Skip to main content

Fundamental Physics, Partial Models and Time’s Arrow

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 27))

Abstract

This paper explores the scientific viability of the concept of causality—by questioning a central element of the distinction between “fundamental” and non-fundamental physics. It will be argued that the prevalent emphasis on fundamental physics involves formalistic and idealized partial models of physical regularities abstracting from and idealizing the causal evolution of physical systems. The accepted roles of partial models and of the special sciences in the growth of knowledge help demonstrate proper limitations of the concept of fundamental physics. We expect that a cause precedes its effect. But in some tension with this point, fundamental physical law is often held to be symmetrical and all-encompassing. Physical time, however, has not only measurable extension, as with spatial dimensions, it also has a direction—from the past through the present into the future. This preferred direction is time’s arrow. In spite of this standard contrast of time with space, if all the fundamental laws of physics are symmetrical, they are indifferent to time’s arrow. In consequence, excessive emphasis on the ideal of symmetrical, fundamental laws of physics generates skepticism regarding the common-sense and scientific uses of the concept of causality. The expectation has been that all physical phenomena are capable of explanation and prediction by reference to fundamental physicals laws—so that the laws and phenomena of statistical thermodynamics—and of the special sciences—must be derivative and/or secondary. The most important and oft repeated explanation of time’s arrow, however, is provided by the second law of thermodynamics. This paper explores the prospects for time’s arrow based on the second law. The concept of causality employed here is empirically based, though acknowledging practical scientific interests, and is linked to time’s arrow and to the thesis that there can be no causal change, in any domain of inquiry, without physical interaction.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 259.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See, e.g., Davies (1977, p. 26), who puts it this way: “All known laws of physics are invariant under time reversal,”—though noting the singular exception of processes involving K-mesons and the weak force. Cf. Greene (2004, p. 145): “… not only do known laws fail to tells us why we see events unfold in only one order, they also tell us that, in theory, events can unfold in reverse order”.

  2. 2.

    Cf. e.g., Fodor (1974), “all events that fall under the laws of any science are physical events and hence fall under the laws of physics”.

  3. 3.

    Weinberg (1992, p. 9).

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., the brief account in Penrose (2004, pp. 627–654) and Carroll 2012, The Particle at the End of the Universe, “Appendix Two, Standard Model Particles,” pp. 293–298.

  5. 5.

    Savitt (1995, p. 6).

  6. 6.

    See e.g., Susskind (2008, p. 87): “There is another very subtle law of physics that may be even more fundamental than energy conservation. Its sometimes called reversibility, but let’s just call it information conservation”.

  7. 7.

    Carroll (2010, p. 121).

  8. 8.

    Callaway (2014, p. 76).

  9. 9.

    Einstein and Infield (1938, p. 277).

  10. 10.

    Cf. Einstein (1940, p. 488).

  11. 11.

    Einstein (1940, p. 488).

  12. 12.

    Laplace and Simon (1820/1902) the Introduction to his Théorie Analytique des Probabilités.

  13. 13.

    See James (1909/2008, p. 47), in the 2008 edition: “Every single event is ultimately related to every other, and determined by the whole to which it belongs.” In James’ general conception of the block universe, the determination need not be causal.

  14. 14.

    Laplace and Simon (1820/1902, p. 4).

  15. 15.

    Contrast Lloyd (2006, p. 98): “Even if the underlying laws of physics were fully deterministic, however, … to perform the type of simulation Laplace envisaged, the calculating demon would have to have at least as much computational power as the universe as a whole.” This is to suggest that the required computation is physically impossible.

  16. 16.

    Eddington’s note: “There are, however, others beside myself who have recently begun to question it.” See Eddington (2014, p. 85, Footnote 1).

  17. 17.

    Eddington (2014, p. 85).

  18. 18.

    Einstein (1940, p. 488).

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Cf. Sauer (2014, p. 287).

  21. 21.

    See, e.g., the very influential “EPR paper”: Einstein et al. (1935).

  22. 22.

    See, for instance, Hewett et al. (2012). The editors of the volume comment that the Standard Model of particles physics “leaves some big questions unanswered;” Some of these questions “are within the Standard Model itself,” such as “why there are so many fundamental particles and why they have different masses;” and “In other cases, the Standard Model simply fails to explain some phenomena, such as the observed matter-antimatter asymmetry in the universe, the existence of dark matter and dark energy, and the mechanism that reconciles gravity with quantum mechanics.” If what is regarded as “fundamental” is viewed as open to question and inquiry, then the concept is much less problematic.

  23. 23.

    Green (2000, p. 341).

  24. 24.

    See, for instance Weinberg (1977/1988, pp. 147–148): “Gravitational radiation interacts far more weakly with matter than electromagnetic radiation, or even neutrinos” and he continues, “For this reason, although we are reasonably confident on theoretical grounds of the existence of gravitational radiation, the most strenuous efforts have so far apparently failed to detect gravitational waves from any source.” On the history of the decades long theoretical debate, including Einstein’s own occasional doubts, see Kennefick (2007). Approximate solutions of the Einstein equations predicting gravitational waves date to Einstein (1916). See Einstein (1916).

