Abstract
This chapter analyses the different types of institutional investors, institutions which, with various objectives, professionally manage portfolios of financial and real assets on behalf of a plurality of investors. Actually, the lowest common denominator among all categories of institutional investors is represented by the professional management of assets on behalf of a wide variety of individuals. Such management can be carried out on a collective basis, as in the case of investment funds, or on an individual basis, as in the case of discretionary mandates given on a client-by-client basis. If we accept this principle, we can consider the institutional investors as follows: collective investment vehicles; individual portfolio management, based on mandates given by clients on a single and discretionary basis; insurance companies; pension funds; institutions for occupational or personal retirement provisions; foundations and endowments. In this chapter, the development factors and benefits for the financial system generated by institutional investors are identified and a comparison is made at the international level.
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Notes
- 1.
Davis and Steil (2001).
- 2.
Directive 2014/65/EU, Annex 2.
- 3.
Directive 2014/65/EU, Annex 2.
- 4.
Assuming a more extensive definition of institutional investor, we can include banks, given their need of managing securities in the proprietary book, and also sovereign funds, for their necessity of managing diversified asset portfolios.
- 5.
The different categories of CIVs will be discussed further in Chap. 2.
- 6.
Çelik and Isaksson (2013).
- 7.
Bushee (2001).
- 8.
Blake (2006).
- 9.
Acharya and Dimson (2007).
- 10.
Advisory and management functions are integrated into the fiduciary manager model, which is largely widespread in Anglo-Saxon countries, which manages the assets of an institution as a whole, sub-delegating the management of specific sectors to ad hoc selected managers. In this way, without stirring conflicts of interest, a unitary direction to all management activities and a more effective risk control are ensured. Refer to van Nunen (2007).
- 11.
Vittas (1998).
- 12.
Davis and Steil (2001).
- 13.
OECD (1998).
- 14.
De Hann et al. (2015).
- 15.
Bratton and McCahery (2015).
- 16.
Vittas (1998).
- 17.
Piotroski (2004).
- 18.
Ryan (2002).
- 19.
Rubach (2009).
- 20.
- 21.
OECD (2011).
- 22.
Public pension reserve funds (PPRFs) include Australia’s Future Fund, Belgium’s Zilverfonds (2008–2013), Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund (2010–2013), Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund, Korea’s National Pension Service, New Zealand Superannuation Fund, Government Pension Fund of Norway, Poland’s Demographic Reserve Fund, Portugal’s Social Security Financial Stabilization Fund, Spain’s Social Security Reserve Fund, Sweden’s AP1–AP4 and AP6, United States’ Social Security Trust Fund.
- 23.
OECD (2015).
- 24.
OECD (2015).
- 25.
OECD (2014a).
- 26.
OECD (2014b).
- 27.
OECD (2014c).
- 28.
OECD (2014b).
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Basile, I. (2016). Institutional Investors. In: Basile, I., Ferrari, P. (eds) Asset Management and Institutional Investors. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32796-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32796-9_1
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