Abstract
Positivist theory, to state the obvious, is not held in high regard, at least among some members of U.S. legal academia. This position, it seems, is partly owed to alleged methodological deficiencies of the positivist approach: A formalist, or even “hyperformalist” theory, positivism, it is sometimes suggested, is destined to entail a “hypertextualist” and thus in any case inadequate view on interpretation. Focusing on the Kelsenian variety of legal positivism one may wonder whether this presumption actually proves to be correct. Arguably Kelsen’s theory is to be understood as a formal approach to law. Still: Whether the appreciation of positivist thought as “formalist” or even “hyperformalist” actually does apply obviously depends on the definition of formalism. But, even if Kelsen’s theory of legal positivism is to be considered a formal approach to law, are the methodological consequences thus implied valid? Does the pure theory of law call for a purely formalist theory of interpretation? This essay argues it does not.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
And, of course, the Kelsenian seems to be particularly opposed to realist ideas:
[P]ositivists, especially those of the Kelsen school, have adopted an extreme conceptualism: Consistency of legal norms is for them the only criterion of legality once a sovereign lawmaker is postulated. At the opposite pole of positivist jurisprudence, self-styled American legal realists and many adherents of the Critical Legal Studies movement treat legal rules as rationalizations of the empirical behavior of legal officials and find the sources of that behavior in economic, political, and other non-legal factors. (Berman 1998: 781) (footnote omitted)
See, for further references of the wide spread claim that positivism and realism are opposing theories, Leiter (2001).
- 3.
Ackerman (1998: 92): “[M]y hypertextualist interlocutor builds on a jurisprudential school that has been (more or less) dominant throughout the twentieth century: legal positivism.”
- 4.
- 5.
See, for example, Ely ( 1980: 1) : “‘interpretivism’ […] indicating that judges deciding constitutional cases should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution.” Continuing in the annotation to this remark: “Interpretivism is about the same thing as positivism.”
- 6.
Dworkin states:
Could the advocate of the ‘text’ do better by appealing, not to political theory, but to the concept of law? None of the standing philosophical theories of law supplies the necessary arguments. Not even positivist theories, which seem the most likely. Neither Bentham’s nor Austin’s theory of positivism will do. Nor even Kelsen’s (Dworkin 1985: 37).
A belief held not only in U.S. academia of course—see, for example, Brugger (1994: 405 n.22): “Positivism, formalism, and textualism form the main elements of Begriffsjurisprudenz and Hans Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre.” For further references as to the allegation in European academia that Kelsen’s theory of law was particularly formalist, see Paulson (2005: 213–214).
- 7.
Even though there obviously are, (few) “self-described formalists in America today” (Leiter 2010: 131).
- 8.
To give just a few examples of the variety of definition in legal scholarship: While Malkan (1998, 1393) holds that “formalism usually refers to the claim that wellcrafted rules embodied in authoritative texts will constrain the choice of an impartial decisionmaker” (For a quite similar appreciation, see, ie, Eskridge 1990: 646); “Formalism,” according to Burton (2007: 3), “insists that legal reasoning should determine all specific actions required by the law based only on objective facts, unambiguous rules, and logic.” According to Strauss (1987: 488) the formalist approach is thus essentially anti-functionalist. For a further display of a wide number of different accounts of formalism, see Leiter (1999: 1144–1145) or Schauer (1988: 510).
- 9.
For these arguments, see Hayek (1944: 117–123).
- 10.
On this approach, see in particular Kennedy (1973: 359).
- 11.
See in particular Hart’s critique: “The vice known to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally formulated rules which both seeks to disguise and minimize the need for […] choice, once the general rule has been laid down” (Hart 1961: 126). Also see Hart (1958: 606–615).
- 12.
For a short account focusing on this “formalistic” character, see Stewart (1990: 273).
- 13.
See, for a more recent account, Kammerhofer (2011): 147–148).
- 14.
My—quite literal—translation. Kelsen continues by referring verbatim to Hermann Cohen (1922, 587): “Nur das Formale ist sachlich[;] je formaler eine Methodik ist, desto sachlicher kann sie werden. Und je sachlicher in der ganzen Tiefe der Sache ein Problem formuliert wird, desto formaler muß es fundamentiert sein.” [Only what is formal is objective; the more formal a method, the more objective it can be. And the more objective a problem is defined in its depth, the more formal it has to be founded]. Kelsen then continues by stating: “Whoever does not grasp that, does not know what science is about.” For the second essay mentioned above, see Kelsen (1953: 512).
- 15.
For the historical background of this claim, see Tamaha (2010: 60–62).
- 16.
My—quite literal—translation.
- 17.
Which is, of course, generally true for the relation of formalism and positivism—see, for example, Leiter (1999: 1150) “Positivism is a theory of law, while formalism is a theory of adjudication.”
- 18.
My translation. Continuing: “Judgments or decisions by administrative bodies are referred to as formalist in order to point to some specific deficiency” [my translation], showing quite the same understanding as Posner or Schauer quoted above. For [nearly] the identical remark, see Kelsen (1953: 511).
- 19.
Also see Jeremy Telman (2013: 6).
- 20.
Kelsen, however, did later consider some of his remarks in that preface as “unfortunate” [“verunglückt”] (Kelsen 1929: 1725).
- 21.
In the essay mentioned above, however, Kelsen indicated that the “Pure Theory of Law had […] until recently not commented on the problem of interpretation” [my translation] (Kelsen 1929: 1725). For this “recent comment,” Kelsen refers to Fritz Schreier (1927: III), who also points to the fact “that the Vienna School had disregarded the problems of interpretation to some extent” [my translation]. It seems worth noting that unlike Schreier (Schreier 1927: 6), Kelsen does not mention Adolf Merkl , Zum Interpretationsproblem, Grünhutsche Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart 1916, 535, even though later scholarship on this question (see Mayer 1992: 63 or Günther Winkler 1990: 208) treats this essay as starting point of the pure theory’s stance on interpretation.
