Abstract
The concept of the we-mode plays a central role in Raimo Tuomela’s work. In his account, the we-mode is the form of intentionality at work in joint action. The suggestion is that typical forms of joint action involve collective intentionality, and that the distinction between individual intentionality and collective intentionality concerns the intentional mode rather than just the content of the intentional attitudes in question. This paper examines this claim and argues for a plural subject view of collective intentionality.
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Notes
- 1.
For a more detailed analysis cf. Schmid 2009.
- 2.
I will not discuss Searle’s version of a mode-account in the following. However, it should be noted that Searle does not himself use expressions like “we-mode”. To my knowledge, he refers to “we intend…” as a form rather than as a mode of intention. I take this to reflect some awareness of the problems to be noted below.
- 3.
The qualification in brackets is due to the fact that not all authors seem to agree on the range of modes of intentionality that occur in the collective; it does not seem implausible at all to resist the idea that all kinds of intentionality can be shared.
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Acknowledgment
I wish to thank my wife Maj Tuomela for excellent comments on this response.
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Schmid, H.B. (2017). What Kind of Mode is the We-Mode?. In: Preyer, G., Peter, G. (eds) Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33236-9_5
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