Abstract
Negotiation is an important skill when interacting actors might have misaligned interests. In order to support automated negotiators research the Automated Negotiation Agent Competition (ANAC) was founded to evaluate automated agents in a bilateral negotiation setting across multiple domains. An analysis of various agents’ strategies from past competitions show that most of them used an explicit opponent modeling component. While it is well known that in repeated interactions, learning the opponent and developing reciprocity become of prominent importance to achieve one’s goal, when the interactions with the same partner are not repeated, focusing on complex opponent modeling might not be the right approach. With that in mind, we explore a domain-based approach in which we form strategies based solely on two domain parameters: the reservation value and the discount factor. Following the presentation of our cognitive model, we present DoNA, a Domain-based Negotiation Agent that exemplifies our approach.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Admittedly, we present what we refer to as satisfactory—rather than optimal—parameter values in the sense that the values we used preform well enough, however, we are currently developing the theoretical foundation to calculate optimal parameter values.
- 3.
Competition website: http://www.itolab.nitech.ac.jp/ANAC2014/.
References
Axelrod, R.M.: The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York (1984)
Byde, A., Yearworth, M., Chen, K.Y., Bartolini, C.: Aut ONA: A system for automated multiple 1–1 negotiation. In: Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE International Conference on Electronic Commerce (CEC), pp. 59–67 (2003)
Cheng, K.L., Zuckerman, I., Nau, D.S., Golbeck, J.: The life game: cognitive strategies for repeated stochastic games. In: SocialCom/PASSAT, pp. 95–102. IEEE (2011)
Jonker, C.M., Robu, V., Treur, J.: An agent architecture for multi-attribute negotiation using incomplete preference information. Auton. Agents Multi-Agent Syst. 15(2), 221–252 (2007)
Kalai, E., Smorodinsky, M.: Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Econometrica 43, 513–518 (1975). http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/kalai75a.pdf
Lai, G., Li, C., Sycara, K., Giampapa, J.: Literature review on multi-attribute negotiations. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University (2004)
Lai, G., Sycara, K.: A generic framework for automated multi-attribute negotiation. Group Decis. Negotiat. 18(2), 169–187 (2009). doi:10.1007/s10726-008-9119-9, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-008-9119-9
Lin, R., Kraus, S., Wilkenfeld, J., Barry, J.: Negotiating with bounded rational agents in environments with incomplete information using an automated agent. Artif. Intell. 172(6–7), 823–851 (2008)
Nash, J.: The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155–162 (1950)
Osborne, M., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)
Rosenschein, J.S., Zlotkin, G.: Rules of Encounter—Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation among Computers. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)
Sim, K.M.: A survey of bargaining models for grid resource allocation. SIGecom Exch. 5(5), 22–32 (2006). doi:10.1145/1124566.1124570, http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1124566.1124570
Zuckerman, I., Rosenfeld, A., Kraus, S., Segal-Halevi, E.: Towards automated negotiation agents that use chat interfaces. In: The Sixth International Workshop on Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiations. Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA (2013)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Erez, E.S., Zuckerman, I. (2016). DoNA—A Domain-Based Negotiation Agent. In: Fukuta, N., Ito, T., Zhang, M., Fujita, K., Robu, V. (eds) Recent Advances in Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiation. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 638. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30307-9_18
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30307-9_18
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-30305-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-30307-9
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)