Abstract
This chapter is about the controversial use of contemporary social media in local and global conflicts. The particular focus is on Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine, the United States, and the rest of civilized world. The chapter’s aim is to demonstrate how easily social media, which are used as effective drivers of positive change in some states, are becoming an instrument of propaganda, misinformation, and disorientation of the audience. The chapter argues that without significant intellectual and critical development, fake news and post-truth will no longer belong only to state TV channels and mainstream media in Russia, but that multiple audiences in other countries will be vulnerable to manipulation.
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Notes
- 1.
See Rainie & Wellman, Networked: The New Social Operating System, 21.
- 2.
See Barnes, “Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish.”
- 3.
See Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties.”
- 4.
See Rainie & Wellman, Networked: The New Social Operating System, 11–14.
- 5.
See Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People.
- 6.
See Rosen, “The People Formerly Known as the Audience.”
- 7.
See Blossom, Content Nation: Surviving and Thriving as Social Media Changes Our Work, Our Lives, and Our Future, 29.
- 8.
See Shirky, Here Comes Everybody. The Power of Organizing Without Organizations, 81.
- 9.
See Christians, Fackler, Richardson & Kreshel, Media Ethics: Cases and Moral Reasoning, 4.
- 10.
See Kovach & Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect.
- 11.
See Beckett & Ball, WikiLeaks: News in the Networked Era.
- 12.
See Brevini, Hintz & McCurdy, Beyond WikiLeaks.
- 13.
See Polloc, “Streetbook: How Egyptian and Tunisian Youth Hacked the Arab Spring.”
- 14.
See Mourtada & Salem, “Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter.”
- 15.
See Wolfsfeld, Segev, & Sheafer, “Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First.”
- 16.
See Lim, “Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004–2011.”
- 17.
See Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest.
- 18.
See Beaumont, “The Truth About Twitter, Facebook and the Uprisings in the Arab World.”
- 19.
See Chang & Zacher, “A ‘Tidal Wave of Revolt:’ How World Editorials Framed the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.”
- 20.
See Du & Cheng, “Framing the 2011 Egyptian Revolution Within Ideological Boundaries: One Incident, Three Stories.”
- 21.
See Knoll, “Advertising in Social Media: A Review of Empirical Evidence.”
- 22.
See Polese, “Ukraine 2004: Informal Networks, Transformation of Social Capital and Colored Revolutions.”
- 23.
See McFaul, “Transitions from Postcommunism.”
- 24.
See Nayyem, “Okay, Take It Seriously….”
- 25.
See Zaliznyak, “The New Media of EuroMaidan: Online Instruments to Defend Democracy in Ukraine.”
- 26.
See Minchenko, “Already 3 million of Ukrainians Are Using Facebook.”
- 27.
See Barberá & Metzger, “How Ukrainian Protestors Are Using Twitter and Facebook.”
- 28.
See Soldatov & Borogan, The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia’s Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries.
- 29.
See Shenker, “Fury Over Advert Claiming Egypt Revolution as Vodafone’s.”
- 30.
See Barberá and Metzger, “Tweeting the Revolution: Social Media Use and the #EuroMaidan protests.”
- 31.
See Kvit, Mass Communication.
- 32.
See “Media Ownership Monitor Ukraine.”
- 33.
See Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Dynamics of the Internet in Ukraine. September 2013.”
- 34.
See Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, 59–61.
- 35.
See “The Journalist: Tigipko’s Marketing Manager for $600 Promoted Nayem’s Call, Which Started Euromaidan.”
- 36.
See Zaliznyak, “Russian World’s Fundamentalism Aggression Against Ukraine as a Challenge for Modern Journalism Standards.”
- 37.
See Zaliznyak, “Information Security and Russian Aggression: Ukraine–EU–NATO Hybrid Response to Hybrid War.”
- 38.
See StopFake “Top 5 Russian Fake Reports of 2014.”
- 39.
See Pomerantsev & Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture, And Money.”
- 40.
See Sanders, “Did Vladimir Putin Call the Breakup of the USSR ‘The Greatest Geopolitical Tragedy of the 20th Century?’”
- 41.
See Rumer, “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action.”
- 42.
See Kramer, “Russian General Endorses ‘Hybrid War’ Philosophy.”
- 43.
See Klijn & Yüksel, “Russia’s Hybrid Doctrine: Is the West Barking Up the Wrong Tree?”
- 44.
See Sviridova, “Vectors of Military Strategy Development.”
- 45.
See Gerasimov, “The Value of Science in Foresight.”
- 46.
See Johnson, “General Gerasimov on the Vectors of the Development of Military Strategy: Review of Speech by General Gerasimov at the Russian Academy of Military Science.”
- 47.
See McDermott, “Gerasimov Unveils Russia’s ‘Strategy of Limited Actions.”
- 48.
See Kasapoglu, “Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-linear Warfare and Reflexive Control.”
- 49.
See Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.’”
- 50.
See Helmus et al., “Russian Social Media Influence. Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe.”
- 51.
See Samokhvalova, “The Russian Organizers of a ‘Third Maidan’ in Ukraine.”
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See MacFarquhar, “Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as ‘Putin’s Cook.’”
- 53.
See Schwirtz & Borgia, “How Russia Meddles Abroad for Profit: Cash, Trolls and a Cult Leader.”
- 54.
See Lister et al., “Putin’s Private Army.”
- 55.
