Abstract
Leibniz’s scientific and philosophical correspondence with the Dutch scientist Burcher de Volder (1698–1706) is one of the most important of his career. It is usually studied in connection with certain basic Leibnizian notions in physics, like force and matter and their metaphysical interpretations, with his criticism of Cartesian extension, and with the much-debated issue of Leibnizian corporeal substance. But the correspondence also provides Leibniz with an occasion to develop a general criticism of the Cartesian ontology.
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Notes
- 1.
I have already dealt with this discussion in Di Bella, “Indigentia Conceptus Alterius”, which is mainly devoted to the topics dealt with here in the first two sections.
- 2.
PPL 196–206.
- 3.
Besides this, in the discussion Leibniz tries to clarify the distinction between conceptual and physical simplicity. See for this Di Bella, “Multum interest inter terminos et res”.
- 4.
De Volder to Leibniz, 18 October 1700, LDV 187.
- 5.
See Descartes The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume I, 213–5 (Principles of Philosophy I, §§60–2).
- 6.
Paul Lodge, in his valuable introduction to his translation of the correspondence, discusses the further problem (pointed out by Leibniz himself) of the apparent duplicity of criteria for substantiality, namely, the per seconcipi criterion and that of conceptual simplicity, and their relationship as invoked by de Volder. See also his whole presentation of this ontological side of the correspondence in Section 6 of the Introduction, The Debate Concerning de Volder’s Account of Substance, LDV pp. li–lx.
- 7.
See on this Di Bella “La querelle de l’attribut. Démontage et déconstruction ontologique dans les Notes de Leibniz sur l’Ethica de Spinoza”.
- 8.
De Volder to Leibniz, 25 July 1702, LDV 245.
- 9.
Leibniz to de Volder, 20 June 1703, LDV 257.
- 10.
Ibid.
- 11.
See PE 258–61.
- 12.
I make use here of this loosely Husserlian terminology to designate a view where an essence (eidos) is the object of an intellectual intuition, and the related de re necessities are those implied by this ideal object. In the Cartesian view, Thought and Extension work as two essences of this type.
- 13.
With the possible exception of God’s concept. But this also, in its turn, should be grasped by us starting from the set of primitive simple concepts.
- 14.
See above, note 9.
- 15.
For a suggestive reflection on this aspect, see Guéroult (“Substance and the primitive simple notion in the philosophy of Leibniz”). See also Leibniz’s De Cogitationum Analysi [On the analysis of thought], a draft in which he envisages the building up of complex concepts for particular concrete things starting from simpler ones: A VI 4, 2769–71.
- 16.
Leibniz to de Volder, April 1702, LDV 239.
- 17.
Leibniz to de Volder, 31 December 1700, LDV 199 (Italics mine).
- 18.
De Volder to Leibniz, 13 February 1701, LDV 203, translation modified.
- 19.
Leibniz to de Volder, 6 July 1701, LDV 209.
- 20.
See Leibniz to Des Bosses, 20 September 1712, LDB 271. Schoolmen attributed to the accidents (e.g. qualities) of a substance a proper reality, really distinct from substance itself. The terminology of “modes”, preferred by Descartes, aimed at avoiding any commitment to this type of ontological resource.
- 21.
See A VI 4, 987–94.
- 22.
Leibniz to de Volder, 6 July 1701, LDV 209 (italics mine).
- 23.
See PPL 703–4.
- 24.
For this reading see Mugnai (Leibniz’s Theory of Relations), 122. Benson Mates also draws attention to this point; see Mates (Leibniz: Philosophy of Logic and Language), 220.
- 25.
Leibniz to de Volder, 6 July 1701, LDV 209.
- 26.
Leibniz to de Volder, 31 December 1700, LDV 199.
- 27.
By the way, we should observe that it is in no way assumed that conceptual dependence is a sufficient condition either for causality. In his remarks on Spinoza’s Ethics, Part I, pr. 25, Leibniz had warned that conceptual dependence does not always signify causal dependence. See on this Di Bella (“Nihil esse sine ratione, sed non ideo nihil esse sine causa”).
- 28.
Speaking of “involvement” instead of “containment”, a terminological distinction adopted by Leibniz himself, aimed at capturing a conceptual relation that should be “weaker” and more flexible than strict containment.
- 29.
For this distinction, see e.g. A VI 4, 627; Di Bella (“Leibniz’s Theory of Conditions. A Framework for Ontological Dependence”).
- 30.
Leibniz to de Volder, 6 July 1701, LDV 209.
- 31.
Ibid.
- 32.
See the Preface to Nizolius, PPL 126.
- 33.
See PPL 335.
- 34.
See Spinoza (Ethics), I, Ax.
- 35.
See PPL 231–2.
- 36.
See Leibniz to de Volder, 6 July 1701, LDV 207: “My further reply to this is twofold: first, even if it is not necessary to conceive of a determinate mode of generation in order to conceive of the essence of an ellipse, nevertheless, the essence of an ellipse, or of anything else, cannot be conceived of perfectly unless its possibility can be demonstrated a priori through a formal cause that exists in every particular mode of generation, and for this, simpler lines must necessarily be used; the second further reply is that I have long since established that with incomplete things, such as lines or shapes, it is possible for one to be similar to another even if they are generated by different causes, as an ellipse formed by a cone is similar to an ellipse described by the motion in a plane. But this cannot happen with complete things…” For a corresponding distinction between “constitution” and “generation”, see the De synthesi et analysi, quoted in note 35 above. On this aspect of the discussion see also Di Bella (The Science of the Individual), 84–5 and LDV, Introduction, p. lix.
- 37.
See DSR 50–3.
- 38.
De Volder to Leibniz, 7 October 1701, LDV 217.
- 39.
LDV 239. For this interesting sub-discussion, see also Leibniz to de Volder, 27 December 1701, LDV 223; de Volder to Leibniz, 3 April 1702, LDV 233.
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Di Bella, S. (2017). Conceptual Analysis and Ontology in the Leibniz–De Volder Correspondence. In: Strickland, L., Vynckier, E., Weckend, J. (eds) Tercentenary Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Leibniz. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38830-4_7
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