Abstract
Strong predictivism, the idea that novel predictions per se confirm theories more than accommodations, is based on a “no miracle” argument from novel predictions to the truth of theories (NMAT). Eric Barnes rejects both: he reconstructs the NMAT as seeking an explanation for the entailment relation between a theory and its novel consequences, and argues that it involves a fallacious application of Occam’s razor. However, he accepts a no miracle argument for the truth of background beliefs (NMABB): scientists endorsed a successful theory because they were guided by largely true background beliefs. This in turn raises the probability that the theory is true; so Barnes embraces a form of weak predictivism, according to which predictions are only indirectly relevant to confirmation. To Barnes I reply that we should also explain how the successful theory was constructed, not just endorsed; background beliefs are not enough to explain success, scientific method must also be considered; Barnes can account for some measure of confirmation of our theories, but not for the practical certainty conferred to them by some astonishing predictions; true background beliefs and reliability by themselves cannot explain novel success, the truth of theories is also required. Hence, the NMAT is sound, and strong predictivism is right. In fact, Barnes misinterprets the NMAT, which does not involve Occam’s razor, takes as explanandum the building of a theory which turned out to predict surprising facts, and successfully concludes that the theory is true. This accounts for the practically certain confirmation of our most successful theories, in accordance with strong predictivism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Michel Ghins reminded me that even Newton, on the basis of his corpuscularist conception of light, believed it was subject to gravitation. But that opinion had been abandoned with the appearence of the electromagnetic theory.
- 2.
- 3.
Of course it makes sense to say that the theory found by the scientist had a good probability of entailing E if we refer to it opaquely, as the theory which resulted from his/her efforts. But if we refer to it transparently, as the theory which in fact it is, i.e. T, then it is just a logical fact that E is among its consequences.
- 4.
- 5.
The labels ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ are applied by Lipton to a related but different distinction: according to “weak predictivism” when theories make predictions they are more confirmed because either the theory or the data tend to be different and better; for “strong predictivism”, instead, a predicted datum confirms a theory more than the same datum would have confirmed the same theory if it had been accommodated (1991, 165).
- 6.
Endorsement is defined as a gradual and contextual notion; but the probability attributed to T must be (i) no lower than an indepedent’s evaluator own probability, and (ii) sufficiently high so that any new evidence for T raises the endorser’s credibility: pp. 35–36.
- 7.
He also denies that the empirical adequacy of background beliefs is a possible alternative explanation (155–162).
- 8.
I owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee.
- 9.
I owe also this suggestion to the same referee.
- 10.
Which of course leaves open both in-principle skeptical doubts, and the possibility of amending these theories on many accounts.
- 11.
I owe this suggestion to Michel Ghins.
- 12.
I shall say more on this at Sect. 4. In any case, it is the actual disposition to find and/or endorse successful theories, not the reputation of being reliable.
- 13.
A consequence referred to opaquely, qua consequence of T: not transparently, qua E, for then, as just explained, we wouldn’t need an explanation of its truth beyond the meaning of E and the way the world is.
- 14.
Clearly, that we can have them does not imply that we always have them.
References
Achinstein, P. (1994). Explanation vs. Prediction: Which carries more weight? In D. L. Hull, M. Forbes & R. M. Burian (Eds.), PSA (Vol. 2, pp. 156–164). East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association.
Alai, M. (2014a). Novel predictions and the no miracle argument. Erkenntnis, 79(2), 297–326.
Alai, M. (2014b). Why antirealists can’t explain success. In F. Bacchini, S. Caputo & M. Dell’Utri (Eds.), Metaphysics and ontology without myths (pp. 48–66). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Barnes, E. C. (2008). The paradox of predictivism. Cambridge: University Press.
Collins, R. (1994). Against the epistemic value of prediction over accommodation. Nous, 28, 210–224.
Duhem, P. (1906). La théorie physique. Son objet et sa structure. Paris: Rivière.
Giere, R. N. (1983). Testing hypotheses. In J. Earman (Ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Vol. 10, pp. 269–298).
Hitchcok, C., & Sober, E. (2004). Prediction vs. Accommodation and the risk of overfitting. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55, 1–34.
Horwich, P. (1982). Probability and evidence. Cambridge: University Press.
Howson, C. (1988). Accommodation, prediction, and Bayesian confirmation theory. PSA, 2, 381–392.