  25. 25.

    The LIGO project, with major facilities in Louisiana and Washington State, is the largest scientific project ever funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation, to the tune of over $300 million in capital investment and $30 million per year, since the early 1990s.

  26. 26.

    See “Introduction to LIGO and Gravitational Waves,” at the LIGO web pages.

  27. 27.

    See e.g., Taylor’s Nobel Lecture, describing his work, 1997. The observed loss of energy is consistent with the generation of gravitational waves, in accordance with solutions of the Einstein field equations.

  28. 28.

    See Dyson (2012). See also Dyson’s review of Brian Greene’s The Fabric of the Cosmos, in The New York Review of Books, May 13, 2004. On the prospect of detection of gravitons in a particle collider, Sean Carroll writes, “Gravitons are only produced by gravitational interaction, which is so weak that essentially no gravitons are made in a collider and we don’t have to worry about them.” See Carroll (2012, p. 104–105).

  29. 29.

    Krausss et al. (2014). See also Rothman and Boughn (2006).

  30. 30.

    See e.g., Carroll (2010, p. 389): “… there must be dark matter, and we have ruled out all known particles as candidates…”.

  31. 31.

    Weinberg (1992, p. 216).

  32. 32.

    See e.g. Oriti (2009, p. xvi): “I think it is fair to say that we are still far from having constructed a satisfactory theory of quantum gravity, and that any single approach currently being considered is too incomplete or poorly understood, whatever its strength and successes may be, to claim to have achieved its goal, or to have proven to be the only reasonable way to proceed”.

  33. 33.

    Cf. the discussion in Majid (2008, pp. 67–69).

  34. 34.

    Maccone (2009, p. 5).

  35. 35.

    Cf. the discussion in Greene (2004, pp. 159–163). Greene’s point is that the purely statistical reasoning of the second law equally suggests that entropy will be found to increase in the past of any system considered, since states of higher entropy are generally more probable.

  36. 36.

    Maccone (2009, p. 1).

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Ibid.

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    Greene (2004, p. 177).

  42. 42.

    See, e.g., Born (1954), the Nobel Lecture, p. 256.

  43. 43.

    See e.g., the Journal of Cosmology, Vols. 3 and 14 on consciousness and the quantum; Bohm (1952), Bub (2010; arXiv:1006.0499v1), Bell (1993), Aspect et al. (1982).

  44. 44.

    Regarding the “spontaneous collapse” proposal of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, Brian Greene remarks that “they introduce a collapse mechanism which does have a temporal arrow—an “uncollapsing” wavefunction, one that goes from a spiked to a spread out shape, would not conform to the modified equations.” See Greene (2004, p. 214).

  45. 45.

    Greene (2004, p. 212).

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Greene (2004, p. 210). Cf. Carroll (2010, pp. 253–254) “In the many-worlds interpretation, decoherence plays a crucial role in the apparent process of wavefunction collapse. The point is not that there is something special or unique about ‘consciousness’ or ‘observers’ other than the fact that they are complicated macroscopic objects. The point is that any complicated macroscopic object is inevitably going to be interacting (and therefore entangled) with the outside world, and its hopeless to imagine keeping track of the precise form of the entanglement. For a tiny microscopic system such as an individual electron, we can isolate it and put it into a true quantum superposition, but for a messy system such as a human being … that’s just not possible”.

  48. 48.

    Greene (2004, p. 213). Cf. Weinberg (2012, p. 2): Weinberg proposes a “correction” to quantum mechanics which nonetheless eventuates in “inherently probabilistic collapse” of the state vector, with probabilities given by “the Born rule of ordinary quantum mechanics”; cf Ghirardi et al. (1985, 1986).

  49. 49.

    The supposition is that this is true, even if, as sometimes argued, causality is an “emergent” phenomenon. See for instance Norton (2003, p. 1), where the thesis is that though causation is not fundamental, it “remains a most helpful way of conceiving the world”.

  50. 50.

    Greene (2004, p. 215).

  51. 51.

    Ibid, p. 212.

  52. 52.

    Ibid, p. 214.

  53. 53.

    See Lloyd (2006), Chaps. 4 and 5 on thermodynamics, information and quantum mechanics.

  54. 54.

    Emphasis on the inflationary expansion in the early universe, the multiverse idea and the anthropic principle is even more pronounced in Sean Carroll’s recent book, Carroll (2010). But see pp. 339–345, where a range of doubts are discussed.