See Stronski, “Implausible Deniability: Russia’s Private Military Companies.”
- 56.
See Hauer, “The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army.”
- 57.
See Laurence, “Powerful ‘Putin’s Chef’ Prigozhin Cooks up Murky Deals.”
- 58.
See Grove & Kurmanaev, “Russia’s Backing of Venezuela’s Maduro Has Its Limits.”
- 59.
See Helmus et al., “Russian Social Media Influence. Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe.”
- 60.
See Stelzenmüller, “The Impact of Russian Interference on Germany’s 2017 Elections.”
- 61.
See Ellehuus, “Mind the Gaps: Russian Information Manipulation in the United Kingdom.”
- 62.
See Timberg, “Russian Propaganda Effort Helped Spread ‘Fake News’ During Election, Experts Say.”
- 63.
See Collins & Cox, “Jenna Abrams, Russia’s Clown Troll Princess, Duped the Mainstream Media and the World.”
- 64.
See Hern, “Cambridge Analytica: How Did It Turn Clicks into Votes?”
- 65.
See Confessore, “Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far.”
- 66.
See Rushe, “Facebook Sorry – Almost – For Secret Psychological Experiment on Users.”
- 67.
See Fielding & Cobain, “Revealed: US Spy Operation that Manipulates Social Media.”
- 68.
See Jarvis, “America’s Absurd Stab at Systematizing Sock Puppetry.”
- 69.
See Ellick & Westbrook, “Operation Infektion.”
- 70.
See Nakashima et al., “Senior Intelligence Official Told Lawmakers That Russia Wants to See Trump Reelected.”
- 71.
See Macmillan & Tandon, “Russia-Linked Disinformation Campaign Fueling Coronavirus Alarm, US Says.”
- 72.
See Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.”
- 73.
See Fridman, “On the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine:’ Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch.”
- 74.
Boyd-Barrett, “Ukraine, Mainstream Media and Conflict Propaganda.”
- 75.
See Pivarnyik, “Hungarian Lieutenant Colonel Defends Russian Expansionism;” and Szénási, “Not a Surprise: Ukrainian President Poroshenko Poses with Elite Paratrooper Wearing Waffen SS Insignia and Posts It on Twitter.”
- 76.
See Ukrainska Pravda, “Mingarelli: Disinformation Has Negatively Affected Ukraine’s Image in Europe.”
- 77.
See The Moscow Times, “Navalny May Have Poisoned Himself, Putin Reportedly Tells Macron.”
- 78.
See Holdsworth, “Kremlin Propagandists from RT Sent to Fill Belarus Airwaves.”
- 79.
See O’Connor, “Russia Troops Drop Near West Border in Belarus Drills Being Watched by U.S..”
- 80.
See Eckel & Yurieva, “Polish-Based Blogger Becomes Driving Force in Belarusian Protests.”
- 81.
See Gallagher, “Belarusian Officials Shut Down Internet with Technology Made by U.S. Firm.”
- 82.
See Dmytrenko, “For the First Time VKontakte Is Out of the TOP-10 Sites Visited in Ukraine.”
- 83.
Zubchenko, “Ruslan Kotsaba Told His Version of History: Paid Revolution, Illegal Anti-terrorist Operation and Insurgent Donbas.”
- 84.
See Official Website of the President of Ukraine, “Annex 2 to the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine” from April 28, 2017 “On the Use of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions).”
- 85.
See Safarov, “Analysis of the New Bill ‘On Media.’”
- 86.
See PlusOne Research, “Facebook and Instagram in Ukraine.”
- 87.
See Statcounter, “Social Media Stats Ukraine June 2019–June 2020.”
- 88.
See We Are Social & Hoodsuite, “Digital 2020: Ukraine.”
- 89.
See Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukrainian Users of VKontakte to be Registered with Law Enforcement Agencies—NSDC Secretary.”
- 90.
See VOX Ukraine, “About Us.”
- 91.
See Stop Fake, “About Us.”
- 92.
See Babak et al., “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin Propaganda.”
- 93.
See UA TV, “About Us.”
- 94.
See “Alexander Tkachenko Announced the Launch of an International Broadcast Channel.”
- 95.
See Jeong, “Information Darwinism.”
- 96.
See Volz, “False News 70 Percent More Likely to Spread on Twitter: Study.”
- 97.
See TV Toronto official channel on YouTube.
- 98.
See Coldewey, “Apple and Google Maps Accommodate Russia’s Annexation of Crimea.”
- 99.
See Fung, “Twitter Says It’s Looking at Subscription Options as Ad Revenue Drops Sharply.”
- 100.
See Andrews, “Are Political Social Media Campaigns a Threat to Democratic Elections?”
- 101.
See Nielsen, “Commission: 120 Minutes to Remove Illegal Online Content.”
- 102.
See European Commission, “Tackling Disinformation Online: Expert Group Advocates for More Transparency Among Online Platforms.”
- 103.
See Ilves, “Is Social Media Good or Bad for Democracy?”
- 104.
See Department of State, “Exposing Russian Health Disinformation.”
- 105.
See Keir, “Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media.”
- 106.
See Helmus et al., “Russian Social Media Influence. Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe.”
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See Wikileaks, “Partners.”
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Zaliznyak, Y.B. (2021). Russia’s Social Media Propaganda Warfare. In: Ward, S.J.A. (eds) Handbook of Global Media Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32103-5_65
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