Howson, C., & Franklin, A. (1991). Maher, Mendeleev and Bayesianism. Philosophy of Science, 58, 574–585.
Kahn, J. A., Landsburg, S. E., & Stockman, A. C. (1992). On novel confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43(4), 503–516.
Keynes, J. M. (1921). A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1977). The essential tension. Chicago: University Press.
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsificationism and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp. 91–195). Cambridge: University Press.
Lange, M. (2001). The apparent superiority of prediction to accommodation as a side effect: A reply to Maher. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52, 575–588.
Leplin, J. (1997). A novel defence of scientific realism. Oxford: University Press.
Lipton, P. (1991). Inference to the best explanation. London: Routledge (20042).
Maher, P. (1988). Prediction, accommodation and the logic of discovery. PSA, 1, 273–285.
Maher, P. (1990). How prediction enhances confirmation. In J. M. Dunn, & A. Gupta (Eds.), Truth or consequences: Essays in honor of Nuel Belnap (pp. 327–343). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Maher, P. (1993). Howson and Franklin on prediction. Philosophy of Science, 60(2), 329–340.
Mill, J. S. (1843). A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. London: Parker.
Musgrave, A. (1974). Logical vs. Historical theories of confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 1–23.
Musgrave, A. (1988). The ultimate argument for scientific realism. In R. Nola (Ed.), Relativism and realism in science (pp. 229–252). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Musgrave, A. (1999). Essays on realism and rationalism. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Peirce, C. S. (1883). A theory of probable inference. In C. S. Peirce (Ed.), Studies in logic by members of the Johns Hopkins University (pp. 126–181). Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, & C.
Popper, K. R. (1962). Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Putnam, H. (1975). Mathematics, matter and method: Philosophical papers (Vol. 1). Cambridge: University Press.
Rosenkrantz, R. D. (1977). Inference, method and decision. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Schlesinger, G. (1987). Accommodation and prediction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65, 33–42.
Smart, J. J. C. (1968). Between science and philosophy. New York: Random House.
Whewell, W. (1840). The philosophy of the inductive sciences. London: Parker & Sons (London: Routledge, 1996).
White, R. (2003). The epistemic advantage of prediction over accommodation. Mind, 112(448), 653–683.
Worrall, J. (1978a). The ways in which the methodology of scientific research programmes improves on popper’s methodology. In G. Radnitzky & G. Andersson (Eds.), Progress and rationality in science. Boston studies in the philosophy of science (Vol. 58, pp. 45–70). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Worrall, J. (1978b). Research programmes, empirical support and the Duhem problem: Replies to criticism. Ibid. (pp. 321–338).
Worrall, J. (1985). Scientific discovery and theory-confirmation. In J. C. Pitt (Ed.), Change and progress in modern science. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Worrall, J. (1989a). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43, 99–124. Reprinted in D. Papineau (Ed.), Philosophy of science. Oxford: University Press.
Worrall, J. (1989). Fresnel, Poisson and the White spot: The role of successful predictions in the acceptation of scientific theories. In D. Gooding, T. Pinch, & S. Schaffer (Eds.), The use of experiment: Studies in the natural sciences (pp. 135–157). Cambridge: University Press.
Worrall, J. (2005). Prediction and the ‘periodic law’: A rejoinder to Barnes. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 36, 817–826.
Worrall, J. (2006). Confirmation: Two types, both logical, non historical. In C. Cheyne & J. Worrall (Eds.), Rationality and reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Dordrecht: Springer.
Wright, J. (2002). Some surprising phenomena and some unsatisfactory explanations of them. In S. Clarke & T. D. Lyons (Eds.), Recent themes in the philosophy of science. Scientific realism and commonsense (pp. 139–153). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Zahar, E. (1973a). Why did Einstein’s programme supersede Lorentz’s? (I). British Journal of Philosophy Science, 24, 95–123.
Zahar, E. (1973b). Why did Einstein’s programme supersede Lorentz’s? (II). British Journal of Philosophy Science, 24, 223–262.
Acknowledgment
I thank an anonymous referee and Michel Ghins for very useful comments to earlier versions of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Alai, M. (2016). The No Miracle Argument and Strong Predictivism Versus Barnes. In: Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_30
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_30
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-38982-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-38983-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)