References

  • Aspect, A., Grangier, P., & Roger, G. (1982). Experimental realization of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm Gedankenexperiment: A new violation of Bell’s inequalities. Physical Review Letters, 49(2), 91–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bell, J. (1993). Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bohm, D. (1952). A suggested interpretation of quantum theory in terms of ‘hidden’ variables, I and II. Physical Review, 85, 166–193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Born, M. (1954). Nobel Prize lecture, “the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics”. Nobel prize lectures: Physics, 1942–1962 (pp. 256–267). Amsterdam, London: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bub, J. (2010). Von Neumann’s ‘no hidden variable’ proof: A re-appraisal. Foundations of Physics, 4, 1333–1340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carroll, S. (2010). From eternity to here, the quest for the ultimate theory of time. New York: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carroll, S. (2012). The particle at the end of the universe, how the hunt for the Higgs Boson leads us to the edge of a new world. New York: Dutton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davies, P. (1977). The physics of time asymmetry. Berkeley and Los Angles: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dyson, F. (2004). The world on a string, review of Brian Greene, The fabric of the cosmos, The New York review of books, 51, No. 8 May 13, pp. 16; reprinted in Dyson, F. (2006). The scientist as Rebel. New York: The New York Review of Books, pp. 213–228.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dyson, F. (2012). Is a graviton detectable? The Poincaré Prize Lecture. https://publications.ias.edu/sites/default/files/poincare.2012.pdf

  • Eddington, A. S. (1928/2014). In H. G. Callaway (Ed.), The nature of the physical world, an annotated edition. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A. (1916). Nährungsweise Integration der Feldgleichungen der Gravitation. In Sitzung der physikalisch-mathematischen Klasse (Approximative integration of the field equations of gravitation, Einstein 1997, The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, The Berlin Years, Vol. 6, pp. 201–210) (pp. 688–696). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A. (1940). Considerations concerning the fundamentals of theoretical physics. Science, 91(2369), 487–492.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A., & Infield, L. (1938). The evolution of physics, from early concepts to relativity and quanta. New York: Simon and Schuster.

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A., Podolsky, P., & Rosen, N. (1935). Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete? Physical Review, 47, 777–780.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. A. (1974). Special sciences. In Synthèse (Vol. 28, pp. 77–115). Reprinted in Fodor (1981). RePresentations (pp. 127–45). Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghirardi, G., Rimini, A., & Weber, T. (1985). A model for a unified quantum description of macroscopic and microscopic systems. In L. Accardi (Ed.), Quantum probability and applications. Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghirardi, G., Rimini, A., & Weber, T. (1986). Unified dynamics of microscopic and macroscopic systems. Physical Review D, 34, 470ff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greene, B. (2000). The elegant universe, superstrings, hidden dimension and the quest for the ultimate theory. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greene, B. (2004). The fabric of the cosmos, space, time and the texture of reality. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hewett, J. L., Weets, H., et al. (2012). Fundamental physics at the intensity frontier, report of the workshop held December 2011 in Rockville. MD: SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, Stanford University.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • James, W. (1909/2008). In H. G. Callaway (Ed.), A pluralistic universe. A new philosophical reading. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kennefick, D. (2007). Traveling at the speed of thought, Einstein and the quest for gravitational waves. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Krausss, L. M., & Wilczek, F. (2014). Using cosmology to establish the quantization of gravity. Physical Review D, 89(4). arXiv:1309.5343v2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laplace, M., & Simon. P. (1902) In F. W. Truscott & F. L. Emory (Eds.), A philosophical essay on probabilities. London: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lloyd, S. (2006). Programming the universe, a quantum computer scientist takes on the cosmos. New York: Knopf, Random House (2007).

    Google Scholar 

  • Maccone, L. (2009). A quantum solution to the arrow of time dilemma. Physical Review Letters 103. arXiv:0802.0438v3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Majid, S. (2008). Quantum spacetime and physical reality. In S. Majid (Ed.), On space and time (pp. 56–140). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Norton, J. D. (2003). Causation as folk science. Philosophers’ Imprint, 3(4). http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/003004.pdf

  • Oriti, D. (2009). Approaches to quantum gravity, toward a new understanding of space, time and matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Penrose, R. (2004). The road to reality a complete guide to the laws of the universe. New York: Vintage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothman, T., & Boughn, S. (2006). Can gravitons be detected? Foundations of Physics 36, 1801–1825. arXiv:gr-qc/0601043v3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sauer, T. (2014) Einstein’s unified field theory program. In M. Jannsen & C. Lehner (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Einstein (pp. 281–305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savitt, S. F. (Ed.), (1995). Time’s arrow today, recent physical and philosophical work on the direction of time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Susskind, L. (2008). The black hole war. New York: Little, Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, J. H. (1997). Binary pulsars and relativistic gravity. In G. Ekspong (Ed.), (1997) Nobel lectures, physics 1991–1995. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weinberg, S. (1977/1988). The first three minuets: A modern view of the origin of the universe. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weinberg, S. (1992). Dreams of a final theory. New York: Pantheon Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weinberg, S. (2012). The collapse of the state vector. Physical Review A, 85(6). arXiv:1109.6462v4.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Howard G. Callaway .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Callaway, H.G. (2016). Fundamental Physics, Partial Models and Time’s Arrow. In: Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_34

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics