of right, but not the other way around.
- 14.
The notion of side constraints can be better understood here: “In contrast to incorporating rights into the end state to be achieved, one might place them as side constraints upon the actions to be done: don’t violate constraints C. The rights of others determine the constraints upon your actions” (Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. 29).
- 15.
As Höffe says: “First, the idea of negative rights to freedom is at the source of human rights. Second, they are definitely defensive rights” (“Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights”, 2010, p. 78).
- 16.
Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. 95.
- 17.
Apparently, Nozick is again in tune with Kant about this issue (see Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. 170).
- 18.
The whole sentence in German reads: “Nun kann ich zwar zu Handlungen, die als Mittel auf einen Zweck gerichtet sind, nie aber einen Zweck zu haben von anderen gezwungen werden, sondern ich kann nur selbst mir etwas zum Zweck machen”.
- 19.
“[T]he moral capacity to constrain oneself can be called virtue, action springing from such a disposition (respect for law) can be called virtuous (ethical) action” (MS, 6: 394).
- 20.
See also the distinction between an “honorable man” and a “good citizen” corresponding to the distinction between “rectitudo juridica” and “rectitudo ethica” in Kant’s Lectures on Ethics (V -Mo/Mron, AA 27: 299).
- 21.
Kant is explicit regarding the extension of the state’s role in his theory of possession: “a civil constitution is just the rightful condition, by which what belongs to each is only secured, but not actually settled and determined.—Any guarantee, then, already presupposes what belongs to someone (to whom it secures it)” (MS, 6: 257). Our reading of the topic is very similar to Byrd’s (See Byrd. “Intelligible Possession of Objects of Choice”, 2010).
- 22.
Höffe considers two rights as “quasi-human rights”. They are: (1) the “right to live in a legal order that permits every object of human choice to become mine or yours”, and (2) “the right of a human being to live in a public legal order” (“Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights”, 2010, p. 91).
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Pavão, A., Faggion, A. (2016). Kant For and Against Human Rights. In: Faggion, A., Pinzani, A., Sanchez Madrid, N. (eds) Kant and Social Policies . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42658-7_3
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