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Security Taxonomies of Industrial Control Systems

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Cyber-security of SCADA and Other Industrial Control Systems

Part of the book series: Advances in Information Security ((ADIS,volume 66))

Abstract

With many types of systems, elements, threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, threat actors and so on, it is natural to wonder whether some conceptual order could be imposed on the complex and seemingly chaotic space of ICS security. Taxonomies and ontologies are among means by which humans bring order, meaning and knowledge management to broad domains of things, concepts and principles. For this reason, in this chapter we offer an overview of selected ICS security taxonomies and elements of emerging ontologies. The migration of data processing to open web infrastructures poses a great challenge for ICS in terms of information fusion and knowledge management. In this regard, ICS architectures can benefit from the use of ontologies, namely models of the underlying semantics of data. Ontologies are already used in a variety of applications, from Search Engine Optimization, Knowledge Discovery (e.g. elicitation of patterns of interactions within genomic data), and traditional AI and common-sense reasoning. The use of ontologies to complement ICS security taxonomies is a logical extension. The first section (Sect. 7.2) of this chapter presents key concepts, and their relationships, in a discussion of established taxonomies. Section 7.3 discusses ongoing research related to ICS security taxonomies and extended approaches based on ontologies. Section 7.4 summarizes the current status and discusses future trends in regards to ICS security taxonomies. Unless otherwise indicated ICS refers to all control systems, SCADA and DCS; as well as other control system configurations and constituent parts. In those instances where a specific type of control system is the subject, it will be indicated by name.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This was based on Landwehr’s taxonomies on operating system flaws.

  2. 2.

    It was initially developed as a component in a model intended to contribute to development of a larger taxonomy (See, Fleury et al. 2008).

  3. 3.

    Previously titled Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems. Revision 4 represents the most comprehensive re-write of SP 800-53 since 2005. It was developed by an interagency partnership consisting of the Department of Defense the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security that began working in 2009, culminating with the release of revision 4 in 2013 (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative 2013).

  4. 4.

    Revision 4 of NIST SP 800-53 has removed the class designations from the security control families. This was because many of the security controls within a family may be linked to various classes. However, this is not meant to preclude the use of the classes where they would be helpful (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative 2013, p. F-3).

  5. 5.

    General ones, like “part-of” and “associated with”, or domain-specific, like “exploited-by”, “connected-to”, “runs-on”, “installed-on” (see Choraś 2009 for a list of relevant semantic relationships).

  6. 6.

    Such as RDF and OWL: see http://www.w3.org/standards/techs/owl#w3c_all.

  7. 7.

    As attested by the FOIS conference series (Formal Ontology in Information Systems): http://www.iaoa.org/fois/.

  8. 8.

    ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ict/docs/security/project-summary-inspire_en.pdf.

  9. 9.

    Interestingly enough, one of the contributors to this book chapter has recently presented a similar hybrid approach, where the Bayesian statistical computation was performed by ACT-R cognitive architecture (Oltramari 2014).

  10. 10.

    http://www.w3.org/Math/.

  11. 11.

    Regarding ontology modularity and implications at the level of semantic interoperability (see Parent 2009).

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Correspondence to Angelyn S. Flowers .

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Flowers, A.S., Smith, S.C., Oltramari, A. (2016). Security Taxonomies of Industrial Control Systems. In: Colbert, E., Kott, A. (eds) Cyber-security of SCADA and Other Industrial Control Systems. Advances in Information Security, vol 66. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32125-7_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32125-7_7

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