Skip to main content

One-Round Strong Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9723))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope (OSBE) has been widely employed for anonymity-orient and privacy-preserving applications. The conventional OSBE execution relies on a secure communication channel to protect against eavesdroppers. In TCC 2012, Blazy, Pointcheval and Vergnaud proposed a framework of OSBE (BPV-OSBE) without requiring any secure channel by clarifying and enhancing the OSBE security notions. They showed how to generically build an OSBE scheme satisfying the new strong security in the standard model with a common-reference string. Their framework requires 2-round interactions and relies on the smooth projective hash function (SPHF) over special languages, i.e., languages from encryption of signatures. In this work, we investigate the study on the strong OSBE and make the following contributions. First, we propose a generic construction of one-round yet strong OSBE system. Compared to the 2-round BPV-OSBE, our one-round construction is more appealing, as its non-interactive setting accommodates more application scenarios in the real word. Moreover, our framework relies on the regular (identity-based) SPHF, which can be instantiated from extensive languages and hence is more general. Second, we also present an efficient instantiation, which is secure under the standard model from classical assumptions, \(\mathsf {DDH}\) and \(\mathsf {DBDH}\), to illustrate the feasibility of our one-round framework. We remark that our construction is the first one-round OSBE with strong security.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Abdalla, M., Benhamouda, F., Blazy, O., Chevalier, C., Pointcheval, D.: SPHF-friendly non-interactive commitments. In: Sako, K., Sarkar, P. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2013, Part I. LNCS, vol. 8269, pp. 214–234. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Abdalla, M., Benhamouda, F., Pointcheval, D.: Disjunctions for hash proof systems: new constructions and applications. In: Oswald, E., Fischlin, M. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9057, pp. 69–100. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Abdalla, M., Chevalier, C., Pointcheval, D.: Smooth projective hashing for conditionally extractable commitments. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 671–689. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Alwen, J., Dodis, Y., Naor, M., Segev, G., Walfish, S., Wichs, D.: Public-key encryption in the bounded-retrieval model. In: Gilbert, H. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6110, pp. 113–134. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Benhamouda, F., Blazy, O., Chevalier, C., Pointcheval, D., Vergnaud, D.: New techniques for SPHFs and efficient one-round PAKE protocols. In: Canetti, R., Garay, J.A. (eds.) CRYPTO 2013, Part I. LNCS, vol. 8042, pp. 449–475. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Blazy, O., Chevalier, C., Vergnaud, D.: Mitigating server breaches in password-based authentication: secure and efficient solutions. In: CT-RSA, pp. 3–18 (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Blazy, O., Pointcheval, D., Vergnaud, D.: Round-optimal privacy-preserving protocols with smooth projective hash functions. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) TCC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7194, pp. 94–111. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Boneh, D., Franklin, M.: Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 213–229. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Boneh, D., Gentry, C., Hamburg, M.: Space-efficient identity based encryption without pairings. In: Proceedings of 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2007), October 20–23, 2007, Providence, RI, USA, pp. 647–657 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Chen, R., Mu, Y., Yang, G., Guo, F., Wang, X.: A new general framework for secure public key encryption with keyword search. In: Foo, E., Stebila, D. (eds.) ACISP 2015. LNCS, vol. 9144, pp. 59–76. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Chen, R., Mu, Y., Yang, G., Susilo, W., Guo, F.: Strongly leakage-resilient authenticated key exchange. In: CT-RSA, pp. 19–36 (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Chen, Y., Zhang, Z., Lin, D., Cao, Z.: Anonymous identity-based hash proof system and its applications. In: Takagi, T., Wang, G., Qin, Z., Jiang, S., Yu, Y. (eds.) ProvSec 2012. LNCS, vol. 7496, pp. 143–160. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Chen, Y., Zhang, Z., Lin, D., Cao, Z.: Identity-based extractable hash proofs and their applications. In: Bao, F., Samarati, P., Zhou, J. (eds.) ACNS 2012. LNCS, vol. 7341, pp. 153–170. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Chen, Y., Zhang, Z., Lin, D., Cao, Z.: Generalized (identity-based) hash proof system and its applications. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2013, 2 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Chen, Y., Zhang, Z., Lin, D., Cao, Z.: CCA-secure IB-KEM from identity-based extractable hash proof system. Comput. J. 57(10), 1537–1556 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Chow, S.S.M., Dodis, Y., Rouselakis, Y., Waters, B.: Practical leakage-resilient identity-based encryption from simple assumptions. In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2010, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 4–8 October 2010, pp. 152–161 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Cocks, C.: An identity based encryption scheme based on quadratic residues. In: Honary, B. (ed.) Cryptography and Coding 2001. LNCS, vol. 2260, pp. 360–363. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Coron, J.: A variant of Boneh-Franklin IBE with a tight reduction in the random oracle model. Des. Codes Crypt. 50(1), 115–133 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Universal hash proofs and a paradigm for adaptive chosen ciphertext secure public-key encryption. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 45–64. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  20. Gennaro, R., Lindell, Y.: A framework for password-based authenticated key exchange. In: EUROCRYPT, pp. 524–543 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  21. Gentry, C.: Practical identity-based encryption without random oracles. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4004, pp. 445–464. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Gentry, C., Peikert, C., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions. In: Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, May 17–20, 2008, pp. 197–206 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Halevi, S., Kalai, Y.T.: Smooth projective hashing and two-message oblivious transfer. J. Cryptology 25(1), 158–193 (2012)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  24. Katz, J., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Round-optimal password-based authenticated key exchange. In: Ishai, Y. (ed.) TCC 2011. LNCS, vol. 6597, pp. 293–310. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  25. Li, N., Du, W., Boneh, D.: Oblivious signature-based envelope. In: PODC, pp. 182–189 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments on a previous version of this paper. The work of Guomin Yang is supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (Grant No. DE150101116) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61472308). The work of Mingwu Zhang is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61370224).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Rongmao Chen or Yi Mu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Chen, R., Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Yang, G., Guo, F., Zhang, M. (2016). One-Round Strong Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope. In: Liu, J., Steinfeld, R. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9723. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40367-0_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40367-0_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-40366-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-40367-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics