Abstract
Philosophers and neuroscientists often suggest that we perceptually represent objects and their properties. However, they start from very different background assumptions when they use the term “perceptual representation”. On the one hand, sometimes philosophers do not need to properly take into consideration the empirical evidence concerning the neural states subserving the representational perceptual processes they are talking about. On the other hand, neuroscientists do not rely on a meticulous definition of “perceptual representation” when they talk about this empirical evidence that is supposed to show that we perceptually represent such and such properties. It seems that, on both sides, something is missed. My aim is to show that, in the light of empirical evidence from neuroscience, the case of action properties is a good candidate in order to properly talk of perceptually represented properties. My claim is that the neurophysiological states encoding action properties are perceptual processes and that these perceptual processes are representational processes. That is, in the case of those neurophysiological states involved in the detection of action properties, it is correct to speak of perceptual representational states, and hence, ipso facto, of perceptually represented properties. First, I describe a reasonable and widely agreed upon conception of perceptual representation in the philosophical literature. Then, I report evidence from vision and motor neuroscience concerning the perception of action properties, which is subserved by the ventro-dorsal stream, a portion of the dorsal visual system. Finally, I show that a strong connection can be found between the philosophical idea of perceptual representation I have reported before and the neuroscientific evidence concerning the activity of the ventro-dorsal stream, whose job is, as said, to detect action properties.
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Notes
- 1.
I am using the word “mental” and I will use the expression “cortical” or “mental” or neurophysiological state/representation as synonyms, leaving aside the issues concerning the mind-body problem.
- 2.
Representations of these properties are usually called in literature “pragmatic/motor representations” (see Nanay 2013b, 2014a; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003; Jeannerod 2006; Pacherie 2000; Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014). So, one might think that another way of formulating my claim would be to say that motor representations really are perceptual representations. However, in order to avoid problems with the different interpretations of the expression “motor representation” within the general literature, I am not committed to this reformulation here, see (Sect. 5).
- 3.
The famous “Principles of Neural Science” by Kandel et al. (2013) mentions the different expressions “to represent” and “representation” more than 200 times in the book. Concerning the presence of representational terminology in neuroscience, see also (Brooks and Akins 2005; Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2012; Bennett et al. 2007; Bickle 2013; Jacob 2005; Mandik 2005).
- 4.
Of course here we are talking of a perceptual state in general, as the whole outcome of our perceptual systems: the representation of colors, shapes, smells by different representational states etc. When talking of a particular representational state, it is not problematic to argue that the content of the representational state is the property it represents.
- 5.
- 6.
A large part of neurons in this area discharges during object fixation and is selective for object properties, such as shape, size, and orientation (Verhoef et al. 2010).
- 7.
Those “visuomotor” neurons showed a specific selectivity, discharging more strongly during the fixation of certain solids as opposed to others, the difference between them depending on the kind of grip afforded by those objects (e.g. precision grip, finger prehension, etc.).
- 8.
There are different notions of simulation: here I mean an automatic mechanism with perceptual function to facilitate the motor preparation (Gallese 2000, 2009; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Jeannerod 2006; Borghi and Cimatti 2010; Decety and Grèzes 2006; Borghi et al. 2010; Ferretti 2016). The fact that simulation involves several bodily changes (Jeannerod 2006) is another reason for talking not about neural states but neurophysiological states.
- 9.
First, AIP detects the geometrical features of the handle that exhibit precise motor characteristics with respect to my motor repertoire. This means that shape, texture, size are encoded as action properties. Thus, this information is sent to F5, which computes the most suitable motor act (say, a power grip) in order to catch the handle of the cup. Though, things may be fuzzier then this, see footnotes 15–19.
- 10.
Of course, it is difficult in a neural geography to isolate portions of our cortical systems. This is a crucial practice in the neuroscientific analysis, though.
- 11.
Perceptual features of objects are read as contents of a (sensori) motor nature and visual stimuli are ‘motorically’ encapsulated (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: 177). This is an internal state in which perception and action are not precisely delimited (Jeannerod 2006): for example, the discharge of visuomotor neurons is neither purely visual nor purely motor, codifying a potential motor action (Fadiga et al. 2000: 176).
- 12.
Zipoli Caiani (2013) has defended the idea that V-D detects affordances—that, in gibsonian terms, means that V-D does not use representations in the detection of action possibilities—insofar this perceptual process does not involve any detached representation of the target, being involved in the direct detection of sensorimotor patterns in the stimulus. This is because it automatically maps the information contained in the perceptual stimulus on a specific motor plan for action, insofar the perceptual stimulation conveys enough information to somatotopically activate the sensorimotor system. However, it should be noted that what Zipoli Caiani has in mind are inferential representations a là computationalism and following his interpretation, Gibsonian anti-representationalism only rejects this kind of representations. The rejection of this particular kind of representations is not difficult to agree with (Nanay 2013a: 1056, 2013b: 3.1; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: Chap. 6) and the same holds for me. The problem is that usually the interpretation of gibsonian anti-representationalism is not this and the term affordance is used in order to avoid every kind of representation (Orlandi 2011: 20; Pacherie 2002: 69). I do not care about this point here. However, several arguments suggest that, in describing the complexity of our motor interactions, we should not talk about affordances, insofar we do not visually perceive affordances in the gibsonian sense, if they are used to avoid every kind of representation (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: Chap. 6).
- 13.
