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Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 3))

Abstract

Nudging has become an increasingly popular policy tool on both sides of the Atlantic, even while scholars and commentators continue to debate its appropriate boundaries, efficacy, and legitimacy. The present chapter outlines a sympathetic, ‘internal’ critique of Nudge’s policy framework (Thaler and Sunstein 2008. Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press) identifying a fundamental problem that has received little attention to date. Thaler and Sunstein define their key concept as the use of a particular toolkit (rationally-neutral behavioural interventions) to promote a specific policy goal (individuals’ self-judged well-being). To remain within the boundaries of these defining parameters, the chosen toolkit must nudge only by helping boundedly rational people better achieve their own ends. However, a closer look at this intuitively appealing approach reveals a fundamental problem of fit that should trouble even those who support Nudge’s mission. Namely, while the tools of nudging can sometimes promote its declared goals, other tools can often do so equally well or even more effectively. And the tools of nudging are equally suited to promoting goals that are excluded by Nudge’s own framework. This problem of fit causes some of Thaler and Sunstein’s own applications to breach the boundaries of what they define as legitimate nudges and, more significantly, obscures the broader potential of behaviourally-informed policies and the substantial trade-offs involved in their implementation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    E.g., Camerer et al. 2003; Glaeser 2006; Klick and Mitchell 2006; Rachlinski 2006; Sunstein and Thaler 2003; Zamir 1998.

  2. 2.

    E.g., Bubb and Pildes 2015; Sibony and Alemanno 2015; Willis 2013.

  3. 3.

    Bernheim 2009; Spiegler 2015.

  4. 4.

    Hausman and Welch 2010; Maloberti 2012.

  5. 5.

    Bovens 2010; Conly 2012; Hausman and Welch 2010; White 2013.

  6. 6.

    Glaeser 2006; Johnson et al. 2012.

  7. 7.

    Mitchell 2005; Mongin and Cozic 2014; Rebonato 2014.

  8. 8.

    Bernheim 2009, Wright and Ginsberg 2012.

  9. 9.

    Mitchell 2005; Wright and Ginsberg 2012; Rebonato 2014; Baldwin 2015.

  10. 10.

    Mitchell 2005; Menard 2010.

  11. 11.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 6.

  12. 12.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 3.

  13. 13.

    Hausman 1992.

  14. 14.

    Tor 2002, 2008.

  15. 15.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5.

  16. 16.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5.

  17. 17.

    Posner 2010.

  18. 18.

    At best, successful nudging diminishes individuals’ deviations from rationality , helping them to overcome their errors of judgment or choice and thereby promotes their rationality in fact. Effective nudging, however, may lead people to avoid the consequences of their bounded rationality and therefore appear as if they were more rational even without facilitating their rationality in fact, an important distinction that is outside the scope of the present analysis.

  19. 19.

    Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5.

  20. 20.

    Although technically, Nudge’s definitions may be read to allow the shaping of preferences , so long as such interventions do not literally constrain choice or affect economic incentives.

  21. 21.

    Note that this analysis concerns the goals of nudging and stands irrespective of the fact that rational employees would be indifferent to the savings default and save exactly as much as needed to achieve their self-judged goals. After all, boundedly rational employees may be nudged by the default irrespective of their self-judgments of well-being .

  22. 22.

    Bubb and Pildes 2014.

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Tor, A. (2016). The Critical and Problematic Role of Bounded Rationality in Nudging. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) Nudging - Possibilities, Limitations and Applications in European Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29562-6_1

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