- 22.
Which he published separately for the first time 1934. For Kelsen’s prior “phase on interpretation,” see Paulson (1990: 141–143).
- 23.
Where he at one point was even defamed to act based on political motives—see Christian Neschwara (2005: 368) which, albeit quite simply put, eventually led to Kelsen not being re-appointed to the Constitutional Court after the Constitutional reform of 1929 (BGBl 392/1929, 393/1929) in 1930. Id . at 374–382.
- 24.
- 25.
To give just one example that proved to be particularly important for Austrian Constitutional doctrine: It was Hans Kelsen who drafted the Constitutional Court’s judgment introducing the non-delegation doctrine to Austrian Constitutional Law (VfSlg 176/1923)—(Öhlinger 2008). The wording of Article 18 § 1, however, on which this judgment is based does not state any requirements to be observed by the legislator when providing a legal foundation of administrative action (also the earlier commentary by Kelsen, Fröhlich and Merkl (1922: 85) does not make any reference to such an assessment).
- 26.
These—generally speaking—do not differ significantly regarding their core assessment as to the “achievement potential” of legal interpretation (see Christoph Schwaighofer 1986: 233).
- 27.
Kelsen, overall, gave limited attention to the problem of interpretation as such (see Jackson 1985: 88 with further references).
- 28.
Which makes it pointless to elaborate on this here any further.
- 29.
This is not necessarily common to any positivist theory of law (see Leiter 1999: 1150).
- 30.
I will rely on and refer to the English translation by Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (1990: 127–135) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Id . at 127.
- 31.
For the perception of “formalism” as a mere process of legal deduction, see Sebok (1998: 57–112).
- 32.
For a deeper discussion, see, ie, Brian Bix (1991: 51–72).
- 33.
Lastly, to give a full account, Kelsen argues, “purportedly valid norms [may] contradict one another wholly or in part” (Kelsen 1990: 129–130).
- 34.
- 35.
It is important to note, however, that in his later writings on interpretation Kelsen emphasized that in cases of authentic interpretation (ie interpretation by a law applying organ—see, for example, Kelsen (1960: 351)), norms—albeit cognitively outside the frame—are to be considered valid; also see Kelsen 1950: xv—for this argument see Paulson’s (1990: 151–152) analysis.
Taking this into account, of course, Richard Posner (2003: 270) is correct in stating that in Kelsen’s thought “law does not dictate the outcome of judicial decisions.” See, for an earlier version of this argument, Posner (2001: 23) adding: “provided only the judge does not stay outside the boundaries of his jurisdiction. […] He may be mistaken, but he is not lawless.”
- 36.
This was particularly emphasized by Kurt Ringhofer (1971: 205) who argued that “in order to interpret the norm its meaning must not be clear from the very outset.” [my translation]
It is, however, not certain (or rather, far from certain) that Kelsen adhered to the principle “in claris non fit interpretatio.” For this maxim, see Meder (2004: 17–21) or Tosato (2000: 157 n.94). For background and origin, see Masuelli (2002: 402).
- 37.
My translation. Hart’s argument, analyzing the allegation of “formalism” takes the same direction. (Hart 1958: 611).
- 38.
As generally “[t]he pure theory of law by no means denies the validity of […] sociological jurisprudence” (Kelsen (1941: 52).
- 39.
See, for the classical account, Llewellyn (1931).
- 40.
Citing some of the more common definitions, Brian Leiter (1997: 267–268).
- 41.
Which—as Brian Leiter (2001: 294) explains—few realists would in the first place.
- 42.
For a quasi-empirical take on this question, see Kozinski (1996): 993).
- 43.
See, however, Jerome Frank’s statement:
Out of my own experience as a trial lawyer, I can testify that a trial judge, because of overeating at lunch may be so somnolent in the afternoon court-session that he fails to hear an important item of testimony and so disregards it when deciding the case. “The hungry judges soon the sentence sign, And wretches hang that juryman may dine,” wrote Pope. Dickens’ lovers well remember Perker’s advice to Pickwick: “A good, contented, well-breakfasted juryman, is a capital thing to get hold of. Discontented or hungry jurymen, my dear sir, always find for the plaintiff.” (Frank 1973: 162)
- 44.
However, empirical evidence suggests that there is indeed some truth to this claim (see Danziger et al. 2011: 6889–6892).
- 45.
Even though judges, of course, would typically present the result as conclusion based on a “sophisticated formalist” manner (Brian Leiter 2010: 112).
- 46.
- 47.
On the compatibility of Legal Positivism and Legal Realism in general , see Brian Leiter (2001: 278).
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Acknowledgments
This essay was originally drafted as a contribution to “Hans Kelsen in America,” a conference held in Chicago on June 27–28, 2014, sponsored by the Valparaiso University Law School, supported by a grant from the Botstiber Institute for Austrian-American Studies. I am most grateful to Jeremy Telman for organizing this event and inviting me to take part in it as well as to the participants for their most helpful comments. Particular thanks to Michael Potacs for his willingness to discuss an earlier draft of this essay and to my late friend Heinz Peter Rill who generously shared his most valuable insights on the topic.
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Bezemek, C. (2016). Pure Formalism? Kelsenian Interpretative Theory between Textualism and Realism. In: Telman, D. (eds) Hans Kelsen in America - Selective Affinities and the Mysteries of Academic Influence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 116. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33130-0_13
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