One might argue that this evidence shows only that the dorsal stream responds to pictures because it is involved in the perception of the surface of the pictures. However, evidence shows that motor related effects registered are deep related with the kind of motor act (e.g. power grip) one can perform on the depicted object (e.g. the handle of a mug), which is, in these cases, different from the act one can perform on the picture surface (precision grip). In many of the experimental settings, pictures are presented on a monitor, which, of course, cannot afford the same action afforded by the depicted object. However, looking at an image of an object triggers the activation of a suitable motor pattern for the execution of a motor act and the motor activation is highly specific to the action that is represented (see Jeannerod 2006 about this specificity). For example, in the case of Buccino et al. (2009) subjects observe virtual images of objects, in this case of handles. Here the motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) are from the right opponent pollicis and from the first dorsal interosseous muscle. These anatomical components are crucial in grasping, and the presence of this kind of motor response shows us that the motor act encoded pertains to the handle and not, of course, to the surface of the image, since in this case the image is not a normal picture, but an image on a monitor, which cannot require grasping (for a very interesting review see Zipoli Caiani 2013). Accordingly, in the case of Chao and Martin (2000) motor response is dependent on particular pragmatic features of depicted objects (the depicted handle) (see also Grazes and Decety 2002). That is, motor responses are deep related with the kind of motor act (e.g. power grip) one can perform on the depicted object (e.g. the handle of a mug), which is, in these cases, different from the act one can perform on the picture surface (precision grip)—for a philosophical review of this empirical evidence with respect to this specific point see (Ferretti 2016).
- 14.
Tsutsui et al. (2002) explored the sensitivity of caudal intraparietal (CIP) neurons in the dorsal stream to texture-defined 3D surface orientation. CIP neurons are involved in high-level disparity processing (the reconstruction of 3D surface orientation through the computation of disparity gradients). Some of CIP neurons are sensitive to texture gradients, which is one of the major monocular cues. Some of them are sensitive to disparity gradients, suggesting their involvement in the computation of 3D surface orientation. Moreover, those sensitive to multiple depth cues were widely distributed together with those sensitive to a specific depth cue, suggesting CIP’s involvement in the integration of depth information from different sources. The convergence of multiple depth cues in CIP seems plays a critical role in 3D vision by constructing a generalized representation of the 3D surface geometry of objects (Tsutsui et al. 2005).
- 15.
Arguably, this is possible because AIP, which is the stage from the visuomotor transformation starts, responds to small 2-D fragments. Since it is AIP to send the information for encoding the motor acts to F5 it is possible that thanks to this encoding, the action property, and then the potential motor act, are computed despite the distal cause of stimulus (see Romero et al. 2014).
- 16.
- 17.
Also, prior to discriminating depicted objects as such, infants seem to perceive depicted objects as real objects affording action and they even grasp at the pictures as if trying to pick up the depicted objects (Deloache 2004: 68; see also Pierroutsakos and DeLoache 2003; Deloache et al. 1998). Accordingly, Westwood et al. (2002) asked a neurological patient with visual-form agnosia—a ventral impairment leaving the subject with visual dorsal encoding only—(patient D.F.) to grasp 3D objects and 2D images of the same objects and to estimate their sizes manually. D.F.’s grip aperture was scaled to the sizes of the 2D and 3D target stimuli, but her manual estimates were poorly correlated with object size. The interpretation of this evidence suggests—Westwood et al. conclude—that dorsal perception cannot discriminate between 2D and 3D objects, responding in a similar way to a 3D object and a 2D image of the same object (see Ferretti 2016).
- 18.
There is also a definition of misrepresentation according to which the perceptual representational state can occur even in the absence of the property which the state carries information about. The case of encoding of an action possibility when we are facing with a picture is an example of this kind of misrepresentation.
- 19.
It has been argued that AIP might need the help of F5—which encodes motor acts—for the encoding action properties: it is difficult to properly discern how the representation of action properties is detached from the representation of the related motor acts and whether those two encodings are properly divided (Romero et al. 2014; Nowak and Hermsdörfer 2009; Theys et al. 2015; Janssen and Scherberger 2015; Chinellato and del Pobil 2016). Recent evidence has been offered about the complex interplay between AIP and F5, confirming the AIP/F5 union in forming a fronto-parietal network for transforming visual signals into grasping instructions (Brochier and Umilta 2007; Brochier et al. 2004). For my point, this is not relevant.
- 20.
Different ideas concerning the topics mentioned in this paper were presented at the Italian Conference for Analytic Philosophy, University of Cagliari, at the Salzburg Conference for Analytic Philosophy, University of Salzburg, at the Italian Conference for Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Urbino, at the International Conference for Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Rome 3, at the European Conference for Analytic Philosophy, University of Bucharest, at the International Conference for Analytic Philosophy, University of L’Aquila, at the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Annual Conference, Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge, at the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Messina in Noto, at the International Conference for Cognitive Sciences, University of Rome 3, at the Conference on Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology—Models and Inferences: Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues—Computational Philosophy, in Sestri Levante, and in different departmental colloquia in the Department of Pure and Applied Science in Urbino, with the research group in Science of Complexity. I would like to thank these various audiences for their comments. I also warmly thank these scholars who discussed with me, with enthusiasm, several topics mentioned in this paper and provided numerous insightful comments. Special thanks go to Bence Nanay, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Silvano Zipoli Caiani, Corrado Sinigaglia, Pierre Jacob, Riccardo Cuppini, Alfredo Paternoster, Michele Di Francesco, Pierluigi Graziani, Vincenzo Fano, Claudio Calosi, Andrea Borghini, Chiara Brozzo, Dan-Cavendon Taylor, Laura Gow, Neil Van Leeuwen, Joseph Brenner, Angelica Kaufmann and Achille Varzi.
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Ferretti, G. (2016). Neurophysiological States and Perceptual Representations: The Case of Action Properties Detected by the Ventro-Dorsal Visual Stream. In: Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_10
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